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13 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
14 **CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

15 MARK COMBS, VLAD IACOB, and  
16 BENJAMIN NORTHEY, Individually and  
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,

17 Plaintiffs,

18 v.

19 SAFEMOON LLC, SAFEMOON US, LLC,  
20 SAFEMOON CONNECT, LLC,  
SAFEMOON LTD, SAFEMOON  
21 PROTOCOL LTD, SAFEMOON MEDIA  
GROUP LTD, BRADEN JOHN KARONY,  
22 JACK HAINES-DAVIES, RYAN  
ARRIAGA, SHAUN WITRIOL, HENRY  
23 "HANK" WYATT, JAKE PAUL, DAVID  
PORTNOY, KYLE NAGY, DeANDRE  
24 CORTEZ WAY, BEN PHILLIPS, MILES  
PARKS McCOLLUM, and DANIEL M.  
25 KEEM,

26 Defendants.  
27  
28

Case No. 2:22-cv-01108-SVW-  
MRW

**SECURITIES CLASS ACTION  
CONSOLIDATED  
COMPLAINT**

**DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**





1 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (see Dkt. #40-1), Plaintiff Northey  
2 purchased SAFEMOON Tokens during the Relevant Period and suffered investment  
3 losses as a result of Defendants' conduct.

4 ***Defendants***

5 9. Defendant SafeMoon LLC is a privately held company with its  
6 headquarters located at 364 N 500 E, Provo, Utah 84606.

7 10. Defendant SafeMoon US, LLC is a privately held company with its  
8 headquarters located at 1022 W 2200 N. Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062.

9 11. Defendant SafeMoon Connect, LLC is a privately held company with  
10 its headquarters located at 1022 W 2200 N. Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062.

11 12. Defendant Tano LLC is a privately held company with its headquarters  
12 located at 1022 W 2200 N. Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062.

13 13. Defendant SafeMoon LTD is a privately held company that was  
14 incorporated on April 8, 2021, with its headquarters located at 20-22, Wenlock Road,  
15 London, England, N1 7GU.<sup>1</sup>

16 14. Defendant SafeMoon Protocol LTD is a privately held company, that  
17 was incorporated on April 8, 2021 with its headquarters located at 20-22, Wenlock  
18 Road, London, England, N1 7GU.

19  
20  
21  
22 <sup>1</sup> The only listed director and shareholder for the SafeMoon entities in the  
23 United Kingdom is an Italian national, Castiliano Foini. Publicly available  
24 information about Foini and the UK entities is limited. However, a search of the  
25 UK's government's company information website indicates that a now-dissolved  
26 privately held company, Target Company Development Ltd (Company #  
27 12420163), was located at the same address as the SafeMoon UK entities. Notably,  
28 that company's only director and shareholder was Braden John Karony's mother,  
Jennifer Diane Karony ("Mrs. Karony). Similarly, according to bankruptcy filings  
submitted by Mrs. Karony and her husband (Karony's father, Bradford J. Karony)  
in 2013, the Karony family home is listed as 364 N. 500 East Provo, UT 84606. See  
Summary of Schedules – Amended, Schedule C – Property Claimed, Karony, 13-  
13777-BFK (E.D. Va. Oct. 8, 2012). This is the same address for the SafeMoon  
LLC entity. Upon information and belief, Karony, with the aid of his parents, set up  
the Company's corporate structure in a purposefully complex manner to hide the  
ownership interests in the various SafeMoon-affiliated entities in the U.S. and UK.

1 15. Defendant SafeMoon Media Group LTD is a privately held company,  
2 that was incorporated on June 28, 2021, with its headquarters located at The Terrace  
3 5th Floor, 76 Wardour Street, London, United Kingdom, W1F 0UR.

4 16. Defendant Braden John Karony (“Karony”) is a resident and citizen of  
5 Utah, living in Provo, Utah. Karony serves as the Company’s CEO, and he exercised  
6 control over SafeMoon and directed and/or authorized, directly or indirectly, the sale  
7 and/or solicitations of SAFEMOON Tokens to the public.

8 17. Defendant Jack Haines-Davies (“Haines-Davies”) is a resident and  
9 citizen of the United Kingdom, living in London, England. Haines-Davies serves as  
10 the Company’s Chief Operating Officer (“COO”).

11 18. Defendant Ryan Arriaga (“Arriaga”) is a resident and citizen of  
12 California, living in Elk Grove, California. Arriaga has served as the Company  
13 Global Head of Products since July 2021.

14 19. Defendant Shaun Witriol (“Witriol”) is a resident and citizen of  
15 California, living in San Diego, California. Witriol served as a representative for the  
16 Company.

17 20. Defendant Henry “Hank” Wyatt (“Wyatt”) is a resident and citizen of  
18 Pennsylvania, living in Shippensburg, Pennsylvania. Wyatt served as the  
19 Company’s Chief Technology Officer and Vice President of Research and  
20 Development.

21 21. Defendant Kyle Nagy (“Nagy”) is a resident and citizen of Florida,  
22 living in Vero Beach, Florida. Nagy was the founder of the Company and served as  
23 lead developer of the SAFEMOON Token.

24 22. Defendant Thomas Smith (“Smith”) is a resident and citizen of New  
25 Hampshire, living in Conway, New Hampshire. Smith served as the Company’s  
26 Chief Blockchain Officer.

27 23. Defendants Karony, Nagy, Smith, Haines-Davies, Arriaga, Witriol, and  
28 Wyatt are collectively referred to as the “Executive Defendants.”

24. Defendant Jake Paul (“Paul”) is a resident and citizen of California, living in Calabasas, California. Paul acted as a promotor for the Company and the SAFEMOON Tokens.

25. Defendant David Portnoy (“Portnoy”) is a resident and citizen of New York, living in New York, New York. Portnoy acted as a promotor for the Company and the SAFEMOON Tokens.

26. Defendant DeAndre “Souja Boy” Cortez Way (“Way”) is a resident and citizen of California, living in Bell Canyon, California. Way acted as a promotor for SafeMoon and the SAFEMOON Tokens.

27. Defendant Ben Phillips (“Phillips”) is a resident and citizen of the United Kingdom, living in Wales, United Kingdom. Phillips acted as a promotor for the Company and the SAFEMOON Tokens.

28. Defendant Miles “Lil Yachty” Parks McCollum (“McCollum”) is a resident and citizen of Georgia, living in Smyrna, Georgia. McCollum acted as a promotor for the Company and the SAFEMOON Tokens.

29. Defendant Daniel M. Keem (“Keem”) is a resident and citizen of New York, living in Buffalo, New York. Keem acted as a promotor for the Company and the SAFEMOON Tokens.

30. Defendants Paul, Portnoy, Way, Phillips, McCollum, and Keem are collectively referred to as the “Promotor Defendants.”

### **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

31. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to §27 of the Exchange Act, 15 USC §78aa, §22 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §77(v), and 28 U.S.C. §1331. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367.

32. This Court may exercise jurisdiction over Defendants because they have continuous and systematic contacts with this District, do substantial business in this State and within this District, and engage in unlawful practices in this District

1 as described in this Complaint, so as to subject themselves to personal jurisdiction  
2 in this District, thus rendering the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court proper and  
3 necessary.

4 33. Venue is proper in this judicial District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b)  
5 because certain Defendants live and/or conduct business in this District, therefore, a  
6 substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims alleged herein  
7 occurred in this District.

## 8 **FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

### 9 **Growth of the Crypto Sector**

10 34. A crypto-asset is a digital asset designed to work as a medium of  
11 exchange or a store of value or both. Crypto-assets leverage a variety of  
12 cryptographic principles to secure transactions, control the creation of additional  
13 units, and verify the transfer of the underlying digital assets.

14 35. Created in 2009, Bitcoin was the world's first decentralized crypto-  
15 asset.<sup>2</sup> With a current market capitalization of approximately \$580 billion, Bitcoin  
16 is also the largest and most popular crypto-asset. Bitcoin spawned a market of other  
17 crypto-assets that, together with Bitcoin, have a current market capitalization of  
18 \$1.3 trillion.

19 36. One of the main features that Bitcoin popularized was the use of a  
20 distributed ledger to track the ownership and transfer of every Bitcoin in existence.  
21 This distributed ledger is known as a blockchain. Blockchains are a central technical  
22 commonality across most crypto-assets. While each blockchain may be subject to  
23 different technical rules and permissions based on the preferences of its creators,  
24 they are typically designed to achieve a form of decentralization.

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25  
26  
27 <sup>2</sup> Bitcoin and other crypto-assets are also commonly referred to as  
28 "cryptocurrencies" regardless of whether they are commodities (as the term implies)  
or securities.



1       37.       There are two main ways to obtain crypto-assets. One way is to be part  
2 of the framework of incentives to validate the transactions on the blockchain, under  
3 either a “Proof of Work” or “Proof of Stake” scheme. Users who expend resources  
4 to validate the blockchain get rewarded with newly minted tokens. This process is  
5 colloquially referred to as “mining” for Proof of Work blockchains or “validating”  
6 for Proof of Stake blockchains.

7       38.       A second and more common way to obtain crypto-assets is to acquire  
8 them from someone else. This often involves acquiring them through online crypto-  
9 asset exchanges. These exchanges are similar to traditional exchanges in that they  
10 provide a convenient marketplace to match buyers and sellers of virtual currencies.

11       39.       Bitcoin, for a time, was the only crypto-asset available on exchanges.  
12 As crypto-assets grew in popularity, however, exchanges began listing other crypto-  
13 assets as well and trading volumes expanded. In early 2013, daily Bitcoin trading  
14 volumes hovered between \$1 million and \$25 million. By the end of 2017, daily  
15 Bitcoin trading volumes ranged between \$200 million and \$3.8 billion, and reached  
16 over \$80 billion in 2022.

17       40.       Ethereum is the second-most popular crypto-asset, with a market  
18 capitalization of approximately \$250 billion. Ethereum was designed to enable  
19 “smart contract” functionality. A smart contract is a program that verifies and  
20 enforces the negotiation or performance of a contract. Smart contracts can be self-  
21 executing and self-enforcing, which theoretically reduces the transaction costs  
22 associated with traditional contracting.

23       41.       For example, a smart contract enables two parties to submit ether to a  
24 secure destination and automatically distribute the ether at the end of the month  
25 without any third-party action. The smart contract self-executes with instructions  
26 written in its code which get executed when the specified conditions are met. Since  
27 Ethereum first introduced the concept of smart contracts, many other companies  
28



1 have sought to create crypto-assets that improve on and compete with Ethereum in  
2 the smart contract ecosystem.

3 42. Interest in crypto-assets began to accelerate towards the end of 2016,  
4 with prices growing at a rate historically unprecedented for any asset class. Over  
5 the course of 2017 alone, Bitcoin's price increased from approximately \$1,000 to  
6 approximately \$20,000. On January 1, 2017, Ethereum was trading at  
7 approximately \$8 per ether. Approximately one year later, it was trading at over  
8 \$1,400 per ether – a return of approximately 17,000 percent over that period.

9 43. This enthusiasm for crypto-assets prompted many entrepreneurs to  
10 raise funds through initial coin offerings ("ICOs"). Between 2017 and 2018, ICOs  
11 raised nearly \$20 billion. None of these ICOs was registered with the Securities  
12 Exchange Commission ("SEC").

13 44. Token issuers typically released a "whitepaper" describing the project  
14 and terms of the ICO. These whitepapers advertise the sale of tokens or coins  
15 through the ICO. The whitepapers typically contained vastly less information than  
16 a registration statement filed with the SEC would usually include. For example,  
17 whitepapers do not typically include a "plain English" description of the offering; a  
18 list of key risk factors; a description of important information and incentives  
19 concerning management; warnings about relying on forward-looking statements; an  
20 explanation of how the proceeds from the offering will be used; or a standardized  
21 format that investors can readily follow.

22 45. More recently, another trend concerning crypto-assets has boomed.  
23 Over the past few years, the popularity of decentralized finance, known as "DeFi,"  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

1 has exploded.<sup>3</sup> DeFi “is an emerging financial technology based on secure  
2 distributed ledgers similar to those used by cryptocurrencies.”<sup>4</sup>

3 46. One increasingly popular application of DeFi is decentralized  
4 exchanges – crypto-asset exchanges that “facilitate peer-to-peer trading by relying  
5 on automated smart contracts to execute trades without an intermediary.”<sup>5</sup>  
6 Decentralized exchanges commonly rely on “liquidity pools,” which provide “a  
7 mechanism by which users can pool their assets” in a decentralized exchange’s  
8 “smart contracts to provide asset liquidity for traders to swap between currencies.”<sup>6</sup>  
9 Specifically, a “liquidity pool is a crowdsourced pool of cryptocurrencies or tokens  
10 locked in a smart contract that is used to facilitate trades between the assets on a  
11 decentralized exchange.”<sup>7</sup>

12 47. In a liquidity pool, users “called liquidity providers (LP) add an equal  
13 value of two tokens in a pool to create a market. In exchange for providing their  
14 funds, they earn trading fees from the trades that happen in their pool, proportional  
15 to their share of the total liquidity.”<sup>8</sup> For traders, liquidity pools provide a market  
16 for exchanging one type of crypto-asset for another.

17  
18 <sup>3</sup> Natalie Zhang, *How decentralized finance works, and why it’s taking on Wall*  
19 *Street*, CNBC (Sep. 17, 2021), [https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/17/how-](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/17/how-decentralized-finance-works-and-why-its-taking-on-wall-street.html)  
[decentralized-finance-works-and-why-its-taking-on-wall-street.html](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/17/how-decentralized-finance-works-and-why-its-taking-on-wall-street.html).

20 <sup>4</sup> Rakesh Sharma, *Decentralized Finance (DeFi) Definition*, Investopedia, (Jun.  
21 26, 2022), [https://www.investopedia.com/decentralized-finance-defi-](https://www.investopedia.com/decentralized-finance-defi-5113835#:~:text=Decentralized%20finance%20(DeFi)%20is%20an,financial%20products%2C%20and%20financial%20services.)  
[5113835#:~:text=](https://www.investopedia.com/decentralized-finance-defi-5113835#:~:text=Decentralized%20finance%20(DeFi)%20is%20an,financial%20products%2C%20and%20financial%20services.)  
[Decentralized%20finance%20\(DeFi\)%20is%20an,financial%20products%2C%20a](https://www.investopedia.com/decentralized-finance-defi-5113835#:~:text=Decentralized%20finance%20(DeFi)%20is%20an,financial%20products%2C%20and%20financial%20services.)  
[nd%20financial%20services.](https://www.investopedia.com/decentralized-finance-defi-5113835#:~:text=Decentralized%20finance%20(DeFi)%20is%20an,financial%20products%2C%20and%20financial%20services.)

22 <sup>5</sup> [https://www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/decentralized-exchange-dex-crypto#](https://www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/decentralized-exchange-dex-crypto#section-decentralized-exchanges-vs-centralized-exchanges)  
23 [section-decentralized-exchanges-vs-centralized-exchanges](https://www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/decentralized-exchange-dex-crypto#section-decentralized-exchanges-vs-centralized-exchanges). (last visited Jun. 28,  
24 2022).

25 <sup>6</sup> [https://www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/what-is-a-liquidity-pool-crypto-market-](https://www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/what-is-a-liquidity-pool-crypto-market-liquidity#section-the-role-of-crypto-liquidity-pools-in-de-fi)  
[liquidity#section-the-role-of-crypto-liquidity-pools-in-de-fi](https://www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/what-is-a-liquidity-pool-crypto-market-liquidity#section-the-role-of-crypto-liquidity-pools-in-de-fi). (last visited Jun. 28,  
26 2022).

27 <sup>7</sup> [https://www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/what-is-a-liquidity-pool-crypto-market-](https://www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/what-is-a-liquidity-pool-crypto-market-liquidity#section-the-role-of-crypto-liquidity-pools-in-de-fi)  
[liquidity#section-the-role-of-crypto-liquidity-pools-in-de-fi](https://www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/what-is-a-liquidity-pool-crypto-market-liquidity#section-the-role-of-crypto-liquidity-pools-in-de-fi). (last visited Jun. 28,  
28 2022).

<sup>8</sup> <https://academy.binance.com/en/articles/what-are-liquidity-pools-in-defi>.  
(last visited Jun. 28, 2022).

**SafeMoon Background**

48. The SAFEMOON Token is a speculative digital token created in March 2021 by a group of cryptocurrency developers and investors, including, but not limited to, the Executive Defendants.

49. A “token” is a financial product that is contractually based (via a “smart” contract) and is created and uploaded permanently to a given blockchain.<sup>9</sup> When investors purchase these products/contracts on a given blockchain, their expectation is that the general buying, selling, and exchanging of these tokens will function according to the terms of the original smart contract and in a manner similar to other tokens on the same blockchain. Thus, when a token owner transfers assets from one wallet address to another new wallet address, on the same blockchain, the owner reasonably expects that those assets will actually be transferred to the new wallet address. This expectation is much like an industry standard in that the same expectation applies to all current blockchains and tokens, not just the SafeMoon blockchain.

50. The SAFEMOON Tokens in particular are blockchain-based digital assets known as “BEP-20 tokens” that are created using the Binance Smart Chain mainnet blockchain. After a BEP-20 token is created, it can be traded, spent, or otherwise transacted with.

51. The name “SafeMoon” is derived from the phrase, “Safely To The Moon,” which suggests that the token is meant not to rise only but to rise safely.<sup>10</sup>

52. In the beginning of 2021, Nagy began working as primary developer (“dev”) of the SAFEMOON Tokens. Shortly thereafter, Nagy recruited another developer, Thomas (“Papa”) Smith, to assist in the development the SAFEMOON

<sup>9</sup> A “blockchain” refers to a decentralized, digital database that stores transactions and other forms of data.

<sup>10</sup> Benjamin Godfrey, *What is SafeMoon and can the crypto newcomer reach the moon?*, FORKAST (Nov. 26, 2021), <https://forkast.news/what-is-safemoon-crypto-can-it-reach-the-moon/>.

1 Tokens. Together, Nagy and Smith wrote the code for SafeMoon smart contract and  
2 Protocol Deployer wallet that eventually launched the digital asset, SAFEMOON  
3 Token. During this process, Nagy was able to disperse significant amounts of the  
4 SAFEMOON Tokens (worth hundreds of millions of dollars) to various undisclosed  
5 wallets under his or Smith's control.<sup>11</sup> He nevertheless promised investors from the  
6 outset: "no rug is possible. #safemoon join us on our journey safely to the moon."

7 53. Nagy and Smith eventually met with Karony and Haines-Davies to  
8 discuss a partnership for the sale of the SAFEMOON Tokens. Nagy and Smith  
9 would continue to work as the developers of the SAFEMOON Tokens, while Karony  
10 and Haines-Davies would operate as the fledgling company's management and  
11 marketing team. Smith was also tasked with using his public profile to market the  
12 SAFEMOON Tokens. Nagy, however, purposefully chose to hide his identity,  
13 operating publicly under the handle of "SafeMoonDev" instead.

14 54. In the early days of the Company's formation in March 2021, Karony  
15 held a meeting with Witriol wherein Witriol indicated his interest in being a part of  
16 the SafeMoon team. According to Witriol, at the end of the meeting, Karony  
17 welcomed him onto the SafeMoon team, saying "You're in."<sup>12</sup>

18 55. Witriol also publicly stated that he has been a part of SafeMoon since  
19 "day one or day two."<sup>13</sup> According to Karony, "There's individuals who took the  
20  
21  
22

23 <sup>11</sup> These wallets are a part of a larger interconnected web of cryptocurrency  
24 wallets that repeatedly interact with one another. Upon information and belief,  
25 Nagy's Deployer Wallet is at the center of this web, and he transferred millions of  
26 dollars-worth of SAFEMOON Tokens from this wallet to these undisclosed wallets,  
for the purpose of selling the SAFEMOON Tokens later, as a part of the scheme  
alleged herein. See [https://miro.com/app/board/o9J\\_lx5kv5k=?MoveToWidget=3074457363957861693&cot=14](https://miro.com/app/board/o9J_lx5kv5k=?MoveToWidget=3074457363957861693&cot=14).

27 <sup>12</sup> Witriol, *SafeMoon LIVE: Shaun Witriol ON BLOCKCHAIN, FUTURE,*  
*PRICE, AND MORE!*, YouTube (June 5, 2021), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HBiY2SIQCqw>.

28 <sup>13</sup> *Id.*

1 risk early on and acquired SAFEMOON Tokens and now they are reaping their  
2 benefit . . . it's kinda like with Apple in the early days.”<sup>14</sup>

3 56. The Company's “core” team consisted of Karony, as the CEO; Haines-  
4 Davies, as the COO; Wyatt, as the CTO; Smith, as the Chief Blockchain Officer;  
5 Trevor Church, the Community Manager; Witriol, as a part of the online marketing  
6 team (also with Smith and Haines-Davies); and Jacob Smith, as another developer.<sup>15</sup>

7 57. On March 8, 2021, the Executive Defendants launched the  
8 SAFEMOON Tokens with a transaction volume of \$149,427 and a price of  
9 \$0.0000000004, according to data from CoinMarketCap.

10 58. “SafeMoon deployed with 1 quadrillion tokens (15 zeroes) and  
11 perpetually burns supply, alluding to rising scarcity. . . . [As of May 19, 2021],  
12 there's roughly 584 trillion SAFE in circulation (after 223 trillion went to “devs”),  
13 which means it's currently burning 2.9 trillion [SAFEMOON Tokens] per day on  
14 average.”<sup>16</sup>

15 59. The tokens reserved for the “devs” were sent to wallet addresses owned  
16 and/or controlled.

17 60. The following are some of the wallet addresses, upon information and  
18 belief, that are owned/controlled by various Executive Defendants and were used  
19 both to fraudulently transfer and/or sell SAFEMOON Tokens during the Relevant  
20 Period and to otherwise extract value out of the Safemoon liquidity pool, which is  
21 described in more detail below:

22 a. Karony

- 23 • 0xd51d1d5503dcff819e214faa66c3b6f0ebb06abe

24  
25 <sup>14</sup> Protos Staff. *FBI ties and Ponzi games – here's what SafeMoon doesn't want*  
26 *you to know*, PROTOS (May 19, 2021), <https://protos.com/safemoon-fbi-ties-ponzi-games-crypto-protocol-dave-portnoy-shill/>.

27 <sup>15</sup> *Altcoin Overview: What is SafeMoon? And is it Actually a Safe Investment?*,  
28 MINTDICE (Nov. 11, 2021), <https://mintdice.medium.com/altcoin-overview-what-is-safemoon-and-is-it-actually-a-safe-investment-a8e23ea27b2c>.

<sup>16</sup> *Id.*

- 0x666cfedc8455886f4fd606cacac0c1f6fdea0984
- 0x35Abddd20Be12C385C4961E28513e6b27967Ae4C
- 0x82B7503bFfD8aEa31AEa5EE14fB01959191Af45B
- 0x0514a89b8bac595e323603cc3c0a1cb765e99eb2
- 0xcb6b64740e60e107e15f78384a68c1a954afb9bd
- 0x7be8076f4ea4a4ad08075c2508e481d6c946d12b

b. Nagy

- 0xa121d56d44be198f010ad55b88cd2161cfe2273c
- 0xe266c8e4afc8a06ad0707597f736272e694323e0
- 0xf8e645a4540f4a20037a76a9348161f8b86d94ec
- 0xbd96898865929cb5c5d883c3162d1b3510a2ce73
- 0xC95063D946242f26074A76C8A2E94c9D735dfc78
- 0x819c9853eb5b1f164bd026a96cca9a9acdccc23
- 0xe281d781cceb1a89b2a19296fd834d262ddf288e
- 0xb254fa1b023e9a430d5e85219979c8457da3ce2f
- 0x43d809fde541922658e4ba84e95e80a37e6dc1c4
- 0xda9a0aa8c78c356c5007602d70a7fec5329f3399
- 0x08c922033588028b3597c9df4c9afbd2ca3da2eb
- 0xc13a6d7c9718b7a09affd9bd300bb2c4a5a37135
- 0xcd67f7e01e13e21c1c78da396d74120a82e4ca14
- 0x244d5cfdd0b6082eed6d8e7070419a97c5545240
- 0x1dcda7d1e407c03cfb9da602aeebe4a46449fe88
- 0xc86f1479cc87c7fc9338a0696360a16a3cd1034b

c. Smith


- 0x05d1c1defa31c257d3206f2af99aa16dbbf05d46
- 0x5c0c255516423b64b21e5a2c7aaa8ab6bf3d0d91
- 0x79c4af7c43f500b9ccba9396d079cc03dfcafda1
- 0x293dae9e9c468c32efe98cab95e81e8af516c2a7

- 0xaed9589d4be340a5410881310f1eee576911af8f
- 0xba8a7a205ad0804747b3d64acd93880c9e653b5d
- 0xfd7260b8f94b2da1d65b231f0e3bfc42cec98e76
- 0xc1c550ebc5b16647214575ce3970a14ee6c3e062

d. Wyatt

- 0x02de75df6F7F607Cba6AJc1140B3A7dD672badA

61. Karony received SAFEMOON Tokens from both Nagy and later the liquidity pool itself in the wallet addresses under his ownership and/or control including, but not limited to, Wallet Address 0xd51d1d5503dcff819e214faa66c3b6f0ebb06abe (Karony Wallet 1). According to Karony, this was his wallet by way of Tano (which is owned by Karony):<sup>17</sup>



62. As discussed further below, the Karony Wallet 1 received millions of dollars' worth of digital assets from the crypto exchange Bitmart. These digital assets came from the transaction fees charged by Bitmart, which were supposed to fund the Safemoon liquidity pool, but instead were rerouted to Karony Wallet 1.

63. In addition, starting on March 5, 2021, and in the months that followed, Nagy withdrew millions of dollars in total from Safemoon's liquidity pool. Neither the Company nor the Executive Defendants ever disclosed Nagy's or Karony's misappropriation of funds. Indeed, as explained below, it was not until April 2022 that investors learned of this misconduct.

64. SAFEMOON Tokens were first made available to investors on a decentralized cryptocurrency exchange, PancakeSwap.

<sup>17</sup> [https://twitter.com/papacthulu/status/1521169641783152642?s=20&t=I7PnptkNxfP9yC4\\_Yhrqng](https://twitter.com/papacthulu/status/1521169641783152642?s=20&t=I7PnptkNxfP9yC4_Yhrqng).



65. At the time of launch, and throughout the Class Period, the SAFEMOON Tokens were sold pursuant to a three-page “whitepaper” titled, “SafeMoon: A Deflationary Reflection Token with Automated Liquidity Acquisition.”<sup>18</sup> Whitepapers in cryptocurrency are documents released by the founders of the project that are supposed to give investors technical information about its concept, and a roadmap for how it plans to grow and succeed, serving essentially the same purpose as a registration statement.

66. The SafeMoon whitepaper described, among other things, how the favorable “tokenomics” for SAFEMOON Tokens “may afford far superior benefits” to investors.

67. First, the Company outlined its goal to “solve the problems of prior cryptocurrencies including mining rewards, farming rewards, and liquidity provisioning” by providing “an easy alternative to mining rewards” in the form of “allowing users to participate in a smart contract token reflection to produce tokens inside their own wallet.” Additionally, the Company pointed to the challenge of “maintain[ing] liquidity on decentralized exchanges” and proposed “utilizing a smart contract function to automatically capture liquidity to be used on the decentralized exchanges and held in custody independent from user possession.”

68. Finally, the SafeMoon whitepaper makes the following statements about the burn of the SAFEMOON Tokens:

[A] smart contract that provides the capability to burn tokens can promote scarcity by reducing the total supply. Together, the combination of these tokenomics may afford far superior benefits for the community within the decentralized venue. Allowing these functions to be amplified and dependent on volume provides an ideal incentive to expedite adoption and foster new use cases. . . .

\* \* \*

<sup>18</sup> <https://safemoon.net/whitepaper.pdf> (last visited Feb. 28, 2022).

1 In a decentralized smart chain environment, contract functions can be  
2 utilized to achieve token scarcity. To do this, we propose also  
3 distributing rewards to the burn address, which is publicly verifiable for  
4 all participants to see. We can then track the depreciating supply in  
5 real-time for added transparency. In our effort to establish a baseline  
6 token burn rate, we find that these values are dependent on three  
7 important factors: reflection rate, token quantity, and market volume.  
8 The rate of reflection rewards is proportional to the total supply in each  
9 holder's wallet address.<sup>19</sup>

10 69. In plain terms, the Company's purported purposes are the same as any  
11 other company trying to sell its financial products to investors: offer dividend-like  
12 "reflection" rewards for investors that hold the SAFEMOON Tokens (holders are  
13 charged a transaction fee of about 5%, which is distributed among the SAFEMOON  
14 Token holders); ensure that there is enough liquidity for SAFEMOON Tokens to be  
15 traded on exchanges; and minimize dilution of the Company's market cap.  
16 Furthermore, like other decentralized finance projects, the Company depends on:

17 a liquidity pool to encourage holders to "stake" tokens to acquire more  
18 – similar to a bond that matures, but with a volatile crypto. What  
19 SafeMoon claims to do differently is distribute what it calls "static  
20 rewards" to its now 2 million holders. Static rewards push to alleviate  
21 downward sell pressure from earlier adopters, who are inclined to dump  
22 their tokens once yield falls. SafeMoon's static rewards are, more or  
23 less, a system that penalizes buyers for anything but holding their  
24 tokens. Anyone that sends SafeMoon to another wallet is "charged" a  
25 10% fee – half is burned and the rest given to other holders.<sup>20</sup>

27 <sup>19</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>20</sup> *See* fn.14, *supra*.

1 70. In addition to the three-page whitepaper described above, the Company  
2 also marketed and sold SAFEMOON Tokens pursuant to a longer whitepaper,  
3 published before the Tokens publicly launched (the “Long Whitepaper”). The Long  
4 Whitepaper is consistent with the shorter whitepaper but provides additional detail  
5 and an even rosier description of the prospect of the price of SAFEMOON Tokens.

6 71. Indeed, the Long Whitepaper – alluding to the price increases implicit  
7 in the name “SafeMoon” – is littered with space-themed imagery, including a full-  
8 page picture of an astronaut on the cover page.<sup>21</sup> The Long Whitepaper explains that  
9 the protocol on which the SAFEMOON Token is designed “to drive the price to  
10 stratospheric all time highs” through so-called static rewards that “encourage[]  
11 holders to hang onto their tokens,” and thus to discourage selling.

12 72. According to the Long Whitepaper, the SAFEMOON Token’s protocol  
13 “employs 3 simple functions: Reflection + LP acquisition + Burn.” Each time a  
14 SAFEMOON Token is traded, “the transaction is taxed a 10% fee.” SafeMoon has  
15 stated that the purpose of this “tax” is to “encourage long-term holding” by  
16 disincentivizing existing tokenholders from selling their SAFEMOON Tokens.

17 73. Of the 10% taxed from each transaction, half is purportedly transferred  
18 by SafeMoon into liquidity pools containing BNB, Binance’s token, and  
19 SAFEMOON Tokens. Specifically, of the 5% that is purportedly allocated to  
20 liquidity pools, 2.5% is sold by SafeMoon on the market for BNB. That BNB is  
21 placed into liquidity pools along with the remaining 2.5% of the SAFEMOON  
22 Tokens. The purpose of the liquidity pools, according to the Long Whitepaper, is to  
23 “support[] the price floor of the token.”

24 74. The remaining 5% generated from SafeMoon’s 10% tax is  
25 “redistributed to all existing holders” by SafeMoon. These payments are referred to  
26

27  
28 <sup>21</sup> <https://whitepaper.io/document/694/safemoon-whitepaper>. (last visited Jun.  
28, 2022).

1 as “Reflections.” Arriaga has publicly compared these Reflections to stock  
2 dividends.

3 75. Critically, as explained in a separate whitepaper issued by SafeMoon  
4 (the “Short Whitepaper”), Reflections would be allocated pro rata among all  
5 tokenholders, including a “burn address,” *i.e.*, an address containing SAFEMOON  
6 Tokens that would be removed from circulation.<sup>22</sup> The Long Whitepaper explained  
7 that, at launch, the total supply of SAFEMOON Tokens would be one quadrillion,  
8 but 223 trillion would be allocated to the “burn address.” As a result, at the outset,  
9 approximately 22% of all Reflections generated from each SAFEMOON Token  
10 transaction would be paid to the “burn address” and removed from circulation.

11 76. Because a certain percentage of each SAFEMOON Token transacted is  
12 “burned,” the supply of SAFEMOON is designed to decrease over time. Moreover,  
13 the protocol underlying SAFEMOON Tokens is designed to permit SafeMoon to  
14 engage in “manual burns” of SAFEMOON Tokens, meaning that SafeMoon can  
15 unilaterally destroy SAFEMOON Tokens, and thus reduce supply at will.  
16 According to the Long Whitepaper, “with the manual burn function and a  
17 depreciating supply, even a small holder at the beginning could potentially walk  
18 away with big money at the end of the token’s lifespan.” Indeed, immediately  
19 following that sentence, the Long Whitepaper includes a graph comparing supply  
20 and price, and showing that price rises steadily as supply decreases. The  
21 unmistakable intended inference is that the price of SAFEMOON Tokens will  
22 increase as the supply decreases over time.

23 77. Not only does the Long Whitepaper suggest that the price of  
24 SAFEMOON Tokens will increase over time, it claims that SafeMoon has a “Step-  
25 by-Step Plan to Ensure 100% Safety.” At step 1, “Dev Burned All Tokens in Dev  
26 Wallet Prior to Launch.” At step 2, there is a “Fair Launch on DxSale.” At step 3,  
27

28 <sup>22</sup> <https://safemoon.com/whitepaper.pdf>. (last visited Jun. 28, 2022).

1 the “LP Locked on DxLocker for 4 years.” At step 4, “LP Generated With Every  
2 Trade & Locked on Pancake.”

3 78. The latter two steps indicate that SAFEMOON Tokens placed into the  
4 liquidity pools cannot be withdrawn by SafeMoon for a period of four years. Indeed,  
5 shortly after launching the SAFEMOON Tokens, SafeMoon similarly represented  
6 on its Twitter page that it had “locked” the liquidity pools, stating on March 19:  
7 “The moon just became even more #SAFU. Now completed is the 4 year lock on  
8 the second LP. We now have 2 locked LP expiring on May 1, 2025.” According to  
9 Binance Academy, “SAFU” stands for the Secure Asset Fund for Users and is used  
10 colloquially to mean “funds are safe.”<sup>23</sup>

11 79. The upshot from the foregoing marketing materials is that: (i) the  
12 supply of SAFEMOON Tokens will continually decrease; (ii) the price of  
13 SAFEMOON Tokens will increase as that supply decreases; and (iii) the Company  
14 will ensure that a market for trading SAFEMOON Tokens exists in the form of  
15 locked liquidity pools. In other words, an investor who buys and holds SAFEMOON  
16 Tokens will be rewarded with profits.

17 80. On the Company’s website, there is a “buying guide” section that shows  
18 investors how to purchase the SAFEMOON Tokens in four steps. Notably, only  
19 steps one to three have actual instructions on the mechanics of acquiring  
20 SAFEMOON Tokens. Step four in its entirety states: “HODL! All that’s left now  
21 is to HODL and see your balance grow from reflections!”<sup>24</sup>

22 81. Unlike some crypto-assets that have a real-world purpose (known as  
23 “utility tokens”), SAFEMOON Tokens have no real-world purpose. Nasdaq, for  
24 example, has noted: “[I]t doesn’t have any use cases or advantages over other  
25  
26

27 <sup>23</sup> <https://academy.binance.com/en/glossary/secure-asset-fund-for-users>. (last  
28 visited Jun. 28, 2022).

<sup>24</sup> <https://safemoon.net/buy> (last visited Feb. 28, 2022).

cryptocurrencies.”<sup>25</sup> Others have likewise observed that “Safemoon has no particular use.”<sup>26</sup>

82. In addition, in contrast to decentralized crypto-assets like ether, 50% or more of SAFEMOON Tokens are owned by SafeMoon itself.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, as of early March 2022, the ten largest holders controlled nearly 30% of the supply of SAFEMOON tokens.<sup>28</sup>

83. As of early March 2022, the Company had two products.<sup>29</sup> The first is a wallet, called the SafeMoon Wallet, which provides a “secure place to store and trade your SafeMoon.” The second is the “SafeMoon Protocol Contract.” SafeMoon’s website indicates that SafeMoon plans to launch two additional products in the future, a “hardware ‘cold’ wallet for safely storing and using your crypto” and an “exchange” that “will bring tokenomics to all of crypto on its platform.”

84. The SafeMoon Protocol Contract is the software on which the SAFEMOON Token runs. The Company is responsible for writing, maintaining, modifying, and implementing that software. For example, in May 2021, CertiK performed an audit of the software. In response to certain critiques and flaws identified by the auditors, SafeMoon indicated the extent to which it would modify code and make other changes to address those critiques and flaws, thereby demonstrating its control over that software.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> <https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/8-things-to-know-before-you-buy-safemoon-2021-07-10> (last visited Jun. 28, 2022).

<sup>26</sup> <https://forkast.news/what-is-safemoon-crypto-can-it-reach-the-moon/> (last visited Jun. 28, 2022).

<sup>27</sup> <https://www.business-powerhouse.com/what-is-safemoon-and-why-is-it-taking-crypto-market-by-storm> (last visited Jun. 28, 2022).

<sup>28</sup> <https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/safemoon/holders/> (last visited Jun. 28, 2022).

<sup>29</sup> <https://safemoon.com/products> (last visited Jun. 28, 2022).

<sup>30</sup> <https://www.certi.k.com/projects/safemoon> (last visited Jun. 28, 2022).

1 85. SafeMoon is also responsible for marketing SAFEMOON Tokens,  
2 which it does relentlessly on social media. SafeMoon stated on its Instagram account  
3 on April 4, that its “Marketing campaign” had begun. Indeed, as CoinDesk notes,  
4 SafeMoon is “shilled endlessly on Twitter.”<sup>31</sup> SafeMoon has explained on Twitter  
5 that it has a “small dedicated marketing team.”

6 86. In addition to marketing SAFEMOON tokens and developing and  
7 launching its products, SafeMoon is also responsible for securing exchange listings,  
8 and thus markets, for SAFEMOON Tokens. For example, on March 17, Karony  
9 noted that they had “talked with WhiteBit,” an exchange. On April 2, 2021, Karony  
10 announced via Twitter that SafeMoon’s team had “[b]een working our A\*\*’s off for  
11 the #SafeMoon community day and night” and that he was “[g]lad to finally be able  
12 to share the good news regarding @WhiteBit6 and @BitMartExchange listings.”  
13 On April 5, 2021, Karony tweeted: “Binance next. I’m giving the #SAFEMOON  
14 community 120% of my energy until we hit the moon and I’ll never stop.”

15 **The Pump – Defendants Lure Investors in with Misleading Promotions**

16 87. SafeMoon’s homepage, safemoon.com, promotes the sale of  
17 SAFEMOON Tokens. That page, which includes a video of a Rocketship taking off  
18 in the background, prominently displays a button that enables visitors to “Buy”  
19 SAFEMOON Tokens, as well as another button that explains “How to Buy”  
20 SAFEMOON Tokens.

21 88. Clicking the “How to Buy” button leads to a “Buying Guide,” which  
22 outlines four steps for purchasing SAFEMOON Tokens. The first step is to “Create  
23 a Wallet.” The second step is to “Purchase BNB.” The third step is to “Swap BNB  
24 for SafeMoon.” The fourth (and final) step is to “HODL!” At that point, according  
25 to the guide, “All that’s left now is to HODL and see your balance grow from  
26 reflections!”

27  
28 <sup>31</sup> <https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2021/05/18/dave-portnoy-just-wants-to-have-fun/> (last visited Jun. 28, 2022).



1 89. As explained by Binance Academy, “HODL is a term commonly used  
2 by cryptocurrency investors that refuse to sell their cryptocurrency regardless of the  
3 price increasing or decreasing.”<sup>32</sup>

4 90. Beginning in March 2021, the Company – through its Twitter page and  
5 other social media platforms – promoted itself and SAFEMOON Tokens. As a result  
6 of these promotions, as well as celebrity endorsements described further below, the  
7 volume of SAFEMOON Tokens traded on a daily basis exploded from  
8 approximately \$150,000 on March 9, 2021 to over \$240 million on May 19, 2021.  
9 The tweets catalogued below are just a sample of the many, many tweets from the  
10 Company and its executives promoting SAFEMOON Tokens and other Company  
11 products over that period and the months that followed.

12 91. On March 1, 2021, the Company’s Twitter account tweeted for the first  
13 time. The tweet stated: “Welcome to the show. . . . Stick around for some amazing  
14 things.” On March 6, 2021, the Company’s Twitter account announced a “Flash  
15 Giveaway” of 100 billion SAFEMOON tokens to “5 lucky winners who”:  
16 (i) “Follow @safemoon and @defishiller”; (ii) “Like and RT”; and (iii) “Tag 3  
17 friends!” The tweet stated: “Grab a big bag of \$SAFEMOON. . . . We are just  
18 getting started! Now listed on #PancakeSwap!”

19 92. In the second half of March 2021, as further discussed below, the  
20 Company retweeted a number of endorsements from celebrities. During that same  
21 period, the Company tweeted instructions on how to buy SAFEMOON Tokens, the  
22 amount of SAFEMOON Tokens that had been burned to date, and updates regarding  
23 the number of Twitter users that were following the Company’s account. Given the  
24 Long Whitepaper’s reference to decreasing supply resulting in higher prices, the  
25 Company’s tweets regarding the amount of SAFEMOON Tokens burned were  
26 clearly intended to imply that the price of SAFEMOON Tokens would increase.

27  
28 <sup>32</sup> <https://academy.binance.com/en/glossary/hodl> (last visited Jun. 28, 2022).

1       93.       On April 3, 2021, the Company tweeted: “396,384,506,514,787  
2 BURNT.” In response, Karony tweeted: “New ATH .. Check. Continual burns ..  
3 also check. Moon... #Imminent.” The acronym “ATH” refers to all-time high price.  
4 The same day, Karony tweeted: “Amazing! Almost a 1 Billion Dollar market  
5 cap!!!” The same day, SafeMoon tweeted: “Next week we put together our plan of  
6 action to list on #Binance.” Binance is the world’s largest crypto-asset exchange by  
7 trading volume.

8       94.       On April 5, 2021, the Company announced via Twitter that  
9 SAFEMOON Tokens would be listed on BitMart, a crypto-asset exchange. In  
10 response to that announcement, Karony tweeted: “It has been a bunch of long nights  
11 for the team, but it’s amazing to see the results.” That day, Karony also tweeted:  
12 “I’m giving the #SAFEMOON community 120% of my energy until we hit the moon  
13 and I’ll never stop.”

14       95.       On April 14, 2021, the Company’s Twitter account posted a short video  
15 titled “How to Hold #SAFEMOON,” which explained the process of buying  
16 SAFEMOON Tokens. The same day, the account stated that SAFEMOON was  
17 “[t]he number 1 searched Cryptocurrency in the world within the last 30 days.”

18       96.       On April 15, 2021, the Company’s Twitter account posted that there  
19 were then “400K HOLDERS!” The following day, the Company posted an image  
20 titled “ALL #SAFEMOON HOLDERS RIGHT NOW.” The image included three  
21 charts – one titled “Bull Market,” one titled “Bear Market,” and the third titled  
22 “Moon Market.” The third chart included a vertical line, indicating that the price  
23 was going straight up. That day, the account also posted a screenshot of a text  
24 exchange in which one person explains to another that, with SAFEMOON tokens,  
25 “[t]he longer you hold the more you get rewarded.”

26       97.       On April 17, 2021, the Company’s Twitter account posted an image  
27 titled “WHY HOLDING REWARDS YOU.” The image was a graph indicating that  
28 “Tokenomics Growth” increases exponentially with “Holding Time.” The same

1 day, the Company's Twitter account announced that there were then "500k  
2 HOLDERS."

3 98. On April 18, 2021 the Company's Twitter account stated that  
4 SAFEMOON was the "NUMBER 1 SEARCHED CRYPTO IN THE WORLD," and  
5 indicated that, less than 50 days in, 400 trillion SAFEMOON Tokens had been  
6 burned, there were 500,000 tokenholders, there were 100,000 Twitter followers, and  
7 the market capitalization for SAFEMOON Tokens was \$1.1 billion. By the end of  
8 that day, the Company's Twitter account had 150,000 followers. The Company's  
9 Twitter account also announced that day that there were "2 New exchange listings  
10 on the horizon," that there were "a lot of exchanges reaching out to list  
11 #SAFEMOON," and that SafeMoon would "only make the right choices to benefit  
12 HOLDERS."

13 99. On April 19, 2021, the Company's account tweeted: "ARE YOU A  
14 #SAFEMOON HOLDER." The next day, the Company tweeted a video, indicating  
15 that there were 700,000 holders, 200,000 Twitter followers, that SAFEMOON was  
16 the "No. 1 searched crypto," and that it was "trending" on Twitter "every day." Also  
17 on April 20, the Company tweeted: "Let's take a bull to the #SAFEMOON" and  
18 posted a picture stating "SAFEMOON BULL RUN" and "ONLY A MATTER OF  
19 TIME." The Company also tweeted that day "DUMMY PROOF" instructions for  
20 "How to Acquire #SAFEMOON," and indicated that there were then 800,000  
21 followers but that trading volumes were so high that "Binance smart chain #BSC  
22 broke."

23 100. On April 21, 2021, the Company tweeted that there were then "900K  
24 HOLDERS" and "300K FOLLOWERS." The Company also announced via Twitter  
25 that there was a "NEW LISTING," indicating that SAFEMOON Tokens would be  
26 listed on MXC. In response to a significant price decrease that day, the Company  
27 tweeted: "That wasn't a dip today . . . we went back to earth for a bigger rocket and  
28 more passengers." (Emojis omitted.) Haines-Davies retweeted that message. By

1 the end of the day, the Company tweeted that there were one million SAFEMOON  
2 tokenholders. The Company also tweeted that day: “Rome wasn’t built in a day,  
3 #SAFEMOON was.”

4 101. On April 22, 2021, in response to continuing price volatility, Witriol  
5 tweeted: “Hey #SAFEMOON It’s all a part of the process! Sit back and relax!”  
6 Referencing a popular 1990s song, he then tweeted: “We #hodl they hatin’  
7 patrolling, trying to catch me ridin’ dirty.” The same day, the Company tweeted:  
8 “WHO’S HOLDING?!” and “In other words HOLD ON TIGHT.” The Company  
9 also tweeted: “We won’t let any TROLL, HATER, FUD<sup>33</sup> SPREADER on this  
10 ship,” and that the SAFEMOON token was “52 DAYS OLD,” there were “1.1  
11 Million HOLDERS” and “340k followers,” that SAFEMOON was “Trending 5 days  
12 in a row,” that “410 Trillion Tokens” had been burned, and that the “Market cap  
13 Reached \$5 Bil.” In addition, the Company announced via Twitter that  
14 “#SAFEMOON was listed on @ZBG\_Exchange Fully tradable in 24HR.” The  
15 Company retweeted the following tweet from “MisterCrypto”: “Once the Market  
16 gets back to normal guess what?! #safemoon will be on the 3rd Exchange that has  
17 the highest Volume of trading per day! Let that sink in for a min now breath and let  
18 those diamond hands Shine.” “Diamond hands” refers “to holding a volatile  
19 investment even when there’s pressure to sell.”<sup>34</sup>

20 102. On April 22, 2021, Karony tweeted: “I think we are setting a records  
21 for speeds and longest times without sleep” and “The team and I have been working  
22 hard all night on a multitude of tasks.” Karony revealed later that day that  
23 SafeMoon’s team was working on getting SAFEMOON Tokens listed on ZBG.

24  
25  
26 <sup>33</sup> The acronym “FUD,” explained further below, stands for “Fear, Uncertainty,  
and Doubt.”

27 <sup>34</sup> [https://www.fool.com/investing/stock-market/market-sectors/financials/  
28 cryptocurrency-stocks/diamond-hands/#:~:text=%22Diamond%20hands%22%20is%20a%20slang,as%20cryptocurrency%20and%20meme%20stocks](https://www.fool.com/investing/stock-market/market-sectors/financials/cryptocurrency-stocks/diamond-hands/#:~:text=%22Diamond%20hands%22%20is%20a%20slang,as%20cryptocurrency%20and%20meme%20stocks) (last visited Jun. 28, 2022).

1     103.     On April 23, 2021, the Company announced via Twitter that  
2     SAFEMOON Tokens would be listed on crypto-asset exchanges Gate.io, Hotbit, and  
3     LetsExchange. As part of its announcement regarding LetsExchange, the Company  
4     tweeted: “[Y]ou can now trade #SAFEMOON for any coin listed by Let’s Exchange  
5     including” Bitcoin and other well-known crypto-assets. That day, the Company  
6     tweeted an old post from someone named Greg Shoen that stated: “I wish I had kept  
7     my 1,700 BTC @ \$0.06 instead of selling them at \$0.30, now that they’re \$8.00.”  
8     Above that post, the Company tweeted: “Wonder how many Gregg’s happened over  
9     the last 48 hours #SAFEMOON don’t be Gregg.” Karony indicated via Twitter on  
10    that day that he had been “[w]orking all day” to get SAFEMOON Tokens listed on  
11    LetsExchange.io.

12    104.     On April 24, 2021, the Company tweeted once again “HOW TO  
13    ACQUIRE #SAFEMOON.” The Company announced via Twitter that day that  
14    there were then 1.3 million holders, and made a number of other optimistic  
15    statements regarding the price of SAFEMOON tokens, including “What lives on the  
16    moon safely . . . someone who HOLDS #SAFEMOON” and “Feeling BULLISH.”  
17    SafeMoon tweeted that day that it was “THIS WEEKS MOST VIEWED CRYPTO  
18    CURRENCY according to [CoinMarketCap]” and was “the MOST VIRAL  
19    CRYPTO CURRENCY on the planet.”

20    105.     On April 25, 2021, the Company tweeted: “41% of the total  
21    #SAFEMOON has been BURNED GONE! NEVER COMING BACK.” (Emojis  
22    omitted.) SafeMoon announced that day via Twitter that it had “400k  
23    FOLLOWERS” and, the following day, that “Exchanges are flooding through the  
24    doors ready to list safemoon, bigger ones are taking longer but worth the wait,  
25    regardless all credible and in the top 50.”

26    106.     On April 26, 2021, the Company tweeted: “We can see the moon,  
27    HOLD on it’s about to get exciting” and posted instructions for obtaining  
28    SAFEMOON tokens on Pancake Swap.

1 107. On April 27, 2021, the Company tweeted that SAFEMOON was the  
2 “fastest growing crypto on the planet” and that, in sixty days, it was “already listed  
3 on 6+ Exchanges with 3bil+ Market cap!”

4 108. On April 28, 2021, the Company announced via Twitter that it would  
5 soon be on the Burency Exchange, “the Biggest Crypto trading platform in Middle  
6 East.”

7 109. On April 29, 2021, the Company once again tweeted instructions for  
8 how to acquire SAFEMOON tokens, stating that it was “now available on 7  
9 EXCHANGES” and was “Still number 1 searched crypto in the world 7 days in a  
10 row.” That day, the Company also announced that there were then “1.4 MILLION  
11 HOLDERS.” Karony tweeted on that day: “Jack and I are working to get SafeMoon  
12 everywhere.”

13 110. On April 30, 2021, the Company tweeted: “WOW! 1.5 MILLION  
14 #SAFEMOON HOLDERS! . . . THE MOON IS IN SIGHT.”

15 111. On May 1, 2021, the Company tweeted instructions for “The  
16 QUICKEST way to HOLD #SAFEMOON via @MXC\_Exchange” and asserted, via  
17 Twitter, that “IF YOU HOLD #SAFEMOON YOU ARE GROWING DAILY  
18 FROM TOKENOMICS . . . UP OR DOWN YOU’RE STILL GOING UP IN  
19 TOKENS.”

20 112. On May 5, 2021, the Company tweeted an image titled “SAFEMOON  
21 TOKENOMICS.” It showed a variety of cars, boats, and planes placed along an  
22 upward sloping line graph. In the top right corner, on top-of-the-line graph, there  
23 was a Rocketship.

24 113. On May 6, 2021, the Company announced via Twitter that there were  
25 then 1.6 million tokenholders and 500,000 Twitter followers. That day, the  
26 Company tweeted a short promotional video, with the following words flashing on  
27 the screen: “SAFEMOON,” “Most Viral Crypto,” “Big Upcoming Projects,” “8  
28 New Exchanges,” “Tokenomics” “Rewards, More Every Day,” “1,500,000



1 Holders,” “Certik Audit Approved,” “412 TR Burnt,” “500k Twitter Followers,” and  
2 “SafeMoon Wallet Coming Soon.”

3 114. On May 8, 2021, the Company tweeted an image that stated: “Don’t  
4 put your eggs in one basket. . . . Keep them in a safe.” The next day, SafeMoon  
5 announced that there were then 1.8 million SAFEMOON tokenholders. That day,  
6 Karony tweeted: “I hope everyone has figured out that #SAFEMOON isn’t just a  
7 crypto, it’s an evolution.”

8 115. On May 10, 2021, the Company re-posted a video with instructions on  
9 “HOW TO ACQUIRE #SAFEMOON.” Above the video, the Company tweeted:  
10 “We see a lot of new holders looking to join #SAFEMOON but ask ‘how do I buy  
11 safemoon’ can we ask you RT and spread the word for the ones who need a little  
12 guidance.” That day, the Company also tweeted a video of a billboard in Times  
13 Square advertising SafeMoon as “The World’s Fastest Growing Cryptocurrency.”  
14 That day, the trading volume for SAFEMOON Tokens increased to approximately  
15 \$195 million; the previous day, it was \$140 million.

16 116. On May 11, 2021, the Company announced another exchange listing  
17 and that there were then 1.9 million SAFEMOON tokenholders. On May 15, 2021,  
18 the Company announced via Twitter that it had 700,000 followers.

19 117. On May 18, 2021 and May 19, 2021, the Company announced that  
20 SAFEMOON Tokens would be listed on two additional exchanges, and posted  
21 another video on “HOW TO ACQUIRE #SAFEMOON.” On May 19, the Company  
22 also tweeted: “JUST POPPING BACK TO PICK UP SOME MORE HOLDERS,”  
23 “WHO’S HOLDING?!,” and “What goes up must go down . . . and what goes down  
24 MUST GO UP!” The price of SAFEMOON Tokens had fallen sharply that day. In  
25 addition, the Company tweeted on May 19: “SHOUTOUT TO ALL DIAMOND  
26 HANDS!” and “HOLDING IS REWARDING WITH TOKENOMICS.” Karony  
27 likewise tweeted that day: “It was days like these that shook out a lot of early BTC  
28 folks. I got Hardman Hands for all crypto.”



1 118. On May 20, 2021, Karony provided a list on Twitter of exchanges that  
2 had listed SAFEMOON Tokens, as well as a list of exchanges that had not yet listed  
3 the tokens. With respect to exchanges in the latter category, he stated: “We will  
4 continue to work with their listing and tech teams to get tokenomics implemented.”  
5 On May 22, 2021, the Company announced via Twitter that it had 800,000 followers  
6 and that there were then 2.25 million SAFEMOON tokenholders.

7 119. On May 26, 2021, the Company announced that there were then 2.5  
8 million SAFEMOON tokenholders and tweeted an image that stated: “BULLISH  
9 OR BEARISH TOKENOMICS WINS.”

10 120. On May 31, 2021, the Company announced via Twitter that another  
11 exchange, bitbns, had listed SAFEMOON Tokens, and tweeted an image captioned  
12 “NO RUG PULLS HERE.” (A “rug pull” is “a malicious maneuver in the  
13 cryptocurrency industry where crypto developers abandon a project and run away  
14 with investors’ funds.”<sup>35</sup>)

15 121. On June 3, 2021, with both the price of SAFEMOON Tokens and the  
16 trading volume significantly lower than it had been just a few weeks earlier, the  
17 Company tweeted “HOLDING IS REWARDING” and “WE’RE ALL IN THIS  
18 TOGETHER!” On June 8, 2021, the Company tweeted, once again, instructions for  
19 “WHERE AND HOW TO ACQUIRE #SAFEMOON” and instructed its many  
20 followers to “Like and RT to spread the word.” That day, the Company also tweeted:  
21 “WHEN YOU UNDERSTAND THE VALUE OF HOLDING #SAFEMOON THE  
22 REST IS HISTORY.”

23 122. On June 16, 2021, with price and volume continuing to lag, the  
24 Company tweeted an image captioned: “WE’RE REACHING THE MOON  
25 TOGETHER.” The image was an upward sloping graph that was being climbed by  
26

27  
28 <sup>35</sup> <https://coinmarketcap.com/alexandria/glossary/rug-pull>. (last visited Jun. 28, 2022).

1 people with increasingly large bags of money. The next day, the Company  
2 announced that tokens would be listed on another exchange.

3 123. On June 24, 2021, the Company tweeted: “ONLY DIAMOND  
4 HANDS WILL MAKE IT TO THE #SAFEMOON.” On July 4, 2021, the Company  
5 tweeted instructions for “HOW TO ACQUIRE #SAFEMOON WITH  
6 @MetaMask.”

7 124. On July 12, 2021 and July 13, 2021, the Company tweeted: “WHO’S  
8 HOLDING? And “DIAMOND HANDS ONLY.” On July 13, 2021, the Company  
9 posted a video of animated bulls running. At the end of the video, the words “Bull  
10 Run” were shown. Above the video, SafeMoon tweeted: “WHO’S THINKING  
11 WHAT WE’RE THINKING.” And on July 19, 2021, the Company tweeted an  
12 image indicating that SAFEMOON tokens were the “MOST HELD TOKENS ON  
13 BINANCE SMART CHAIN.”

14 125. On August 16, 2021, the Company tweeted: “SHOUTOUT TO ALL  
15 DIAMOND HANDS,” “LET’S DO THIS #SAFEMOON1MILLION LIKE AND  
16 RT AND FOLLOW,” and “IF WE HIT 1 MILLION . . . MARKETING WILL  
17 ‘CONSIDER’ STOP USING CAPS.” On August 19, 2021, the Company tweeted:  
18 “1 MILLION #SAFEMOON FOLLOWERS! 2.7 MILLION #SAFEMOON  
19 HOLDERS!”

20 126. On August 27, 2021, the Company retweeted a tweet from Karony that  
21 stated: “Buy button.” The following day, the Company tweeted: “The  
22 #SAFEMOON BUY BUTTON” and posted a video advertising SafeMoon’s crypto  
23 wallet, which would, according to the video, including an “in app buy button.”

24 127. On September 13, 2021, the Company announced on Twitter that the  
25 SafeMoon Wallet was “LIVE on Google Play!!” SafeMoon’s tweet included a link  
26 to download the app.

27 128. On October 6, 2021, the Company tweeted that the SafeMoon Wallet  
28 was “LIVE on iOS.” The Company’s tweet included a link to download the app.

1 129. On October 7, 2021, the Company tweeted: “In the last 12 hours the  
2 #SAFEMOONWALLET rocketed up the App Store chart” to “#10 in the US.”

3 130. On October 16, 2021, the Company tweeted: “Only diamond hands  
4 hold the #SAFEMOONWALLET.” The next day, the Company announced via  
5 Twitter that there had already been “350,000+ downloads for  
6 #SAFEMOONWALLET between iOS and Android.” On October 29, 2021,  
7 SafeMoon announced that there had been 400,000+ downloads, and on October 31,  
8 2021, the Company announced that there had been 500,000+ downloads and more  
9 than 100,000 new SAFEMOON tokenholders in the last 24 hours. On November 6,  
10 2021, the Company announced via Twitter that there were then 2.85 million  
11 SAFEMOON tokenholders.

12 131. To boost the Company’s own marketing efforts, the Executive  
13 Defendants also actively recruited and retained the Promoter Defendants to serve as  
14 the promoters of the SAFEMOON Tokens in March 2021 and beyond.

15 132. As observed in the article *FBI ties and Ponzi games – here’s what*  
16 *SafeMoon doesn’t want you to know*:

17 SafeMoon embodies meme token hype better than almost any crypto in  
18 history. In just two months, SafeMoon has engineered \$4 billion  
19 market value inflated by influencers like Jake Paul, [and] Soulja  
20 Boy. . . . But what SafeMoon resembles most is the **crypto-powered**  
21 **Ponzi games** once popular on Ethereum, like Proof-of-Weak Hands 3D  
22 (PoWH3D).

23 \* \* \*

24 These games – which are now bleeding into the Binance Smart Chain  
25 ecosystem – are designed to mimic real-life Ponzi schemes. And so,  
26 just like the Ethereum-based Ponzi games that came before it – the  
27  
28

1 earliest to buy SafeMoon *hypothetically* stands to make the most profit  
2 – but *only if they can lure enough players* to follow suit.<sup>36</sup>

3 133. As discussed further below, the Company and the Executive  
4 Defendants repeatedly touted the “burn” and “tokenomics” of the SAFEMOON  
5 Tokens, as part of their marketing strategy.

6 134. In fact, the fourth point in the SafeMoon whitepaper is dedicated to  
7 “Depreciating Supply & Burn Address.” The opening line of that section states: “In  
8 a decentralized smart chain environment, contract functions can be utilized to  
9 achieve token scarcity.”<sup>37</sup>

10 135. “SafeMoon’s supply gimmick is integral to its value proposition:  
11 scarcity inflates as supply deflates, which implies value.”<sup>38</sup> However, the price of  
12 the SAFEMOON Tokens is “*determined by market demand* – exactly what makes  
13 celebrity endorsements so critical to SafeMoon’s success.”<sup>39</sup>

14 136. Upon information and belief, all of the Promoter Defendants received  
15 SAFEMOON Tokens and/or other forms of consideration as part or all of their  
16 compensation for promoting SafeMoon.

17 137. For example, a combined search of the Binance Blockchain Explorer  
18 (“BSCscan”),<sup>40</sup> the Ethereum Blockchain Explorer (“Etherscan”),<sup>41</sup> and the non-  
19 fungible token marketplace OpenSea shows that a wallet owned and controlled by  
20 Paul received approximately 50 billion SAFEMOON Tokens on March 26, 2021.

21  
22  
23  
24 <sup>36</sup> See fn.14, *supra*.

25 <sup>37</sup> See fn.18, *supra*.

26 <sup>38</sup> See fn.14, *supra*.

27 <sup>39</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>40</sup> BSCscan allows users to explore and search the Binance blockchain for transactions, wallet addresses, tokens, and prices.

<sup>41</sup> Etherscan does the same thing as BSCscan except on the Ethereum blockchain.

1 138. In particular, a wallet owned and/or controlled by the SafeMoon  
2 deployer transferred 50.4 billion SafeMoon to wallet address 0x4b7d7b on March  
3 26, 2021. The price of the tokens was approximately \$0.0000003951 at the time.

4 139. The following day, March 27, 2021, Paul (as discussed further below)  
5 posted a SafeMoon promotion to his personal Twitter account. Paul promoted  
6 SafeMoon at least three more times between April and May. Notably, in Paul's May  
7 16, 2021 post promoting SafeMoon, he also mentions a new cryptocurrency he was  
8 promoting at the time: Yummy coin.

9 140. On June 17, 2021, the 0x4b7d7b wallet used the decentralized exchange  
10 on the Binance Smart Chain, PancakeSwap, via a "Center.io" wallet, to swap over  
11 48 billion SAFEMOON Tokens to \$190,314.35 USDC. The difference between the  
12 50.4 billion SAFEMOON Tokens and the swapped 48 billion SAFEMOON Tokens  
13 is due the Company's 10% tax since, unlike Karony, Paul's wallet was not exempt  
14 from fees.

15 141. Four minutes later, the 0x4b7d7b wallet transferred the USDC to wallet  
16 address 0x28dfb. A search for the 0x28dfb address on the OpenSea marketplace  
17 reveals that this wallet belongs to "Problem Child." Paul is widely known by his  
18 "fight name," Problem Child.<sup>42</sup>

19 142. On June 22, 2021, the Problem Child Wallet transferred 484,521.44  
20 USDC to wallet address 0x37a3549. A review of the transactions in that wallet  
21 shows that the 0x37a3549 wallet has no use other than to hold the USDC. All other  
22 transactions are simply random token "airdrops" into the 0x37a3549. In other  
23 words, the inflow and outflow of the sum of USDC is the 0x37a3549 wallet's only  
24 purpose.

25 143. On January 4, 2022, the 0x37a3549 wallet transferred the totality of the  
26 USDC holding to an exchange wallet.

27  
28 <sup>42</sup> <https://www.essentiallysports.com/boxing-news-jake-paul-boxing-nickname-why-is-he-called-the-problem-child/> (last visited Feb. 28, 2022).

1 144. An examination of the other portion of the USDC in the 0x37a3549  
2 wallet (\$484,521.44 total USDC – \$190,314.35 paid for Paul’s SafeMoon  
3 promotions = \$294,206.96 remaining) confirms that this wallet is under Paul’s  
4 ownership/control. Approximately, \$294,000 was provided by a separate wallet to  
5 the Problem Child wallet. The providing wallet, 0x3eaea6, gained its USDC value  
6 via a series of three swaps of YUMMY tokens in Center.io. These swaps occurred  
7 between June 16, 2021 and June 17, 2021. The YUMMY tokens were received  
8 between May 13-15 in five transfers. Paul first tweeted about YUMMY on May 16,  
9 2021.<sup>43</sup>

10 145. These complicated transactions demonstrate a pattern by which Paul,  
11 and other promoters including the Promoter Defendants, are given tokens as a  
12 payment for promotions, they go out and post about the token on social media, then  
13 turn around and sell the tokens for profit as investors buy in. The entire purpose of  
14 this paid promotion is for pumping and dumping the token based on the value created  
15 by the Promoter Defendants’ direct action.

16 146. Each of the Promotor Defendants are sophisticated public figures with  
17 familiarity and experience with endorsement contracts. Upon information and  
18 belief, they all received a similar disbursement of tokens from the SafeMoon  
19 deployer wallet and cashed out shortly after making engaging in their promotional  
20 activities in a similar manner to Paul.

21 147. This is why Haines-Davies was a vital part of the Executive  
22 Defendants’ plan for marketing the SAFEMOON Tokens. Prior to joining the  
23 Company, Haines-Davies managed a UK-based YouTube celebrity, Ben Phillips,  
24 from 2017 until March 2021 (*i.e.*, the month that the SAFEMOON Tokens  
25 launched). Phillips also dated Haines-Davies’ sister, Georgia Haines for over three  
26 years. Upon information and belief, Haines-Davies leveraged the contacts and  
27

28 <sup>43</sup> Paul (@iakepaul). Twitter (May 16, 2021). <https://twitter.com/iakepaul/status/1393967703598194692?s=20&t=veoX77c74MdN5qdv4CfGKg>.

1 experience he gained from managing Phillips to recruit other celebrities to promote  
2 the SAFEMOON Tokens in exchange for a portion of the Float. Of course, Phillips  
3 was also recruited by Haines-Davies to act as a promoter of the SAFEMOON Token.

4 148. For example, on March 19, 2021, in a now-deleted post on his official  
5 Twitter account, Phillips feigned ignorance about SafeMoon (despite his manager  
6 Haines-Davies' personal connection as SafeMoon's COO) and asked his followers:  
7 "I keep seeing #SafeMoon everywhere anyone know about it? Is it gonna pop? Or  
8 . . . has it got Big #Doge energy."<sup>44</sup> Phillips did not disclose his connection to the  
9 Company but instead sought to convince investors that the "buzz" about SafeMoon  
10 was organically created as opposed to manufactured by Defendants themselves.

11 149. In addition, Phillips and another SAFEMOON Token promoter, Jake  
12 Paul, have reportedly "discussed creating a cryptocurrency" together,<sup>45</sup> and Paul and  
13 fellow Promoter Defendant David Portnoy are long-time collaborators, with Paul  
14 appearing in a "Team Portnoy" video in 2017.<sup>46</sup>

15 150. Similarly, a series of transactions linked to Defendant Keem's official  
16 OpenSea wallet address 0xF85089157fd4C6F7547929BEbD73bA822DAc9A82  
17 ("Keem Wallet") show multiple transfers of large amounts of SAFEMOON Tokens  
18 from both Phillips and Nagy (via the Deployer Wallet) shortly before and/or after  
19 Keem publicly promoted Safemoon to his followers on Twitter.

20 151. As the other Promoter Defendants were being recruited by Haines-  
21 Davies and Phillips, the Company was making statements to investors about the  
22 "token burn" for SAFEMOON Tokens. In particular, on March 21, 2021, the  
23

24 <sup>44</sup> See [https://www.reddit.com/r/SafeMoon/comments/m8mjpk/safemoontweet\\_by\\_ben\\_phillips\\_benphillipsuk/](https://www.reddit.com/r/SafeMoon/comments/m8mjpk/safemoontweet_by_ben_phillips_benphillipsuk/) (last visited Feb. 28, 2022).

25 <sup>45</sup> Billy Bambrough, *Exclusive: YouTube Starts Jake Paul And Ben Phillips*  
26 *'Discussed' Creating A Cryptocurrency As Bitcoin And Dogecoin Mania Spreads,*  
27 *Forbes* (Feb. 17, 2021, 06:10am EST), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/billybambrough/2021/02/17/exclusive-youtube-star-jake-paul-discussed-creating-own-cryptocurrency-as-bitcoin-and-dogecoin-mania-spreads/?sh=3d7d62591b21>.

28 <sup>46</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UoGAI-VwTt0>. a decentralized smart chain environment, contract functions can be utilized to achieve token scarcity



1 Company released a statement via its official Twitter account, stating that  
2 841,685,253,836 SAFEMOON Tokens “have been burnt in the last 24 hours alone.  
3 That’s over 800 billion tokens permanently removed from the circulating supply!”<sup>47</sup>

4 152. Then on March 22, 2021, the Company announced that “over 1.1  
5 trillion tokens [were] permanently removed from the circulating supply” and that  
6 this amount of tokens were “burnt in the last 24 hours alone.”<sup>48</sup>

7 153. By stressing the “burn” of the SAFEMOON Token supply in a short  
8 period of time, Karony signaled to investors that the value of SAFEMOON Token  
9 would increase as more SAFEMOON Tokens are burned.

10 154. Karony endorsed the Company’s announcement on his personal Twitter  
11 account that same day.<sup>49</sup>

12 155. On March 23, 2021, Smith received a message from an investor, James  
13 “Ginger,” who was interested in joining the SafeMoon team as a moderator for the  
14 Company’s official Discord account. Smith introduced Ginger to the Company’s  
15 Community Manager, Trevor Grant, and brought Ginger on board.

16 156. Upon information and belief, around the same time, Wyatt, Ginger,  
17 Trevor Grant and other SafeMoon social media moderators had a live-streamed  
18 meeting on Discord. In a recording of this meeting that was previously available on  
19 YouTube, the group can be seen discussing how to hide their record logs and delete  
20 their message history on Discord. In particular, Grant advised the group that if they  
21 deleted their account “then it would take 30 days for it to just vanish from their  
22 servers.” The group then discussed whether or not their records would be subject to  
23 disclosure, and Wyatt stated: “I doubt a subpoena is gonna pull up your deleted  
24

25 <sup>47</sup> @SafeMoon 2.0 , Twitter (Mar. 21, 2021), <https://t.co/pCeZQidEMi>:  
“Burn baby burn.   .

26 <sup>48</sup> @SafeMoon 2.0 , Twitter (Mar. 22, 2021), <https://t.co/tZ1kvS2Xdw>: “Not  
27 sure if this is what they meant when they said #SAFEMOON was fire . . . #Burna  
#DeFi #BSC.”

28 <sup>49</sup> Re-tweet of *id.*, by Karony: <https://twitter.com/safemoon/status/1374045413834072070?cxt=HHwWjICtzCPBy5EmAAAA>.

1 messages.” One member of the group “x90” cautioned the others that the Discord  
2 server would likely still save the messages and more importantly “you also gotta be  
3 careful because if they believe you delete out of intent to, ya know, hide evidence,  
4 that’s at that point tampering with evidence.” Wyatt dismisses this warning and  
5 continues on: “No, if your’re deleting it before being subpoenaed, you’re not  
6 deleting evidence of anything. You’re just fucking deleting your messages. If he’s  
7 not subpoenaed, and he deleted it before being subpoenaed then he’s not hiding shit  
8 . . . he’s using a feature on the software that they offer to everybody. He’s allowed  
9 to delete whatever the fuck he wants.” Wyatt goes on to state: “The funny thing is  
10 . . . I can delete all my messages with Safemoon Dev [aka Nagy] and Thomas [Smith]  
11 up until piggy wasn’t a thing then I can just stop it. Which is what I’ll do.”

12 157. On March 25, 2021, on the SafeMoon official Reddit page, a previously  
13 recorded live stream AMA with Phillips was posted. In that AMA, Phillips touts the  
14 growth of the SafeMoon community and favorably compares the SAFEMOON  
15 Tokens to other hot cryptocurrencies like Dogecoin.<sup>50</sup> At the end of the clip, Phillips  
16 is “welcomed” to “the team” by Karony and Smith, and SafeMoon Community  
17 Manager, Trevor Church.<sup>51</sup>

18 158. That same day in a now deleted post<sup>52</sup> on Twitter, Phillips promoted the  
19 SAFEMOON Tokens to his millions of followers:

20 I’ve said it before I’m not a FINANCIAL ADVISOR but I do  
21 like moons and safe places #Safemoon 🗝️😊

22 — Ben Phillips (@BenPhillipsUK) March 25, 2021  
23

24 <sup>50</sup> @u/Eljefe\_bezos. *A.M.A NEWS!! Ben Phillips has been added to the*  
25 *SAFEMOON team. So much great news in this live stream. UPVOTE TO SHOW*  
26 *HIM SOME LOVE: SafeMoon, REDDIT (Mar. 25, 2021),*  
*[https://www.reddit.com/r/SafeMoon/comments/md6gew/ama\\_news\\_ben\\_phillips\\_](https://www.reddit.com/r/SafeMoon/comments/md6gew/ama_news_ben_phillips_has_been_added_to_the/)*  
*has\_been\_added\_to\_the/.*

27 <sup>51</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>52</sup> This post was captured in the *FBI Ties and Ponzi Games* article. See fn.7,  
*supra*.

1 159. On March 27, 2021, social media influencer and boxer, Paul, published  
2 the following post<sup>53</sup> promoting SAFEMOON to his 4.1 million Twitter followers:



13 160. That same day, Karony and Smith also republished the aforementioned  
14 Paul post on their personal Twitter accounts.<sup>54</sup> Paul would later use the same  
15 upward-sloping graph in an April 3, 2021 tweet, where he claimed to have “Predicted  
16 DOGE,” a reference to Dogecoin.

17 161. On March 29, 2021, musician, Miles “Lil Yachty” Parks McCollum,  
18 promoted SAFEMOON in a tweet that stated “#safemoonisthenewdogecoin.”<sup>55</sup> At  
19 the time, the referenced cryptocurrency token (Dogecoin) had a massive increase in  
20 the price of that token. McCollum compared SAFEMOON Tokens to this other hot  
21 cryptocurrency in order to mislead investors into believing that SAFEMOON would  
22 similarly increase in price.

23 162. Notably, Paul publicly endorsed McCollum’s statement about the  
24 SAFEMOON Token’s expected price increase by tweeting out “factssss” as a reply  
25

26 <sup>53</sup> Paul (@jakepaul), Twitter (Mar. 27, 2021), <https://t.co/r9DCQG0pmQ>:  
“Everyone needs #SAFEMOON or this will be you .

27 <sup>54</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>55</sup> McCollum (@lilyachty), Twitter (Mar. 29, 2021), <https://twitter.com/lilyachty/status/1376669875918286848>: #safemoonisthenewdogecoin .

1 to McCollum's SafeMoon promotion.<sup>56</sup> The SafeMoon twitter account also replied  
2 positively to McCollum's post.<sup>57</sup>

3 163. Likewise, Karony and Smith also promoted McCollum's post on their  
4 personal Twitter accounts on March 29, 2021.<sup>58</sup>

5 164. Two days later, on March 31, 2021, McCollum continued his  
6 promotional activities for SafeMoon, repeating "#SAFEMOON" on this Twitter  
7 account.<sup>59</sup> Once again, Karony and Smith endorsed McCollum's March 31, 2021  
8 tweet on their personal Twitter accounts.<sup>60</sup> Karony also retweeted a tweet from  
9 Keem that day, which stated: "#SAFEMOON."

10 165. That same day, Karony offered "Congrats to the winners!  
11 #SAFEMOON" in reply to a now-deleted Twitter post from Ben Phillips.<sup>61</sup>

12 166. Also on March 31, 2021, both the official SafeMoon Twitter account  
13 and Karony's personal Twitter account promoted a post with a picture suggesting  
14 that SAFEMOON Tokens were going up in price with the caption indicating that  
15 this rise was "IMMINENT."<sup>62</sup>

16  
17  
18 <sup>56</sup> Paul (@jakepaul), Twitter (Mar. 29, 2021), <https://twitter.com/jakepaul/status/1376690168875339780>: "@lilyachty factsss."

19 <sup>57</sup> @SafeMoon 2.0 , Twitter (Mar. 29, 2021), <https://t.co/8SnqxKmuJ7>:  
20 "@jakepaul @lilyachty."

21 <sup>58</sup> Karony (@CptHodl), Twitter (Mar. 29, 2021), <https://twitter.com/CptHodl/status/1376676389676519435?cxt=HHwWlsCwlb3495omAAAA>: "Hev!":  
22 McCollum (@lilvachty). Twitter (Mar. 29, 2021). [https://twitter.com/lilvachty/status/1376669875918286848?s=20&t=ag5TXmcQakZZcLhD4-Kn\\_w](https://twitter.com/lilvachty/status/1376669875918286848?s=20&t=ag5TXmcQakZZcLhD4-Kn_w): "#safe  
moonisthenewdogecoin."

23 <sup>59</sup> See, e.g., McCollum (@lilyachty), Twitter (Mar. 31, 2021), <https://twitter.com/lilyachty/status/1377293537264418818>:  
24 "#SAFEMOON#SAFE MOON#SAFEMOON."

25 <sup>60</sup> McCollum (@lilvachty). Twitter (Mar. 31, 2021). [https://twitter.com/lilyachty/status/1377293537264418818?s=20&t=ag5TXmcQakZZcLhD4-Kn\\_w](https://twitter.com/lilyachty/status/1377293537264418818?s=20&t=ag5TXmcQakZZcLhD4-Kn_w):  
26 "#SAFEMOON #SAFEMOON #SAFEMOON."

27 <sup>61</sup> Karony (@CptHodl), Twitter (Mar. 31, 2021), <https://twitter.com/CptHodl/status/1377401899050098688>: "Congrats to the winners! #SAFEMOON."

28 <sup>62</sup> See @SafeMoon 2.0 , Twitter (Mar. 31, 2021), <https://t.co/iSYlX4vdCA>:  
""IMMINENT" #SAFEMOON .

1 167. On April 2, 2021, McCollum again promoted SafeMoon to retail  
2 investors, stating in a Twitter post: “I told y’all safe moon was going up lol.”<sup>63</sup>

3 168. That same day, Smith re-tweeted a SafeMoon promotion from  
4 YouTube influencer, Keemstar (*i.e.*, Defendant Keem).<sup>64</sup>

5 169. On April 3, 2021, SafeMoon announced on its Facebook page that it  
6 had “got” several celebrity promoters to work with the Company, including Paul and  
7 McCollum.<sup>65</sup>

8 170. That same day, the Company announced that 396 trillion SAFEMOON  
9 Tokens were “burnt” and “gone.”<sup>66</sup> Karony reposted the token announcement on his  
10 personal Twitter account and noted in the caption that the supply of SAFEMOON  
11 Tokens would receive “continual burns” and that the price of the SAFEMOON  
12 Tokens was at an all-time high (“ATH”) and would be going to the “moon”  
13 imminently.<sup>67</sup> In an apparent attempt to provide some type of disclaimer to these  
14 statements, Karony, in closing, stated: “Not financial advice, you do you.”<sup>68</sup>

15 171. Defendant Keem also promoted Safemoon on April 3, 2021,  
16 announcing that the SAFEMOON Tokens were exponentially increasing in price:  
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19

20 <sup>63</sup> McCollum (@lilyachty), Twitter (Apr. 2, 2021), <https://twitter.com/lilyachty/status/1378051154416963586?lang=en>: “I told y’all safe moon was goin up lol.”

21 <sup>64</sup> Keem (@KEEMSTAR), Twitter (Apr. 1, 2021), [https://twitter.com/KEEMSTAR/status/1377848102162468864?s=20&t=ag5TXmcQakZZcLhD4-Kn\\_w](https://twitter.com/KEEMSTAR/status/1377848102162468864?s=20&t=ag5TXmcQakZZcLhD4-Kn_w).

22 <sup>65</sup> SafeMoon (@SafeMoonOfficial), Facebook (Apr. 3, 2021), <https://www.facebook.com/101527008681710/posts/so-we-got-jake-paul-lil-yachty-keemstar-ben-phillips-and-tenille-dashwood-anyone/118723846962026/>: “So we got Jake Paul, Lil Yachty, Keemstar, Ben Phillips . . . .”

23 <sup>66</sup> @SafeMoon 2.0 , Twitter (Apr. 3, 2021), <https://t.co/LJKCnIbrM8>: “396,384,506,514,787 BURNT  GONE  #SAFEMOON.”

24 <sup>67</sup> Karony (@CptHodl), Twitter (Apr. 3, 2021), <https://twitter.com/CptHodl/status/1378383282832875523?cxt=HHwWhoC5md6SgKEmAAAA>: “New ATH. Check. Continual burns. also check. Moon . . . #Imminent Not financial advice, you do you. #SafeMoon #FairLaunch #DeFi.”

25 <sup>68</sup> *Id.*

1 “Just checked my #SAFEMOON She gone 🚀”<sup>69</sup> The official Safemoon account  
2 replied, thanking Keem “for believing in us day 1 . . . we are working ever so hard  
3 to meet the visions and goals so everyone support means the world. 🚀🌕.” The  
4 Company did not, however, disclose that Keem was a paid promotor for Safemoon  
5 and not simply just an investor that “supported” and “believed in” Safemoon.

6 172. On April 4, 2021, the Company published the “Safemoon Road Map”  
7 for all four quarters of 2021 as four separate posts on its account on the social media  
8 platform, Instagram. These road maps for each quarter gave investors a false  
9 impression of the Company’s future prospects.

10 173. The caption to the Company’s post about the first quarter’s successes  
11 bragged: “Q1 Complete . . . Cough . . . we the best . . . cough.”<sup>70</sup> The post itself  
12 listed six accomplishments for Q1. Significantly, the Company stated that its  
13 “marketing campaign” had begun.<sup>71</sup>

14 174. In the post for the second quarter of 2021, there was a list of 16 action  
15 items that the Company was looking at for Q2.<sup>72</sup> Most importantly, the Company  
16 stated that it intended to “complete” the SafeMoon wallet and “begin architecting”  
17 the SafeMoon exchange and related NFT exchange within the second quarter of  
18 2021.<sup>73</sup>

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23 <sup>69</sup> Keem (@KEEMSTAR), Twitter (Apr. 3, 2021), <https://twitter.com/keemstar/status/1378490464379228168?lang=en>.

24 <sup>70</sup> @safemoonhq, Instagram (Apr. 4, 2021), [https://www.instagram.com/p/CNPSHnJn03i/?utm\\_source=ig\\_web\\_copy\\_link](https://www.instagram.com/p/CNPSHnJn03i/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link): “Q1 COMPLETE. . . Cough . . .  
25 we the best . . . cough #SAFEMOON 🚀🌕.”

26 <sup>71</sup> *Id.*

27 <sup>72</sup> @safemoonhq, Instagram (Apr. 4, 2021), [https://www.instagram.com/p/CNPScNDHbkB/?utm\\_source=ig\\_web\\_copy\\_link](https://www.instagram.com/p/CNPScNDHbkB/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link): “Q2 Currently working on  
28 this! With your support anything possible.”

<sup>73</sup> *Id.*



1 175. The post for the Company’s Instagram post providing details about the  
2 third quarter of 2021 included eight action items.<sup>74</sup> One of those items stated:  
3 “Finish NFT Exchange.”<sup>75</sup>

4 176. The first bullet point for the Company’s post about the “SAFEMOON  
5 Road Map” for the fourth quarter of 2021 declared that the Company would “finish  
6 SafeMoon exchange.”<sup>76</sup>

7 177. In only nine days after the SafeMoon marketing campaign began in  
8 earnest, the promotion efforts of Paul and McCollum, along with those of the  
9 Company and Executive Defendants during the same time period, caused investors  
10 to purchase SAFEMOON Tokens in droves and drastically increased the trading  
11 volume over those days. For example, from March 27, 2021 to April 4, 2021, the  
12 trading volume leaped from \$7 million to \$68.7 million – a staggering 875%  
13 increase. Over the same time period, the price of SAFEMOON Tokens increased  
14 from \$0.00000039 to \$0.00000157 – *i.e.*, it more than quadrupled.

15 178. Over the next 10 days, the trading volume for the SAFEMOON Tokens  
16 began to die down. Despite the continued promotional activities by the Company  
17 and the Executive Defendants, the trading volume dropped from \$43.9 million on  
18 April 5, 2021 to an interim low of only \$8.9 million on April 15, 2021. Nevertheless,  
19 the Promotor Defendants and the Executive Defendants continued their scheme  
20 misleadingly promoting the SAFEMOON Tokens.

21 179. For example, on April 5, 2021, the Company’s official Twitter account  
22 announced that the SAFEMOON Tokens would be listed and tradable on Bitmart, a  
23 digital asset exchange, that same day. The Company failed to disclose that unlike  
24

25 <sup>74</sup> @safemoonhq, Instagram (Apr. 4, 2021), [https://www.instagram.com/p/CNPSNJO4oH/?utm\\_source=ig\\_web\\_copy\\_link](https://www.instagram.com/p/CNPSNJO4oH/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link): “Q3 Now where cooking.  
26 🚀🔥🌕.”

27 <sup>75</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>76</sup> @safemoonhq, Instagram (Apr. 4, 2021), [https://www.instagram.com/p/CNPSJOLHKcC/?utm\\_source=ig\\_web\\_copy\\_link](https://www.instagram.com/p/CNPSJOLHKcC/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link): “Q4 Who knows this might be  
merged into Q3 🚀🌕.”



1 other exchanges, Bitmart would send the automatic 5% transaction fee that normally  
2 goes to the liquidity pool directly to Karony via the Karony Wallet 1. According to  
3 transactions on the blockchain, Karony Wallet 1 has received approximately  
4 \$15 million in Tether from the Bitmart exchange. In other words, instead of  
5 depositing funds into liquidity pools – as promised – the Company and Karony  
6 siphoned those funds for themselves.

7 180. When this fact was later disclosed in a YouTube video published on  
8 April 18, 2022, the price of SAFEMOON Tokens fell by 25%. The same YouTube  
9 channel subsequently released videos elaborating on the Company’s seizure of funds  
10 that were represented to have been locked in liquidity pools on April 21, 2022, and  
11 April 28, 2022. These videos also disclosed that Nagy had withdrawn millions of  
12 dollars in SAFEMOON Tokens from liquidity pools starting as early as March 5,  
13 2021 – something that would have been impossible if the pools were “locked.” The  
14 net effect of these disclosures was stark: the price of SAFEMOON Tokens fell by  
15 more than 30% between April 17, 2022 and April 29, 2022.

16 181. Undaunted, Defendants continued the scheme to promote Safemoon in  
17 order to continue to bring in the liquidity needed to sell off their portions of the Float.  
18 For example, on April 6, 2021, Keem was on Twitter promoting Safemoon to his  
19 millions of followers and advising investors to “HODL da #SAFEMOON” because  
20 “12 months from now looks good.”<sup>77</sup> He also tweeted that day: “if you notice the  
21 amount of coins are different that’s because you gain more #safeMoon coins by  
22 holding. It’s kind of like dividends.” Two days later, on April 8, 2021, the Keem  
23 Wallet received 100 billion SAFEMOON Tokens from Ben Philips’ Wallet. Less  
24 than five hours later, over the course of two transactions Keem sold all of those  
25 tokens, plus 30 billion more SAFEMOON Tokens that Keem had previously been  
26 given by the Deployer Wallet, for approximately \$118,000 in Wrapped BNB tokens.

27  
28 <sup>77</sup> Keem (@KEEMSTAR), Twitter (Apr. 5, 2021), <https://twitter.com/KEEMSTAR/status/1379288040041017347>.

1 Keem did not disclose any financial relationship or promotional payments that he  
2 received from SafeMoon and/or Philips. Similarly, Keem did not disclose that he  
3 was not looking “12 months from now” at the long-term growth prospects for  
4 Safemoon but rather was planning on selling (and did) at the first opportunity. Keem  
5 has reportedly admitted previously to “scamming people with crypto coin.”<sup>78</sup>

6 182. On April 7, 2021, the official SafeMoon Twitter account posted a video  
7 from Karony, wherein he provided an update “on all our progress.”<sup>79</sup> In particular,  
8 Karony stated that SafeMoon was in the middle of a two-part process of creating its  
9 own cryptocurrency exchange. The first part would be the creation of a  
10 SAFEMOON wallet. Karony advised investors that the Company was working on  
11 a “designated wallet” which “would be a better place for you to hold your  
12 SAFEMOON [Tokens].”<sup>80</sup> The second part would be for the Company to create the  
13 exchange itself. According to Karony, the Company’s developers were in the  
14 process of using the “most innovative” features for the exchange, including creating  
15 a sub-exchange for non-fungible tokens (“NFTs”).<sup>81</sup>

16 183. The following day, both the Company and Karony posted on social  
17 media that “400 TRILLION TOKENS BURNT GONE! NEVER COMING  
18 BACK.”<sup>82</sup>

22 <sup>78</sup> See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aQ5OirKhC2k>. (last visited Jun. 28,  
23 2022).

24 <sup>79</sup> @SafeMoon 2.0 , Twitter (Apr. 7, 2021), <https://t.co/zB7NPJcfyx>:  
25 “Update from our CEO @CptHodl as he talks over the next moves for  
#SAFEMOON future and current and touches on exciting projects in the works.  
 .

26 <sup>80</sup> *Id.*

27 <sup>81</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>82</sup> Karony (@CptHodl), Twitter (Apr. 8, 2021), <https://t.co/yWNdDIMS3k>:  
“400 Trillion! Wow #SAFEMOON #FairLaunch #DeFi”; “400 TRILLION  
TOKENS BURNT GONE! NEVER COMING BACK  #SAFEMOON  .

1 184. On April 10, 2021, the Company's Twitter account published the  
2 following post:<sup>83</sup>



9 185. Karony replied to the Company's boastful post about how it planned to  
10 reveal SafeMoon's "boldest innovation yet" with a single word reference to  
11 "Cryptonomics," i.e., the SAFEMOON Token's tokenomics.<sup>84</sup>

12 186. Apparently realizing that the Company's ability to reach new and  
13 unsuspecting investors for the purpose of luring them into purchasing SAFEMOON  
14 Tokens was decreasing rapidly, the Executive Defendants went back to what worked  
15 previously: celebrity endorsements. In an effort to inflate trading volume back up  
16 again, and ultimately facilitate the sale of their portion of the Float, the Executive  
17 Defendants and the Company went on to recruit new celebrities to act as promoters  
18 for the SAFEMOON Tokens. These efforts were once again successful and would,  
19 in short order, exponentially increase the trading volume for the SAFEMOON  
20 Tokens.

21 187. For example, on April 17, 2021, musician and producer, DeAndre  
22 "Souja Boy" Cortez Way, announced to his 5.4 million followers on Twitter that he  
23 had a public address for SAFEMOON tokens. Notably, around this time, Way

24 <sup>83</sup> @SafeMoon 2.0 , Twitter (Apr. 10, 2021), <https://twitter.com/safemoon/status/1380886849850376194>: "Tomorrow we reveal quite possibly our boldest innovation yet. A lot of you know #SAFEMOON Exchange has been our vision since the beginning, so we invite you to join our CEO as he discusses why this may be one of the biggest moves within crypto space to date."

25 <sup>84</sup> Karony (@CptHodl), Twitter (Apr. 10, 2021), <https://twitter.com/CptHodl/status/1380887019304411136?cxt=HHwWgICzybDb8qkmAAAA>:  
26 ""Cryptonomics.""

1 inadvertently disclosed that he was receiving incentive payments to promote a very  
2 similar crypto project called SaferMars: “They raising 240k, if they raise it after you  
3 tweet – will get you 24k.”<sup>85</sup> Way has a dubious history when it comes to previous  
4 similar promotional activities.<sup>86</sup>

5 188. Keem was also active on social media on April 17, 2021, announcing  
6 to his Twitter followers that “#SafeMoon is flying right now!” and that he regretted  
7 not putting his extra spending cash “into more #Safemoon Rocket[s]” instead of his  
8 friend and fellow Promoter Defendant, Jake Paul’s pay-per-view boxing match  
9 taking place that day.

10 189. On April 18, 2021, SafeMoon representative, Witriol, bragged about  
11 the Company’s marketing success (of which he was a key contributor) specifically  
12 in California. In particular, Witriol posted a screenshot indicating that the hashtag  
13 “#SAFEMOON” was “Trending in California” on Twitter with almost 99,000 posts.  
14 In the accompanying message, Witriol, among other statements promoting  
15 SAFEMOON Tokens in California, used the same misleading promotional phrase –  
16 “#safemoonisthenewdogecoin – that McCollum had previously used to promote the  
17 SAFEMOON Tokens. The entire message<sup>87</sup> is as follows:

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19  
20  
21  
22 <sup>85</sup> [https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2021/05/27/soulja-boy-tells-em-he-got-paid-](https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2021/05/27/soulja-boy-tells-em-he-got-paid-to-tweet/)  
23 [to-tweet/](https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2021/05/27/soulja-boy-tells-em-he-got-paid-to-tweet/). (last visited Jun. 28, 2022).

24 <sup>86</sup> See, e.g., Tarply Hitt, *Rapper Souja Boy Owns up to (Some of) His Wild*  
25 *Scams: ‘I Was Always Tricking People’*, DAILY BEAST (Sept. 18, 2019),  
[https://www.thedailybeast.com/rapper-soulja-boy-owns-up-to-some-of-his-wild-](https://www.thedailybeast.com/rapper-soulja-boy-owns-up-to-some-of-his-wild-scams-i-was-always-tricking-people)  
26 [scams-i-was-always-tricking-people](https://www.thedailybeast.com/rapper-soulja-boy-owns-up-to-some-of-his-wild-scams-i-was-always-tricking-people) (detailing Way’s long history of misleading  
and “scamming” consumers).

27 <sup>87</sup> Witriol (@ShaunWitriol), Twitter (Apr. 18, 2021), <https://t.co/CfuLibxpLe>:  
28 “👀 #safemoon This is only in California! Let’s get this going across the 🌐!  
Together we can do it all! You guys are amazing! 🚀 #safemoonfamily  
#safemooncommunity #safemoonisthenewdogecoin #doge #bnb #binance #btc  
#bitcoin #cryptocurrency #usa #safemoonarmy.”



190. That same day, Keem urged investors to “CHECK YOUR #SAFEMOON RIGHT NOW!” because the “price is going through the damn roof!,” cheering them on “bro we’re rich!”<sup>88</sup> Keem went on to state: “Truly believe in #SAFEMOON & not for this quick  boom. I’m long. People at @safemoon are doing some much good stuff. Love the roadmap. Huge community already. Feels like the start of something huge. In a world of 100,000 new crypto coins. This one sticks out!”<sup>89</sup>

191. On April 20, 2021, Way again promoted SafeMoon to his followers and potential investors on Twitter.<sup>90</sup> Way did not disclose any financial relationship or promotional payments that he received from SafeMoon.

192. These celebrity promotions paid off. Between April 17, 2021 and April 20, 2021, the price of SAFEMOON Tokens increased from \$0.00000155 to \$0.00001180 – i.e., by more than tenfold.

193. On April 21, 2021, the Company itself joined in the promotion of SAFEMOON Tokens, posting the proclamation on Twitter:<sup>91</sup>

<sup>88</sup> Keem (@KEEMSTAR), Twitter (Apr. 18, 2021), <https://twitter.com/KEEMSTAR/status/1383976698098507785>.

<sup>89</sup> Keem (@KEEMSTAR), Twitter (Apr. 18, 2021), <https://twitter.com/KEEMSTAR/status/1383938130835775489>.

<sup>90</sup> Way (@souljaboy), Twitter (Apr. 19, 2021), <https://twitter.com/souljaboy/status/1384095418376613893?lang=en>: “Safemoon.”

<sup>91</sup> @SafeMoon 2.0 , Twitter (Apr. 21, 2021), <https://twitter.com/safemoon/status/1384759982831374337>: “Rome wasn’t built in a day, #SAFEMOON was. .



194. The Company also posted, and Haines-Davies reposted on his personal Twitter account, the following message<sup>92</sup> downplaying the drop in the price of the SAFEMOON Token from the preceding day and encouraging new retail investors to purchase SAFEMOON Tokens:



195. This price drop was caused by insider and promoter sales, and by the release of a report from Obelisk, which published a research paper that day titled “Can You Trust SafeMoon?”<sup>93</sup> After noting that “SafeMoon was advertised as ‘anti-rugpull’ and as having its liquidity locked for 4 years,” the paper explained:

With the massive market capitalization that SafeMoon has amassed, the reflected fees that ended up being added in liquidity have also come to be worth a lot. One of the main issues with the whole project is that while users are [led] to believe that the Liquidity Provider tokens

<sup>92</sup> @SafeMoon 2.0, Twitter (Apr. 21, 2021), <https://twitter.com/safemoon/status/1384897219137056780>: “That wasn’t a dip today . . . we went back to earth for a bigger rocket and more passengers #SAFEMOON.”

<sup>93</sup> <https://obelisk.medium.com/can-you-trust-safemoon-bf2b2db76d16>. (last visited Jun. 28, 2022).



1 (essentially the receipt for having provided liquidity) are in fact locked  
2 and inaccessible from the founders, the exact opposite happens.

3 (*Id.*)

4 196. In particular, Obelisk found that SafeMoon can do “anything it wanted  
5 at any time” with SAFEMOON Tokens that were supposedly locked in liquidity  
6 pools. In other words, contrary to its prior representations, SafeMoon did not “lock”  
7 SAFEMOON tokens in liquidity pools; SafeMoon could withdraw those tokens as  
8 it pleased.

9 197. In response to concerns from investors, on April 21, 2021, Karony  
10 stated in a series of all-caps tweets: “THE LP LOCK IS NOT AUTOMATIC BUT  
11 AUTOMATED. AUTOMATED AND AUTOMATIC ARE NOT THE SAME  
12 THING. THIS IS ONE FOR BOTH SECURITY AND LONGEVITY OF  
13 #SAFEMOON. WE ARE FOCUSED ON THE FUTURE, AND UNDERSTAND  
14 THAT SITUATIONS ARISE WHICH MAY REQUIRE THE USE OF THE LP.  
15 USES INCLUDE: SEEDING OTHER EXCHANGES AND DEX’S,  
16 DEVELOPMENT COSTS OF FUTURE SAFEMOON INNOVATIONS.”  
17 (Arriaga likewise admitted, in a June 2, 2021, YouTube video, that SafeMoon  
18 intentionally decided not to lock the liquidity pools because it wanted to maintain  
19 flexibility to use those funds for other purposes.<sup>94</sup> There can, accordingly, be no  
20 doubt that SafeMoon did not in fact “lock” the liquidity pools.)

21 198. On the news that SafeMoon’s team could in fact draw on the liquidity  
22 pools, the price of SAFEMOON Tokens fell to \$0.00000641 by the end of the day  
23 on April 21, 2021, and further to \$0.00000376 by the end of the day on April 22,  
24 2021. This represented a 72.95% decrease in price from the high on April 20, 2021.

25 199. On April 22, 2021, Witriol again promoted the  
26 “#safemoonisthenewdogecoin” hashtag on his Twitter account, advising investors to  
27

28 <sup>94</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rB1m7NiaekA>. (last visited Jun. 28, 2022).



not sell their SAFEMOON Tokens because the severe price drop that occurred that same day was “all a part of the process! Sit back and relax!”<sup>95</sup> As noted above, Witriol’s post then made reference to a 1990s rap song (with an attached clip of the music video for added emphasis) with a parody of the lyrics: “We #hodl they hatin’ patrolling, trying to catch me ridin’ dirty” in an apparent effort to: (1) dismiss any legitimate criticisms of the Company or those involved in the project; and (2) reassure investors and the “#SafeMoonCommunity” that the SAFEMOON Tokens were still a good investment. The following is the post in its entirety (with a still shot of the GIF that Witriol attached to his post):<sup>96</sup>



<sup>95</sup> Witriol (@ShaunWitriol), Twitter (Apr. 22, 2021), <https://t.co/BcGzO7Vhwq>: “Hey #SAFEMOON It’s all a part of the process! Sit back and relax! “We #hodl they hatin’ patrolling, trying to catch me ridin’ dirty” 🚀🔒🌕 #SafeMoonCommunity #safemoonarmy #safemoonisthenewdogecoin #BNB #BSC.”

<sup>96</sup> *Id.*

200. The trading volume for the SAFEMOON Token exploded as a result of promotional activities of Way, Witriol, and Keem on Twitter and the Company's announcements around the same time. On April 17, 2021, the volume reached \$17.5 million – approximately 70% higher than the previous day.<sup>97</sup> On April 18, 2021 (*i.e.*, the same day that Witriol made statements about SAFEMOON's popularity in California specifically) the trading volume jumped another 36% up to \$23.9 million.<sup>98</sup> Then on April 19th, that volume ***more than tripled***, reaching \$68.8 million.<sup>99</sup> Over the following three days, the Company's continued promotions pushed the trading volume for SAFEMOON Tokens exponentially higher. On April 20, 2021, the volume jumped to \$144.7 million, with it increasing further to \$173.3 million on April 21, 2021, and then temporarily peaking at \$191.6 million on April 22, 2021.

201. Ultimately, the promotional efforts by the Company, Keem, Way, and Witriol, caused ***a staggering 1,691% increase in trading volume*** between April 16, 2021 and April 22, 2021. During this same time, Defendants used the increased volume as exit liquidity to sell off their own SAFEMOON Token holdings. For example, on April 19, 2021, the Keem Wallet received 16.7 billion SAFEMOON Tokens from the Dev Wallet and then promptly sold those tokens on April 21, 2021, along with others Keem had originally received from the Dev Wallet.<sup>100</sup> Keem received approximately \$885,252 worth of Wrapped BNB in this transaction. Notably, only three days earlier Keem had told investors that he was "long" on Safemoon. Similarly, between the 16th and 22nd of April 2021, Phillips sold around

<sup>97</sup> <https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/safemoon/historical-data/>. (last visited Jun. 28, 2022).

<sup>98</sup> *Id.*

<sup>99</sup> *Id.*

<sup>100</sup> In total, the Keem Wall sold 192,833,148,674 SAFEMOON Tokens on April 21, 2021.

1 885 billion tokens for around \$8 million in Wrapped BNB.<sup>101</sup> These sales exerted  
2 downward pressure on the price of SAFEMOON Tokens.

3 202. The day following this massive uptick in trading volume and interest in  
4 the SAFEMOON Token, April 23, 2021, the Company sought to continue the  
5 momentum and announced “NEW EXCHANGE ABOUT TO DROP! Hold on!”<sup>102</sup>  
6 Karony later endorsed this post with a reply saying “Yes.”<sup>103</sup>

7 203. This promotion apparently worked. On April 27, 2021, the Company  
8 announced it had reached it had raised enough capital from investors to fund the  
9 long-promised SafeMoon exchange.

10 204. During the same time, on April 24, 2021, the Company quietly created  
11 a second liquidity pool (“version two” or “V2”) for the purpose of facilitating BNB  
12 token and SafeMoon token swaps.

13 205. On May 1, 2021, Karony advised SAFEMOON Token investors about  
14 an “update” on the status of the SAFEMOON wallet. Karony teased “all the  
15 features” that were available on the wallet and promised to show the user interface  
16 to investors. Karony also gave a “new hint” about the wallet, namely that the wallet  
17 was “a component of Operation Pheonix.”<sup>104</sup>

18 206. In addition to using the celebrity power of the Promoter Defendants,  
19 the Executive Defendants sought to instill confidence in investors by pointing to an  
20

21  
22 <sup>101</sup> [https://bscscan.com/token/0x8076c74c5e3f5852037f31ff0093eeb8c8add8d3  
?a=0xa66800b4cca86a26d6096a5e2eb0784205aedcb8](https://bscscan.com/token/0x8076c74c5e3f5852037f31ff0093eeb8c8add8d3?a=0xa66800b4cca86a26d6096a5e2eb0784205aedcb8) (last visited June 28, 2022).

23 <sup>102</sup> @SafeMoon 2.0 . Twitter (Apr. 23, 2021). [https://twitter.com/  
safemoon/status/1385695682665881601?s=20&t=TiHysl-LrvOAIcJW4uBntQ](https://twitter.com/safemoon/status/1385695682665881601?s=20&t=TiHysl-LrvOAIcJW4uBntQ).

24 <sup>103</sup> Karony (@CptHodl). Twitter (Apr. 23, 2021). [https://twitter.com/  
CptHodl/status/1385696422889246728?s=20&t=TiHysl-LrvOAIcJW4uBntQ](https://twitter.com/CptHodl/status/1385696422889246728?s=20&t=TiHysl-LrvOAIcJW4uBntQ).

25 <sup>104</sup> Karony (@CptHodl), Twitter (May 1, 2021), [https://twitter.com/CptHodl/  
status/1388543343194484737?cxt=HHwWgsC55Yq0jMUmAAAA](https://twitter.com/CptHodl/status/1388543343194484737?cxt=HHwWgsC55Yq0jMUmAAAA): “Looking  
26 forward to tomorrow’s update on the wallet. We cannot go into all the features, but  
27 we will be showing the UI to you. New hint: the wallet is a component of Operation  
28 Pheonix. #SAFEMOONARMY #SAFEMOON #Evolution”: Smith  
(@papacthulu). Twitter (May 3, 2021). [https://twitter.com/papacthulu/status/  
1389320201699794951?s=20&t=ag5TXmcQakZZcLhD4-Kn\\_w](https://twitter.com/papacthulu/status/1389320201699794951?s=20&t=ag5TXmcQakZZcLhD4-Kn_w).

1 audit it had conducted from a Singapore-based company, CertiK.<sup>105</sup> The audit report  
2 created by CertiK (the “CertiK report”) on May 3, 2021, discovered that the  
3 Company’s developers had built an “addLiquidity function” into the SafeMoon  
4 protocol to reward a single “\_owner” address with significant sums of SAFE tokens  
5 over time. According to the CertiK report: “As a result, overtime the \_owner address  
6 will accumulate a significant portion of LP tokens” (worth approximately \$2.6  
7 billion in May 2021).<sup>106</sup> “If the \_owner is an EOA (Externally Owned Account),  
8 mishandling of its private key can have devastating consequences to the project as a  
9 whole.”<sup>107</sup>

10 207. Nasdaq explained the significance of this finding: “[a]n owner address  
11 will acquire the liquidity pool tokens generated by the Safemoon-BNB pool,” which  
12 “gives the owner control over tokens funded by Safemoon’s seller fee.”<sup>108</sup> In other  
13 words, the Company and the Executive Defendants had access to tokens supposedly  
14 locked in liquidity pools.

15 208. As Jasper Lawler, head of research at London Capital Group to the  
16 Financial Post, noted in an article in the *International Business Times*, “The manual  
17 burns, alongside the [C]ompany having a pretty large stake in the [SAFEMOON  
18 Tokens], just speaks to me of a manipulation risk. Whenever there’s some sort of  
19 mechanism to stop selling, that’s a bit of a warning sign.”

20 209. Another cryptocurrency blog described the problem with the manual  
21 burns as follows: “the creators [*i.e.*, the Executive Defendants] can choose to burn  
22 as much of the coin as they want, whenever they want, as this is basically like  
23 trusting the US government not to over inflate the currency. Yes, they have the  
24

25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26 <sup>105</sup> <https://www.certik.com/projects/safemoon> (last visited June 28, 2022).

27 <sup>106</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>107</sup> *Id.*

<sup>108</sup> <https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/should-you-or-anyone-buy-safemoon-2021-05-29>.

1 power to no over inflate the US dollar, but do they use it? Not always. See the  
2 problem?”

3 210. CertiK suggested that the project could mitigate that risk by assigning  
4 such privileged roles to multisig wallets, introducing a DAO, and even time-locking  
5 the centralized wallet. CertiK reported that the Company nevertheless rejected that  
6 advice. Instead, the Company provided a statement to CertiK indicating that the  
7 Executive Defendants **would not** pull funds from the liquidity pools, even though  
8 they could technically pull those funds:

9 In regards to owner control, we are a fair launch governed by a central  
10 board which is subject to governmental regulations and law. We are a  
11 legally registered entity in accordance to the law and jurisdiction in  
12 which we operate. SafeMoon is very different from other projects, and  
13 our differences provide more security for the community vs.  
14 anonymous teams and projects. Risks in regard to “rug pulls” or  
15 anything else is mitigated due to the fact that every member of  
16 SafeMoon would be subject to litigation and likely a swift prison  
17 sentence. Additionally, outside of the law, our social lives would be in  
18 ruin, and we would not be able to show our faces in public again, let  
19 alone get another job. This should be taken into account when looking  
20 at the SafeMoon project as a whole.<sup>109</sup>

21 211. Around this time, moreover, the Company misleadingly tweeted that it  
22 had been “approved” by CertiK.

23 212. On or about May 5, 2021, the Company, via its Reddit social media  
24 account, took in funds raised from “the community” to pay for multiple billboards  
25 that promoted the SAFEMOON Tokens as the “World’s Fastest Growing  
26  
27

28 <sup>109</sup> <https://www.certik.com/projects/safemoon>. (last visited Jun. 28, 2022).



Cryptocurrency” with the “Fastest Growing Crypto Community on Earth.” The following picture was posted on the Company’s Reddit account “r/SafeMoon”:<sup>110</sup>

SAFEMOON AT TIMES SQUARE, NEW YORK 🚀🚀🚀  
Feeling Bullish 📈



213. On May 10, 2021, the Company’s official Twitter account posted a video showing a different six-story billboard display with a SafeMoon advertisement with the caption: “#SAFEMOON has landed in Times Square! Thanks to the community who raised the funds to make this possible, we are overwhelmed with the billboard action across the globe . . . the message is strong. #SAFEMOON ARMY.”<sup>111</sup>

214. The trading volume of SAFEMOON Tokens saw a significant increase following the Company’s promotional efforts, rising over 46% from \$136.2 million

<sup>110</sup> @u/onadrift. SAFEMOON AT TIMES SQUARE, NEW YORK 🚀🚀🚀, Reddit (May 5, 2021), [https://www.reddit.com/r/SafeMoon/comments/n5bkvi/safemoon\\_at\\_times\\_square\\_new\\_york/](https://www.reddit.com/r/SafeMoon/comments/n5bkvi/safemoon_at_times_square_new_york/).

<sup>111</sup> @SafeMoon 2.0 🚀, Twitter (May 10, 2021), <https://t.co/yAb0i78OnG>: “🚀📈 #SAFEMOON has landed in Times Square! Thanks to the community who raised the funds to make this possible, we are overwhelmed with the billboard action across the globe . . . the message is strong. #SAFEMOONARMY.”



on May 9, 2021 to \$199.3 million on May 10, 2021.<sup>112</sup> While this spike in volume was occurring, Defendants were selling. For example, Keem sold 45.9 billion for approximately \$334,232 over the course of four transactions on May 9, 2022.

215. On May 13, 2021, Paul promoted SAFEMOON Tokens in an exchange he had with Grammy award winning rapper Juicy J on Twitter:<sup>113</sup>



216. Then on May 15, 2021, Paul bragged about his earlier promotion of the SAFEMOON Tokens:<sup>114</sup>



217. On May 15, 2021, Phillips promoted the SAFEMOON Tokens in a now-deleted post on Twitter by bluntly stating, “YES I HOLD #SAFEMOON NO SHIT! I ALSO HOLD . . . . (not holding advice).”<sup>115</sup>

<sup>112</sup> <https://www.certik.com/projects/safemoon> (last visited Jun. 28, 2022).

<sup>113</sup> Paul (@jakepaul), Twitter (May 13, 2021), <https://twitter.com/jakepaul/status/1392962577714528256?lang=en>: “@therealjuicyj YOU SAY NO TO SAFEMOON JUICY J CANT CANT CANT.”

<sup>114</sup> Paul (@jakepaul), Twitter (May 15, 2021), <https://twitter.com/jakepaul/status/1393719812547878913?lang=en>.

<sup>115</sup> See fn.14, *supra*.

1 218. Paul's promotional activities created a corresponding increase in people  
2 trading the SAFEMOON Tokens. In particular, the trading volume of SAFEMOON  
3 Tokens that spiked as a result of the promotional efforts of both the Company and  
4 Paul went from \$123 million on May 12, 2021 to \$152.7 million on May 13, 2021  
5 (+24%). Then, following a steep drop off in trading volume on the next trading day,  
6 Paul's May 15th tweet pumped the trading volume up again from \$36.6 million on  
7 May 14, 2021 to \$51.7 million on May 15, 2021 (***an increase of 41% from the***  
8 ***previous day)***).

9 219. On May 16, 2021, Karony tweeted that the Company was preparing to  
10 start a new project called "Operation Pheonix" in the Gambia. According to Karony,  
11 the Company was in talks with the Gambia for government approval of SafeMoon.<sup>116</sup>

12 220. Upon information and belief, this entire trip to the Gambia was a farce  
13 orchestrated by Karony, with the assistance of his parents, to increase the perceived  
14 status of SafeMoon and increase the trading volume in SAFEMOON Tokens.

15 221. On May 18, 2021, Promoter Defendant Portnoy, founder of the  
16 Barstool Sports blog, posted a video promoting the SAFEMOON Tokens. Portnoy  
17 posted the same video to his 2.6 million followers on Twitter. This promotion was  
18 watched by at least 1.5 million people the day Portnoy posted it online and was  
19 featured on Fox Business the following day. In the video, Portnoy recommended to  
20 his followers: "If it is a Ponzi, get in on the ground floor. To the Moon, safely we  
21 go." He further discloses that he had purchased \$40,000 in SAFEMOON Tokens  
22 and that "he will not sell in the near future." Within an hour of Portnoy's post, the  
23 price of SAFEMOON Tokens rose about 18%. Portnoy tweeted later that day: "Ps  
24 - #safemoon is up 25% since I adopted it" and "Rules of #SAFEMOON": "Always  
25 tell people you bought it," "Never sell it," "Get pucks in deep," and "Make memes."

26  
27 <sup>116</sup> Karony (@CptHodl). Twitter (May 16, 2021). <https://twitter.com/CptHodl/status/1394051218293538827?s=20&t=ldpTdv.M2xWE4M69nsVxoRA>: "There's  
28 so much excitement around Operation Pheonix. I wanted to recap that we are working to the ongoing conversations about SafeMoon in The Gambia."

222. The same day, Portnoy stated that he was looking into having his company, Barstool Sports, accept SAFEMOON Tokens. Portnoy was criticized for his promotion of SAFEMOON Tokens, by well-known finance/social media personality WSBCChairman: “You are one of the biggest financial influencers in the world. People can lose their homes or lives from the shit you’re promoting.”<sup>117</sup> Portnoy dismissed the criticism and posted a video imitating his critics as crying and stated: “Yo, buddy. Get yourself fucking together. I didn’t fucking say anything. Why so like fucking mean and crying like a baby.”

223. Portnoy’s promotional video was massively successful in increasing the trading volume of the SAFEMOON Tokens. In particular, *the trading volume of SAFEMOON Tokens soared over 650% in a single day as a result of Portnoy’s efforts*, going from \$29.9 million on May 18, 2021 to \$226.4 million on May 19, 2021.<sup>118</sup> On May 19, 2021, Portnoy reiterated in a now deleted tweet: “I’m in it for the long haul anyway. #DiamondHands.” He would similarly state on May 23, 2021 on Twitter: “I only buy. Never sell.”<sup>119</sup>

224. On or about May 20, 2021, Ginger resigned his moderator position with the Company in order to join on a separate cryptocurrency project that Smith, Wyatt, Church, and Nagy were working on: the Piggy Token. In particular, Ginger was invited to serve as the moderator for the soon-to-be-formed social media account for the Piggy Tokens. Ginger took the position and worked with Smith, Wyatt, and Nagy for months before eventually leaving after accusing Smith and Nagy, in particular, of defrauding Piggy Token investors (and himself).

<sup>117</sup> <https://twitter.com/WSBCChairman/status/1394431354021027840?s=20&t=auD5a5qR2oSethxyHYQ3A>. (last visited Jun. 28, 2022).

<sup>118</sup> <https://bscscan.com/token/0x8076c74c5e3f5852037f31ff0093eeb8c8add8d3?a=0xa66800b4cca86a26d6096a5e2eb0784205aedcb8>. (last visited June 27, 2022).

<sup>119</sup> <https://twitter.com/stoolpresidente/status/1396534971813318660?s=20&t=BP8McMV7rZe9LfhBpXeKw>.

1       225.       On May 22, 2021, an auditing company, HashEx, published an audit  
2 report on the Company’s smart contracts that was created for a SAFEMOON Token  
3 investor (the “HashEx report”).<sup>120</sup> The stated purpose of the audit was to “identify  
4 potential security issues with smart contracts” and “formally check the logic behind  
5 given smart contracts.”<sup>121</sup> The HashEx report ultimately found the Company’s smart  
6 contracts had two “critical” and three “high” severity security issues/vulnerabilities  
7 with the SAFEMOON Token that could be exploited for fraudulent purposes. The  
8 HashEx report defines an issue as critical “if it may cause unlimited losses or breaks  
9 the workflow of the contract and could be easily triggered.” High severity issues are  
10 defined as those that “may lead to limited losses or break interaction with users or  
11 other contracts under very specific conditions.” One of the critical severity issues  
12 that the HashEx report identified was related to SafeMoon’s “Ownable contract.”  
13 Notably, as part of the analysis of this critical severity vulnerability, the HashEx  
14 report disclosed that the SAFEMOON Token contract was merely a modified  
15 version of another, publicly available Ownable contract from OpenZeppelin.<sup>122</sup>

16       226.       Around the same time, commentators began to raise concerns that  
17 SafeMoon was a Ponzi Scheme. For example, on May 19, 2021, *Fortune* noted:  
18 “Critics, though, have taken aim at SafeMoon, saying the team that owns it owns the  
19 majority of the liquidity and have likened it to a Ponzi scheme.”<sup>123</sup> The same day,  
20 an article on *Protos* stated: “But what SafeMoon resembles most is the crypto-  
21 powered Ponzi games once popular on Ethereum, like Proof-of-Weak Hands 3D  
22 (PoWH3d). These games – which are now bleeding into the Binance Smart Chain  
23

24 \_\_\_\_\_  
25 <sup>120</sup> Polly Traore, *Safemoon smart contract audit report*, HASHEX (May 22,  
26 2021), <https://blog.hashex.org/safemoon-smart-contract-audit-report-8e4b843a375d>.

27 <sup>121</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>122</sup> *Id.*

<sup>123</sup> <https://fortune.com/2021/05/19/crypto-crash-safemoon-price-fluctuations-volatility-cryptocurrency/>. (last visited Jun. 28, 2022).

ecosystem – are designed to mimic real-life Ponzi schemes.”<sup>124</sup> An article from May 30, 2021, in *Entrepreneur* likewise observed:

SafeMoon has also been compared to Bitconnect, which turned out to be nothing but a Ponzi Scheme, where any profits made in the future would be based on someone paying more for the token than you did further down the line. This would mean that early adopters would be the main beneficiary of the system, leaving only the scraps for late joiners. As cryptocurrency investor and influencer Lark Davis said: “Remember, just because you make money off a Ponzi does not change the fact that it is a Ponzi.”<sup>125</sup>

227. Shortly after the HashEx report was released, and as criticism of SafeMoon was mounting, Arriaga began working on the Company’s behalf. While he officially joined the Company as its Global Head of Products in July 2021, Arriaga had been operating as an undisclosed promotor of the SAFEMOON Tokens prior to taking on this titled position. Arriaga, using “The Fud Hound” as a pseudonym,<sup>126</sup> worked as the *de facto* public relations/damage control officer for the Company since at least May 24, 2021.<sup>127</sup>

228. Arriaga’s primary job was to attack and discredit anyone publicly spreading fear, uncertainty, or doubt (aka “FUD”) about the Company or the SAFEMOON Tokens.

229. On May 24, 2021, Arriaga created “The FUD Hound” YouTube page. Although he explained his channel was to be “dedicated to exposing opportunists

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<sup>124</sup> <https://protos.com/safemoon-fbi-ties-ponzi-games-crypto-protocol-dave-portnoy-shill/> (last visited Jun. 28, 2022).

<sup>125</sup> <https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/372691> (last visited Jun. 28, 2022).

<sup>126</sup> Upon information and belief, Arriaga also used the username “u/Influencer\_CEO\_Techy” as another alias to anonymously promote and hype the SAFEMOON Tokens to users on the social media platform, Reddit.

<sup>127</sup> The Safemoon Hound (@TheFudHound), Twitter (May 24, 2021), <https://twitter.com/TheFudHound/status/1396917364642385920?cxt=HHwWgMCswaS87OImAAAA>: “Thank you 🙏.”

1 and shillers of FUD,” his videos were nothing more than promotions of  
2 SAFEMOON Tokens that sought to rebut specific criticisms of the Company.  
3 Indeed, each of Arriaga’s six videos as “The FUD Hound” concerned SafeMoon.

4 230. On May 24, 2021, Arriaga uploaded an approximately 30-minute video  
5 titled “Safemoon Reedemed! [sic]”<sup>128</sup> The video’s description also provided the  
6 following statement from Arriaga:

7 Safemoon FUD is the newest desperation tactic that some YouTubers  
8 and opportunists are taking advantage of. Many people who scream  
9 “Ponzi Scheme” or “Scam” before doing their own research are those  
10 that can easily be discredited for their lazy and half-baked analysis. In  
11 this video is an example of such.

12 Remember, there are YouTube opportunists everywhere, most will ride  
13 a trend or movement to which they know nothing about in order to get  
14 views and hopefully pick up some naïve subscribers along the way.  
15 They care not about the damage and destruction they cause for they are  
16 only in the game for themselves.

17 I expose these people for who they are. Enjoy.

18 231. In the *Safemoon Reedemed!* Video, there are clips of videos from other  
19 YouTube channels warning young and naïve investors to stay away from projects  
20 like SafeMoon because it could be a scam and/or displays “Ponzi scheme”  
21 characteristics. Arriaga cynically accuses these other video creators of manipulating  
22 the emotions of investors and then proceeds to undermine those warnings in an effort  
23 to maintain positive sentiment towards the Company and the SAFEMOON Tokens.

24 232. In particular, Arriaga stated:

25 My mission is to analyze and expose those that use FUD to manipulate  
26 you for their own personal gain. Now I came across this video on  
27

28 <sup>128</sup> The FUD Hound, *Safemoon Reedemed!*, YouTube (May 24, 2021),  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ARuxp8Va0bw>.



1 Youtube and I was shocked at how inaccurate, sloppy, and fallacious  
2 this person's arguments were when concerning a new popular  
3 cryptocurrency called SAFEMOON. SAFEMOON, if you haven't  
4 heard, is absolutely killing it on the headlines and is gaining organic  
5 steam like we haven't witnessed since Bitcoin. But with that comes a  
6 whole lot of predators and opportunists that will emerge from the  
7 shadows and ride the coattails of a movement to try to be seen and  
8 heard, no matter the damage they cause. So without further ado, let's  
9 have a few good laughs at the discredited points this Youtuber makes  
10 regarding SAFEMOON being a Ponzi Scheme.

11 (*Id.*)

12 233. In the video, Arriaga mocks the critic and claims that he "doesn't  
13 understand basic finance or basic financial markets." Arriaga proceeds to analogize  
14 SAFEMOON tokens to stocks, asserting that, like a stock, SafeMoon **cannot** be a  
15 Ponzi Scheme, because the value of tokens will also rise if the project succeeds:

16 Look at any asset class in the world. You can well define it as a Ponzi  
17 scheme, however you can't with stocks because they're based on  
18 intrinsic value. They're based on the intrinsic value of a company. So  
19 as the company does well and it releases features, guess what? The  
20 stock goes up. As the company does bad or has bad PR, the stock goes  
21 down. Now, just because you got into a company before IPO does that  
22 mean that you got into a Ponzi scheme? No, no, that actually doesn't.  
23 Now you don't need your Series A to understand this very basic  
24 concept. So when you don't understand finance like this person right  
25 here and then you throw up a video on YouTube so you can try to ride  
26 the coattails of a movement and pick up subscribers along the way,  
27 doesn't really make you right, it just makes you wildly inaccurate and  
28 shows that you don't know anything about finance. . .

1 I wouldn't call SafeMoon a Ponzi Scheme because SafeMoon has  
2 intrinsic value. You can see it on the road map. Just like any other  
3 startup in the world. For example, just because I raise money for my  
4 startup based on a business plan and I have no company built yet, do  
5 you think that that the investors who invested in me are going to call  
6 me a Ponzi Scheme in the time that it takes me to actually build out a  
7 technological product or build out a product? No, they're not going to  
8 call me a Ponzi Scheme, they're going to say, hey, you need the capital  
9 so you can start building your vision, so you can start building those  
10 features. This is the exact same thing that cryptocurrency allows new  
11 entrepreneurs to do. They allow companies, new companies, new  
12 vision of a concept to be launched and then be built on a particular  
13 blockchain or a particular token.

14 Now in this particular example, we're talking about SafeMoon. And  
15 with SafeMoon, what they've done is they said, hey, we have a road  
16 map, thank you for investing in this coin, thank you for investing in this  
17 product. This is what we plan to get done. And everything that they've  
18 planned to get done, along the way, their goals have been hit. Guess  
19 what? With a Ponzi Scheme, there are no goals to be hit, there are no  
20 products to be released.

21 (*Id.*)

22 234. With respect to SafeMoon's 10% transaction tax (which, as noted  
23 above, is intended to discourage existing holders from selling), Arriaga states: "Let  
24 me go ahead and school [the critic] on something here. This is also a concept that's  
25 used in the real world. It's called stock dividends bud and it's a redistributing stock  
26 back to holders." (*Id.*)

27 235. At the end of the video, Arriaga further attacked the critic and issued a  
28 threat to future critics of SafeMoon:

1 I was able to hop on YouTube and then find your little FUD video,  
2 trying to point fingers and call SafeMoon a Ponzi Scheme, when you  
3 don't even have the most basic concepts of understanding about the  
4 cryptocurrency space. You see something wrong with that? People  
5 who are watching this, people like this, they push out content because  
6 they're opportunists. They want to get follows, they want to get views,  
7 they want to pique the Youtube algorithms for their own game and it  
8 doesn't matter what kind of damage and destruction they do to  
9 everything else. They just want to get content out there because they're  
10 thinking about themselves. Be careful, there are FUDsters like this  
11 everywhere. And no matter who you are or where you're from, I will  
12 find you. And I will expose you.

13 (*Id.*)

14 236. The following day, May 25, 2021, the @TheFudHound Twitter account  
15 was created. Arriaga uploaded his first video and immediately began threatening  
16 so-called FUDsters.

17 237. For example, in one of his later tweets on May 25, 2021, Arriaga stated  
18 that he had the "Next #SAFEMOON FUDster in the crosshairs.  
19 #SAFEMOONARMY will love Expose #2. The hound is on the scent, next video  
20 will be even better." Arriaga announced that "Project #StoptheFUD started  
21 yesterday" and threatened potential naysayers: "We are #SafeMoonCommunity  
22 think before you post misinfo because I won't hold back."

23 238. May 28, 2021, Arriaga released his next video as "The FUD Hound,"  
24 titled "Safemoon redeemed, once again." Like his previous video, "Safemoon  
25 redeemed, once again" addresses a particular video criticizing SafeMoon:

26 Sadly, the video I'm about to critique has almost 700,000 views at the  
27 time of this filming. That means that thousands or even hundreds of  
28 thousands of interested investors who have viewed this video and may

1 be unfamiliar with SafeMoon are now influenced by bad logic and  
2 inaccurate information. This is where I clear the air and I expose those  
3 that put popularity before others and cause irreparable damage on well-  
4 meaning companies and movements because they haven't performed  
5 their own basic research.

6 (*Id.*)

7 239. In his video, Arriaga claims that SAFEMOON “is one of the very very  
8 few cryptocurrencies that serve to enrich the people rather than serve to enrich a  
9 small group of investors that got in early.” (*Id.*) To support his claim that  
10 SAFEMOON Tokens are valuable assets, he – once again – compares SAFEMOON  
11 Tokens to stock: “Just like Tesla, the product here is the company in which  
12 SAFEMOON coin represents, much like how a stock represents liquidity for Tesla.”

13 240. On May 31, 2021, the Company posted a short video to its social media  
14 accounts generally promoting the SafeMoon “TOKENOMICS” with images  
15 indicating that investors would be happy to receive the SafeMoon Reflections.<sup>129</sup>

16 241. In another post that day, the Company continued its efforts to promote  
17 SafeMoon’s “tokenomics” to investors, announcing that “Another exchange has  
18 enabled #SAFEMOON tokenomics.”<sup>130</sup>

19 242. Notably, throughout May 2021 and June 2021, as the price of the  
20 SAFEMOON Tokens were near the all-time highs, Smith continued to sell off large  
21 portions of his SAFEMOON Token holdings and/or slowly draining SafeMoon’s  
22 liquidity pool along with other Executive Defendants like Nagy and Karony. In  
23 particular, Smith sold at least over 80 billion of his pre-mined SAFEMOON Tokens  
24 for 900 BNB over this time period.

25  
26 <sup>129</sup> @SafeMoon 2.0  , Twitter (May 31, 2021), <https://t.co/RXFOFdPZ2C>:  
“TOKENOMICS   #SAFEMOON.”

27 <sup>130</sup> @SafeMoon 2.0  , Twitter (May 31, 2021), <https://t.co/NNKuwT3irY>:  
28 “ANOTHER EXCHANGE HAS ENABLED #SAFEMOON TOKENOMICS.  
@bitbns.”

243. Upon information and belief, one of Smith’s wallet addresses is 0x05d1C1 (“Smith Wallet 1”).<sup>131</sup> Using this wallet as a starting point, a BSCscan search of Smith’s transactions from this wallet show a series of transfers to other undisclosed wallets under his control and/or ownership.

244. For example, Smith Wallet 1 sent 100 Binance Coin (“BNB”) – upon information and belief, these BNB tokens were either siphoned from the SafeMoon liquidity pool by Smith or a part of Smith’s pre-sale SAFEMOON Tokens – to wallet address 0x05c02 (“Smith Wallet 2”).<sup>132</sup> An hour later, Smith Wallet 2 transferred 99.99 BNB to a third wallet address that has received funds from Smith several times: 0x21d45.

245. At the time of this filing, wallet address 0x05c02 has over \$110 million in various Binance-pegged tokens – with almost \$39 million in BNB alone.<sup>133</sup> Much, if not all, of this money can be traced via the immutable blockchain back to Smith’s conduct as a developer and selling of SAFEMOON Tokens.

246. On June 1, 2021, the Company attempted to reassure SAFEMOON Token investors, after four consecutive days of decreasing trading volume and downward selling pressure had caused the price of the SAFEMOON Tokens to drop. In a play on investors’ emotions and feelings of goodwill, the Company published a post on Twitter that stated, “No rug pulls here,” above a picture of several puppies with photoshopped SafeMoon badges.<sup>134</sup>

<sup>131</sup> <https://bscscan.com/address/0x05d1c1defa31c257d3206f2af99aa16dbbf05d46> (last visited Feb. 28, 2022).

<sup>132</sup> <https://bscscan.com/address/0x5c0c255516423b64b21e5a2c7aaa8ab6bf3d0d91> (last visited Feb. 28, 2022).

<sup>133</sup> <https://bscscan.com/address/0x21d45650db732ce5df77685d6021d7d5d1da807f> (last visited Feb. 28, 2022).

<sup>134</sup> @SafeMoon 2.0 , Twitter (June 1, 2021), <https://t.co/r4ZpbmEoME>: “ #SAFEMOON SECURITY REPORTING FOR DUTY!  .

1       247.       On June 2, 2021, Arriaga published a video titled, “Hashex Safemoon  
2       Audit DEBUNKED,” in response to the criticisms leveled in the Hashex report.<sup>135</sup>  
3       In the caption to this video, Arriaga stated:

4               Hashex audit on Safemoon exposed in this expose. Is a SafeMoon  
5               Blockchain a possibility? I analyze a little of who Hashex is as well as  
6               their independent critical audit finds that were publicized and used to  
7               discredit SafeMoon. However, there are some holes in this logic as  
8               well as “who” Hashex is. *While uncovering holes in the Hashex audit,*  
9               *I take you down the rabbit hole and reveal how SafeMoon has*  
10              *positioned itself to keep hold of its cards should they decide that a*  
11              *SafeMoon Blockchain is something to pursue. SafeMoon is*  
12              *encountering FUD from all directions. This may be due to the*  
13              *immense threat SafeMoon poses to those already in power positions*  
14              *in the Blockchain space.*

15       [Emphasis added.]

16       248.       In the video itself, Arriaga downplayed the findings of the Hashex  
17       report, calling it, among other things, a “cheap shot” and dismissing the audit’s  
18       finding that there was a critical issue in the code for the SAFEMOON Token that  
19       could result in the liquidity pool being drained.

20       249.       Arriaga also stated that the Company had purposefully not “locked” the  
21       liquidity pool so that the Company would have the flexibility to deploy the capital  
22       within the liquidity pool to fund “innovative” projects instead of it being unavailable  
23       because it was locked up elsewhere.<sup>136</sup>

25       <sup>135</sup>       Arriaga, *Hashex Safemoon Audit DEBUNKED!*, YouTube (June 2, 2021),  
26       <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rB1m7NiaekA>.

27       <sup>136</sup>       This statement by Arriaga demonstrates that the Company’s earlier social  
28       media posts about having two liquidity pools locked until 2025 were misleading and  
      simply meant to trick investors who were worried about the ability of insiders like  
      the Executive and Promoter Defendants to run off with their money into believing  
      that their investments in SAFEMOON Tokens were safe.



250. The promotional efforts of the Company and Arriaga were successful insomuch as trading volume rose approximately 40%, from \$17.8 million on June 1, 2021, to \$29.6 million on June 2, 2021.

251. On June 3, 2021, the Company again promoted the “tokenomics” of the SAFEMOON Tokens and promised investors that “Holding is Rewarding.”<sup>137</sup> Another Twitter post from the Company that same day indicated that investors needed to “HODL” since “WE’RE ALL IN THIS TOGETHER! #SAFEMOON.”<sup>138</sup>

252. The next day, the Company’s Twitter account resumed its efforts to reassure investors and stabilize the trading volume of SAFEMOON Tokens. In particular, the Company posted an animated video of a SafeMoon “FUD Monster” being revealed to be a rat that runs away when exposed. The caption for this post states: “FUD MONSTER IN REALITY . . . #SAFEMOON#FAMILYNOTFUD.”<sup>139</sup>

253. On June 5, 2021, Witriol was interviewed on a question-and-answer video that was uploaded to YouTube. During the interview, Witriol is identified as the “go to” person with the Company who knows “what’s going on” with SafeMoon.<sup>140</sup> Witriol also touted the “tokenomics” of the SAFEMOON Tokens and that there is “a lot to look forward to” with the Company. He assured investors that there was a “low chance of a rug pull” because Karony would “lose his credentials” with the Department of Defense.<sup>141</sup>

254. On June 6, 2021, the Company thanked SafeMoon investors and boasted that SafeMoon was poised to increase significantly in price: “Above all

<sup>137</sup> @SafeMoon 2.0 , Twitter (June 3, 2021), <https://t.co/6cvThDmJ2Y>: “HOLDING IS REWARDING   #SAFEMOON.”

<sup>138</sup> @SafeMoon 2.0 , Twitter (June 3, 2021), <https://t.co/U1nYcRokGu>.

<sup>139</sup> @SafeMoon 2.0 , Twitter (June 4, 2021), <https://t.co/T9GHP81D87>: “FUD MONSTER IN REALITY. . .  #SAFEMOON #FAMILYNOTFUD <https://t.co/T9GHP81D87>.”

<sup>140</sup> See fn.5, *supra*.

<sup>141</sup> *Id.*

1 other projects and tokens, SafeMoon has proved one thing . . . cryptocurrency may  
2 be young but very much on route to the moon.”<sup>142</sup>

3 255. On June 7, 2021, Karony announced that the Company had “identified  
4 glaring security gaps with a lot of wallet providers” and was in the process of  
5 “integrating game changing encryption into the wallet.” Karony then  
6 unambiguously declared that, “The SafeMoon wallet will be one of / if not the  
7 strongest wallets on the market. #SAFEMOON is the #Evolution!”<sup>143</sup>

8 256. Karony went on to state that, “[w]e have come to the conclusion that  
9 it’s just better to do things yourself,” indicating to investors that SafeMoon decided  
10 to create its own wallet due to the vulnerabilities in existing cryptocurrency  
11 wallets.<sup>144</sup> Karony also alluded to the “crypto world” being “ironically archaic, and  
12 toxic,” and hinting that “someone” was copying SafeMoon while simultaneously  
13 trying to “cyber bully and attack” Defendants.

14 257. That same day, June 7, 2021, Arriaga released another so-called exposé  
15 video that attacks another YouTuber for warning investors that the SAFEMOON  
16 Tokens were a “\$500 million dollar scam” and generally “shilling FUD about well-  
17 meaning companies” like SafeMoon.<sup>145</sup>

18  
19 <sup>142</sup> @SafeMoon 2.0 , Twitter (June 6, 2021), [https://twitter.com/safemoon/status/1401617178638622724?s=20&t=4i0FP5\\_ox1QpuQ-AX5OtzW](https://twitter.com/safemoon/status/1401617178638622724?s=20&t=4i0FP5_ox1QpuQ-AX5OtzW): “To all our  
20 loyal HOLDERS! Thank you . . . you have been there on our ups and our downs,  
21 #SAFEMOON is a community. . . a family. Above all other projects and tokens  
safemoon has proved one thing. . . cryptocurrency maybe young but very much on  
route to the moon  .

22 <sup>143</sup> Karony (@CptHodl), Twitter (June 7, 2021), [https://twitter.com/CptHodl/status/1401904812409696257?s=20&t=0JHkaogN0eltPoTdU6K\\_6g](https://twitter.com/CptHodl/status/1401904812409696257?s=20&t=0JHkaogN0eltPoTdU6K_6g): “We also  
23 identified glaring security gaps with a lot of wallet providers. We are integrating  
24 game changing encryption into the wallet. The SafeMoon wallet will be one of / if  
not the strongest wallets on the market. #SAFEMOON is the #Evolution!”

25 <sup>144</sup> Karony (@CptHodl), Twitter (June 7, 2021), <https://twitter.com/CptHodl/status/1401909541105774598>: “We have come to the conclusion that it’s just better  
26 to do things yourself. The crypto world is ironically archaic, and toxic. Someone  
27 copies what you did, then repeatedly tries to cyber bully and attack you. Stop. When  
one wins we all win. Other tokens are not the enemy.”

28 <sup>145</sup> Arriaga, *Safemoon redeemed a 3rd time*, YouTube (June 7, 2021),  
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G8QJm6\\_aKgw](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G8QJm6_aKgw).

258. These various efforts by Arriaga at damage control allowed Defendants to increase and/or stabilize the trading volume for a short period of time.

259. On June 11, 2021, Karony announced that he was “[h]appy to say [the SafeMoon team is] smashing out our internal deadlines.” Karony then hinted at imminent release dates for promised features for “the Wallet, exchange and more importantly Operation Pheonix.”

260. In another public post from the same day, the Company’s official Twitter account bragged, “WE SAID WE’D BRING YOU A SHOW! THE #SAFEMOONWALLET IS JUST THE BEGINNING . . . .”<sup>146</sup>

261. On June 13, 2021, Karony, in an apparent effort to have investors associate SAFEMOON with the popular cryptocurrency Dogecoin and its unofficial ambassador, Elon Musk, cited to the Company’s Chief Blockchain Officer, Thomas Smith, and his being “involved with the Doge Coin x SpaceX partnership.”<sup>147</sup>

262. That same day, Arriaga released a purported exposé video titled, “Crypto Genesis spreads FUD about SafeMoon – DEBUNKED,” wherein he again dismissed criticisms about SafeMoon as invalid “FUD” and threatened to expose anyone speaking negatively about the Company.<sup>148</sup>

263. On June 21, 2021, Arriaga released his sixth and final video on *the FUD Hound* YouTube channel, which was titled, “Matt Wallace bashes Safemoon and

<sup>146</sup> @SafeMoon 2.0 , Twitter (June 7, 2021), <https://twitter.com/safemoon/status/1403431640777510916?s=20&t=HSZFEiryLjHn9PrjFQP1xw>: “WE SAID WE’D BRING YOU A SHOW! THE #SAFEMOONWALLET IS JUST THE BEGINNING. . .  .

<sup>147</sup> Karony (@CptHodl), Twitter (June 13, 2021), <https://twitter.com/CptHodl/status/1404104687566086149?cxt=HHwWioCzncXxsPwmAAAA>: “We have no issues with Doge Coin. Fun fact, the SafeMoon Chief Blockchain Officer was involved with the Doge Coin x SpaceX partnership. So yes, you will be able to hold Doge on #SAFEMOONWALLET. That’s where I’ll be holding mine. #SAFEMOON is the #Evolution!”

<sup>148</sup> Arriaga, *Crypto Genesis spreads FUD about Safemoon – DEBUNKED*, YouTube (June 13, 2021), [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zSbbt\\_JralU](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zSbbt_JralU).

1 then gets destroyed!” with a laughing face emoji.<sup>149</sup> In the caption to the video,  
2 Arriaga claims that SafeMoon critic Matt Wallace’s research was “lazy and  
3 misleading.” Then, in an apparent attempt to persuade investors into ignoring  
4 Wallace’s warnings about the SAFEMOON Tokens, Arriaga attempted to whip up  
5 a mob mentality within the SafeMoon community, by encouraging them to “witness  
6 [Wallace] getting owned on a live-stream as he comes unprepared with zero facts”  
7 and to “[w]atch this epic display of failure as this FUDster gets exposed.”<sup>150</sup>

8 264. In July 2021, Arriaga “officially” joined the Company as its Global  
9 Head of Products.

10 265. On July 14, 2021, Witriol participated in an “Ask Me Anything”  
11 interview (“AMA”) wherein he made numerous statements on behalf of the  
12 Company.<sup>151</sup> For example, in response to a question from a SAFEMOON Token  
13 investor about the Company’s prospects, Witriol stated that he was “more excited  
14 now than when I joined the team” and that investors were “gonna like what you  
15 hear” in the near future.<sup>152</sup>

16 266. Witriol went on to declare that he was “[m]ore bullish now than I was  
17 two weeks ago before I joined the team.”<sup>153</sup> This statement is at odds with Witriol’s  
18 earlier comments that he was with the Company since “day one or day two” when  
19 he met with Karony.<sup>154</sup> Upon information and belief, Witriol knew that his  
20 statements about the Company’s prospects and him only joining the Company “two  
21 weeks ago” were false when he made them. In particular, Witriol appears to have  
22

23  
24 <sup>149</sup> Arriaga, *Matt Wallace bashes Safemoon and then gets destroyed!* 😂, YouTube (June 21, 2021), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z0qVSbwSnEc>.

25 <sup>150</sup> *Id.*

26 <sup>151</sup> *SAFEMOON SHAUN WITRIOL TWITTER SPACES AMA (FULL) 7/14/21*, YouTube (July 15, 2021), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ow0M9bh1mNE>.

27 <sup>152</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>153</sup> *Id.*

<sup>154</sup> *See* fn. 5, *supra*.

1 made the latter statement in an effort to distance himself from the Company and the  
2 other Executive Defendants.

3 267. Within a month of Witriol's AMA interview and in the final weeks  
4 before the promised launch of the SafeMoon wallet (*i.e.*, August 2021), Witriol left  
5 the Company.

6 268. Around the same time, the price of SAFEMOON Tokens was dropping  
7 precipitously due to immense downward selling pressure for large holders.  
8 "SafeMoon has witnessed whales dumping in large proportions from June to July  
9 2021."<sup>155</sup> As reported in the *International Business Times* article, "*Mysterious*  
10 *SafeMoon Investor Dumps 2.4 Trillion Coins, Value Falls 28% in the Day's Trade*,"  
11 the value of the SAFEMOON Tokens dropped 28% on July 31, 2021 in "the largest  
12 sell-off for July 2021," caused by a "domino effect of panic selling." In response to  
13 this, Phillips took to Twitter on August 2, 2021, to talk tough to the unknown whale  
14 who sold the 2.4 trillion SAFEMOON Tokens stating, "F\*\*\*ING  
15 IRRESPONSIBLE WHALE. . . I HOPE YOU GET HIT BY A BUS."<sup>156</sup> Neither  
16 the Company, nor the Executive Defendants denounced Phillips' statement or even  
17 commented on it at all.

18 269. The price and trading volume for the SAFEMOON Tokens began to  
19 stabilize after the Company and the Executive Defendants began promoting the  
20 scheduled SafeMoon wallet launch more aggressively in the lead up.  
21  
22  
23  
24

25 <sup>155</sup> Vinod DSouza, *Crypto Influencer Ben Phillips Wishes Death to SafeMoon*  
26 *Whale: 'I Hope you Get Hit by a Bus,'*, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (Aug. 2,  
2021), <https://www.ibtimes.sg/crypto-influencer-ben-phillips-wishes-death-safe-moon-whale-i-hope-you-get-hit-by-bus-59293>.

27 <sup>156</sup> See Vinod DSouza, *Mysterious SafeMoon Investor Dumps 2.4 Trillion Coins,*  
28 *Value Falls 28% in the Day's Trade*, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (July 31,  
2021), <https://www.ibtimes.sg/mysterious-safemoon-investor-dumps-2-4-trillion-coins-value-falls-28-days-trade-59232>.

270. On August 14, 2021, the Company’s Twitter account posted a minute-long video advertisement for the SafeMoon wallet.<sup>157</sup> The video told investors that:

- “It’s time to get serious about the SAFEMOON wallet”
- “We take intuitive design, and strive for perfection”
- “The future of trading is here”
- “Ease of use built for all”
- “Full Launch 28th of August”
- “Available on Android and iOS”

271. Following the release of this commercial, *trading volume for SAFEMOON Tokens almost quadrupled* from \$11.4 million on August 14, 2021 to \$43.7 million on August 16, 2021.

272. On August 20, 2021, Way touted the financial benefits of investing in SafeMoon (and SafeMoon-related services like the SAFEMOON Tokens?) to his Twitter followers, stating, among other things, that he was “getting paid out in @SafeMoon constantly. . . .”<sup>158</sup>

273. The trading volume for SAFEMOON Tokens increased following Way’s promotion, going from \$14.6 million on August 19, 2021, to \$20.8 million on August 20, 2021 (a 42% increase).<sup>159</sup>

274. On August 19, 2021 and August 24, 2021, Karony stated, on his personal Twitter account, that he was “Looking forward to #SAFEMOONWALLET launch on August 28th!”<sup>160</sup>

<sup>157</sup> @SafeMoon 2.0 , Twitter (Aug. 14, 2021), <https://t.co/atarzOUuX7>: “THANK YOU FOR ALL THE SUPPORT ON THE JOURNEY TO THE #SAFEMOONWALLET LAUNCH   COMING SOON AUGUST 28TH.”

<sup>158</sup> Way (@souljaboy), Twitter (Aug. 20, 2022), <https://twitter.com/souljaboy/status/1428847986759462917?lang=en>.

<sup>159</sup> *Id.*

<sup>160</sup> Karony (@CptHodl), Twitter (Aug. 24, 2021), <https://t.co/m9CrVLGy9L>: “1 million followers in under 6 months. This is a huge achievement. Looking forward to the #SAFEMOONWALLET launch on August 28th. Let’s evolve together! #SAFEMOON #SAFEMOONARMY”; *id.*: “Meetup at the billboard? Looking



1 275. The trading volume rose in the days leading up to the launch of the  
2 SafeMoon wallet from \$13.5 million on both August 19 and 24 up to \$54.6 million  
3 on August 28 – an increase of over 300%. That day, August 28, 2021, Portnoy  
4 tweeted: “#safemoon is going parabolic.” He had affirmed just ten days earlier that  
5 he continued to hold 4.5 billion SAFEMOON Tokens and stated on September 2, in  
6 an interview on Fox Business, that he was not going to sell his SAFEMOON Tokens.

7 276. On August 28, 2021, the Company repeatedly announced on its social  
8 media platforms that the launch of the SafeMoon wallet was scheduled for that day  
9 at 4PM EST. But when the moment for the launch arrived, the Company did not  
10 release the SafeMoon wallet as previously promised.

11 277. The Company released the following statement concerning the failed  
12 release of the SafeMoon wallet:

13 Wallet Update

14 SAFEMOONARMY – Thank you for bearing with us!

15 We’ve experience unforeseen technical issues on launching all 3  
16 products at the same time (website buy & swap, android wallet & IOS  
17 wallet).

18 We’re working around the clock to fix the issues and to ensure we give  
19 you the quality experience you deserve. So we can manage demand,  
20 will be releasing each product in a staggered approach (one by one) –  
21 starting with the website buy & swap function – today.

22 We apologise for the delay. We hear all of you. We can’t wait to bring  
23 you all home.<sup>161</sup>

24  
25  
26  
27 forward to #SAFEMOONWALLET launch on August 28th! #SAFEMOON is the  
#Evolution!”

28 <sup>161</sup> @SafeMoon 2.0  Twitter (Aug. 28, 2021), <https://twitter.com/safemoon/status/1431737961796747267?s=20&t=asnTTweZ9AovC9VEdUFRwQ>.

1 278. After two days without the promised release of the wallet function, the  
2 Company disseminated a second announcement on August 30, 2021, regarding the  
3 delay:

4 Wallet Update

5 What's the hold-up? #SAFEMOON

6 Here's a #SAFEMOONWALLET update from CEO John Karony.

7 Hype and FUD to one side, here is more detail on what happened over  
8 the last 48 hours:

9 As you know, we worked extensively towards the wallet launch on the  
10 28th of August. However, the technical issues experienced at 4:00PM  
11 (BST) created unforeseen side effects that the product development  
12 teams have been unable to resolve yet (for re-approval from Apple &  
13 Google). No reasons for an unsuccessful launch were brought to my  
14 attention prior to 4PM, and for that I apologise as I promised you, our  
15 community a product worth waiting for. It's still coming, we just have  
16 to wait a bit longer. If I had been made aware of the issues now known,  
17 the launch would not have gone ahead.

18 Our aim is to deliver the safest wallet on the planet – we won't launch  
19 any product unless it's the best it could possibly be, for you.

20 We have all been working around the clock to address the technical  
21 issues and have come to the conclusion that ***we need to delay the wallet***  
22 ***launch. I have been reassured by SAFEMOON's Global Head of***  
23 ***Product [i.e., Defendant Arriaga] that this will be fixed swiftly and***  
24 ***efficiently***, and we have the utmost confidence it will.

25 ***All SAFEMOON staff are on hand to support the Global Head of***  
26 ***Product and make sure he has endless resources to deliver the wallet.***  
27  
28

1 The wallet launch is my utmost priority and I am committed to get you  
2 an update as soon as I can. We are all disappointed. But our focus  
3 remains on ensuring you get the wallet you deserve.

4 Thank you for your continued support and patience. The wallet is  
5 coming and it will be worth the wait.

6 We are family, we are SAFEMOON.<sup>162</sup>

7 [Emphasis added.]

8 279. The price of the SAFEMOON Token, and its trading volume,  
9 plummeted in the wake of the failed launch of the wallet. The price went from a  
10 high of \$0.00000355 to a low of \$0.0000014 (a 60.5% decrease). The Company and  
11 the Executive Defendants nevertheless continued to dangle the prospect of the wallet  
12 out to investors in order to continue to unload more of their portion of the Float.

13 280. On September 6, 2021, the Company's Twitter account reposted a tweet  
14 from Arriaga, telling investors that "#SAFEMOONWALLET is imminent!" In the  
15 caption to this re-tweet, the Company credited this statement from Arriaga as being  
16 from the "Dev himself"<sup>163</sup> (i.e., the developer of the SafeMoon wallet). Smith  
17 reposted this announcement on his Twitter account, as well.<sup>164</sup>

18 281. The trading volume of SAFEMOON Tokens once again spiked as a  
19 result of the announcements by the Company itself and Arriaga, going from \$12.5  
20 million on September 5, 2021 (the day before the promotions about the SafeMoon  
21 wallet) up to \$38 million on September 10, 2021 – **a 200% increase in trading**  
22 **volume.**

25 <sup>162</sup> @SafeMoon 2.0 , Twitter (Aug. 30, 2021), <https://t.co/0GGN7mFQIS>:  
26 "UPDATE ON THE #SAFEMOONWALLET   #SAFEMOON."

27 <sup>163</sup> @SafeMoon 2.0 , Twitter (Sept. 6, 2021), <https://twitter.com/safemoon/status/1434855369394860033?s=20&t=CTIBkiT2WMEr75TWa-S91A>: "From the  
28 Dev himself the #SAFEMOONWALLET is IMMINENT  .

<sup>164</sup> *Id.*

1 282. On September 9, 2021, the Company's Chief Technology Officer,  
2 Hank Wyatt, announced his resignation on Twitter.<sup>165</sup> Following his departure,  
3 Wyatt was interviewed about why the SafeMoon wallet failed to launch and the  
4 reasons for his departure.<sup>166</sup> According to Wyatt, the development team for the  
5 SafeMoon wallet were hired by the "business leads not the developmental leads."

6 283. Wyatt also explained how he found out about the SafeMoon project on  
7 the social media platform Discord in the early days of the Company's formation.  
8 Wyatt disclosed that two "old Safemoon moderators" that Wyatt "knew" –  
9 apparently displeased with his departure from SafeMoon and, as a result, "set him  
10 up" with "targeted questions" – had secretly recorded two conversations "without  
11 [his] permission."<sup>167</sup> Apparently feeling threatened with a forced exposure, Wyatt  
12 admits to having invested \$9,000 to join in the Company "in the beginning." He  
13 learned about it on Discord and "went with it."

14 284. In the recording, Wyatt informs those on the call that his next project –  
15 the Piggy Token project, which included Smith and Nagy – would make all of those  
16 insiders who had acquired the Piggy Tokens during a pre-sale event "filthy rich."<sup>168</sup>  
17 Wyatt noted that with the Piggy Token, the creators would not be able to "rug" the  
18

19  
20 <sup>165</sup> Wyatt (@Hankusun), Twitter (Sept. 9, 2021), [https://twitter.com/Hankusun/status/1436043090754744331?ref\\_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1436043090754744331%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1\\_&ref\\_url=https%3A%2F%2Fcryptoslate.com%2Fsafemoon-cto-resigns-fueling-rumors-of-disquiet-within-the-company%2F](https://twitter.com/Hankusun/status/1436043090754744331?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1436043090754744331%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fcryptoslate.com%2Fsafemoon-cto-resigns-fueling-rumors-of-disquiet-within-the-company%2F): "Leaving my position on Safemoon was definitely a difficult decision, the hardest I've ever had to make. However, I'm excited for the future and can't wait for the next chapter of my life to begin!"

23 <sup>166</sup> Control Crypto. *HANK TALKS FUTURE OF SAFEMOON! WHY HE QUIT, PIGGYBANK, WALLET LAUNCH FAILURE, DDOS ATTACKS!*, COINMARKETBAG (Sept. 30, 2021), <https://coinmarketbag.com/hank-talks-future-of-safemoon-why-he-quit-piggybank-wallet-launch-failure-ddos-attacks/>.

24 <sup>167</sup> *Id.*

25 <sup>168</sup> Henry Wyatt (@de crypto mole), Twitter (Sept. 12, 2021), [https://twitter.com/de\\_crypto\\_mole/status/1436952213335707649?s=20&t=v5zpGnlvOvSFaBg23Sitaw](https://twitter.com/de_crypto_mole/status/1436952213335707649?s=20&t=v5zpGnlvOvSFaBg23Sitaw): "Hank from @safemoon outing the entire team on Piggy. This is sick and have taken advantage of the entire community. @PapasB0v @PapasB0y @LynnShelbyL @NotLotusEater @Not\_Ryan\_Dunn @darrenrobinson."

1 liquidity (*i.e.*, deplete the funds allocated to the liquidity pool), which was possible  
2 with SafeMoon.<sup>169</sup>

3 285. As for his work at the Company, Wyatt complained that he and Smith  
4 “did not get to code anymore” in their respective roles as officers of the Company.<sup>170</sup>  
5 Instead, according to Wyatt, as CTO, his job was to “manage things” which “didn’t  
6 take that much time.”<sup>171</sup> Wyatt stated that Smith was only working “15 hours a  
7 week” on SafeMoon; thus, the two of them could devote “80 hours” to the Piggy  
8 Token and other non-SafeMoon projects.<sup>172</sup>

9 286. Wyatt also explained that he and Smith also had all of the marketing  
10 for Piggy Token completed, with several months-worth of social media posts already  
11 created and ready to disseminate.<sup>173</sup> One of the other individuals asked Wyatt if  
12 these pre-fabricated media posts (“4 posts per day for the first two months were  
13 already” done) were going to be spell checked.<sup>174</sup> This question referenced the  
14 announcement that SafeMoon had made regarding the “deliberately misspelled”  
15 event “Project Pheonix.” Wyatt responded by mocking the Company’s marketing  
16 errors, saying “Yeah, we don’t have a dumb, fat brit doing it” this time – presumably  
17 alluding to Phillips’ hamfisted promotional activities with SafeMoon.<sup>175</sup>

18 287. Wyatt went on threaten that it was in Karony’s “best interest” to pay  
19 Wyatt a \$3 million severance package.<sup>176</sup> Wyatt stated that he had the “keys” to the  
20 Company’s Discord account, so “if John wants to get spooky” and not pay the  
21 severance, Wyatt could “just rename it,” “delete every channel,” and reroute  
22

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23 <sup>169</sup> *Id.*

24 <sup>170</sup> *Id.*

25 <sup>171</sup> *Id.*

26 <sup>172</sup> *Id.*

27 <sup>173</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>174</sup> *Id.*

<sup>175</sup> *Id.*

<sup>176</sup> *Id.*

1 individuals looking for SafeMoon to the Piggy token webpage instead.<sup>177</sup> Wyatt  
2 claimed to be “forcing [Karony’s] hand” because Wyatt claimed to have ownership  
3 rights over “everything,” including the Company’s official Twitter account and,  
4 more importantly, the Company’s domain name and website.<sup>178</sup> Wyatt joked that  
5 Karony could “his paperweight or he can pay be fair wages.”<sup>179</sup> Wyatt disclosed his  
6 purpose for seeking the million-dollar payout from SafeMoon: “I want my house”  
7 and that he wanted the severance to cover the \$500,000 he was planning on investing  
8 in the Piggy token project.<sup>180</sup>

9 288. In an interview with Wyatt, after the audio recordings were threatened  
10 to be leaked online, Wyatt attempted to do some damage control with respect to his  
11 recorded statements. Wyatt claimed the recording showed him making a comment  
12 about how he was displeased with SafeMoon because he “didn’t get a raise” and  
13 “didn’t want to work weekends.” After admitting this during the interview, Wyatt  
14 later expresses frustration at the amount of work that he was supposed to do at the  
15 Company and, in particular, with respect to the SafeMoon wallet. In response to a  
16 question on whether he left because it was too much work for him, Wyatt stated that  
17 he had been “dedicating all of his time at SafeMoon and didn’t want to do it anymore.  
18 I had done it for six months. That was enough for [him].” Later in the interview,  
19 Wyatt said that he “felt undervalued” by the Company.<sup>181</sup>

20 289. Wyatt later admitted that he sold a “decent amount” of his  
21 SAFEMOON Tokens “120 something days ago.” He further disclosed that he did  
22 not gain his SAFEMOON Token holdings from working at the Company, but rather  
23 that he acquired them through his own money and being “gifted some Safemoon  
24

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25 <sup>177</sup> *Id.*

26 <sup>178</sup> *Id.*

27 <sup>179</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>180</sup> *Id.*

<sup>181</sup> *See* fn.166, *supra*.



from friends.” With the interview taking place on or about September 30, 2021, this would place Wyatt’s SAFEMOON Tokens sales around late May/early June of 2021. As the following chart shows, this would be around the same time that the price of SAFEMOON Tokens was rebounding briefly before plunging down further:



290. Upon information and belief, Wyatt knew or should have known that the SafeMoon wallet launch would not be occurring within the timeframe the Company announced and because of this, sold his SAFEMOON Tokens to unsuspecting investors before the further delays for the wallet launch were uncovered and the price of the SAFEMOON Tokens took a corresponding hit.

291. The day after Wyatt announced his resignation, on September 10, 2021, the Company released the following announcement<sup>182</sup> that Haines-Davies was also stepping down from his position as COO and would be leaving SafeMoon:

<sup>182</sup> Karony (@CptHodl), Twitter (Sept. 10, 2021), <https://t.co/7Cz562GkgC>: “We wish you well.”



John Karony  
@CptHodl

...

We wish you well



9:13 AM · Sep 10, 2021 · Twitter Web App

1,566 Retweets 125 Quote Tweets 8,334 Likes

292. The cryptocurrency news blogs speculated that, because the Company did not give any details as to the circumstances behind Defendant Haines-Davies' departure and given the time of his resignation, the reason Haines-Davies left the Company was due to its failure to deliver the SafeMoon wallet on the promised schedule.<sup>183</sup> Haines-Davies' Twitter profile timeline appears to confirm this. On August 30, 2021, Haines-Davies reposted the Company's wallet update message regarding the "hold up" with delivering the wallet when promised. Haines-Davies' next post was his September 10, 2021 announcement that he was leaving the

<sup>183</sup> Jack Haines, *COO and Co-founder of SafeMoon Dumped the Project*, NaijaBlog (Sept. 10, 2021), <https://naijablog.ng/2021/09/10/jack-haines-coo-and-co-founder-of-safemoon-dumped-the-project/>.

1 Company.<sup>184</sup> In that post, Haines-Davies stressed that he needed to “remove”  
2 himself from “toxic environments.”

3 293. An article in the International Business Times titled *SafeMoon*  
4 *Developers Flee at Slightest Sign of Trouble, Top Honchos Resign over Wallet*  
5 *Fiasco* questions Defendant Haines for “flee[ing] at the slightest trouble instead of  
6 working towards correcting the missteps of SafeMoon” and whether he “was unable  
7 to handle work pressure for just six months as the COO of SafeMoon. . . .”<sup>185</sup> The  
8 article further observed:

9 When a company fails to deliver on a product and announces “technical  
10 issues” hours before the release while marketing the same product on  
11 billboards for weeks using investors money; the top heads are most  
12 likely asked to resign and the same has happened with SafeMoon.

13 Along with Haines, Wyatt, a software engineer of the company, also  
14 resigned the same day.<sup>186</sup>

15 294. The price of the SAFEMOON Tokens dropped after this  
16 announcement, going from a close of \$0.000000153 on September 9, 2021 to the  
17 low for the day of \$0.000000119 on September 10, 2021.

18 295. In the wake of Haines-Davies’ departure, other executives at the  
19 Company left under similar circumstances.

20 296. For example, on September 10, 2021, Smith, in an apparent response to  
21 the string of high-profile departures from the Company, stated on his personal  
22 Twitter account: “THE SHOW GOES ON.”<sup>187</sup> That same day, Smith posted a clip

23  
24 <sup>184</sup> Haines-Davies (@jackhainesuk), Twitter (Sept. 10, 2021): “Dear  
#SAFEMOON <https://t.co/eU64JoF9cI>” / Twitter.

25 <sup>185</sup> Vinod Dsouza, *SafeMoon Developers Flee at Slightest Sign of Trouble, Top*  
26 *Honchos Resign over Wallet Fiasco*, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (Nov. 8,  
2021), <https://www.ibtimes.sg/safemoon-developers-flee-slightest-sign-trouble-top-honchos-resign-over-wallet-fiasco-60161>.

27 <sup>186</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>187</sup> Smith (@papacthulu). Twitter (Sept. 10, 2021). [https://twitter.com/papacthulu/status/1436324460903243778?s=20&t=WJt3\\_7ruyHQtbxm2OykCHQ](https://twitter.com/papacthulu/status/1436324460903243778?s=20&t=WJt3_7ruyHQtbxm2OykCHQ).

1 from the movie “The Wolf of Wall Street,” wherein the main character defiantly  
2 announces, “I’m not leaving.”<sup>188</sup>

3 297. On September 11, 2021, Ginger posted a message on Twitter to the  
4 SafeMoon community: “#SAFEMOONARMY what if I told you your wallet was  
5 delayed because some of your devs were distracted making their own? What if it  
6 was a wallet that directly competed with Safemoon? He can’t leave Safemoon if he  
7 mentally checked out months ago. #followthewallets”<sup>189</sup> Upon information and  
8 belief, Ginger was referencing Smith here and Smith’s failure to complete the  
9 SafeMoon wallet on time, due to his being too busy working on the Piggy token.

10 298. On November 5, 2021, Smith issued a statement on his personal Twitter  
11 account: “Bullish on the team, I love working @safemoon.”<sup>190</sup> Karony publicly  
12 replied to this message with a GIF image signifying agreement and the power of  
13 brotherhood.<sup>191</sup> Just under three weeks later, Karony announced that Smith was  
14 leaving the Company.<sup>192</sup>

15 299. Around the same time that numerous Company executives were  
16 abandoning SafeMoon rocketship, Karony made the following statement about the  
17 Company’s identity as a cryptocurrency project on the SafeMoon account on  
18 Discord: “SafeMoon is NOT token project. We are a tech company, that uses  
19  
20  
21

22 <sup>188</sup> Smith (@papacthulu). Twitter (Sept. 10, 2021). [https://twitter.com/papacthulu/status/1436324040650760195?s=20&t=WJt3\\_7ruiHQtbxm2OykCHQ](https://twitter.com/papacthulu/status/1436324040650760195?s=20&t=WJt3_7ruiHQtbxm2OykCHQ).

23 <sup>189</sup> Ginger (@TheGingerRBTC). Twitter (Sept. 11, 2021). <https://twitter.com/TheGingerRBTC/status/1436865402831732738?s=20&t=A9Z3BOmDCPm1XRascXTqPQ>.

24 <sup>190</sup> Smith (@papacthulu). Twitter (Nov. 5, 2021). <https://twitter.com/papacthulu/status/1456818387322036230?s=20&t=G-394qt2e5FNZ9F6fecquw>:  
25 “Bullish on the team, I love working at @safemoon.”

26 <sup>191</sup> Karony (@CptHodl). Twitter (Nov. 5, 2021). <https://t.co/96OYsVD1TJ>.

27 <sup>192</sup> Karony (@CptHodl). Twitter (Nov. 23, 2021). <https://twitter.com/CptHodl/status/1463150393160990725?s=20&t=trjCS8pVW1C-M1f6iksEqw>.

SafeMoon as the connecting agent in our ecosystem.”<sup>193</sup> Karony followed that post, clarifying that SafeMoon as a “blockchain innovation company.”<sup>194</sup>

300. On November 22, 2021, the Company’s official Twitter account promoted the “We’re All Gonna Make It coin” (“WAGMI”) – a highly speculative digital asset (similar to Dogecoin) that was trending at the time.<sup>195</sup>

301. Way again promoted SafeMoon’s activities, warning investors: “Safemoon just tweeted about WAGMI. Don’t miss the rocket.”<sup>196</sup>

302. In the following weeks, the price and trading volume of the SAFEMOON Tokens continued to fall despite the promotional efforts of Defendants. Something else had to be done to keep the funding in the liquidity pool and ill-gotten gains in Defendants’ wallets.

### **Outright Theft Under the Veneer of a Token Swap**

303. Not satisfied with the ill-gotten profits they already made throughout 2021 from their SAFEMOON Tokens sales, the Executive Defendants, in particular, Karony, shifted to a different way to fleece their investors: the hard fork scam.

304. The hard fork scam is fairly straightforward despite the technological jargon. The term “hard fork” as it relates to blockchain technology describes a “radical change to a network’s protocol” and “requires all nodes or users to upgrade to the latest version of the protocol software.”<sup>197</sup> Essentially, with a hard fork, the

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<sup>193</sup> A screenshot of Karony’s statements from his Discord account was uploaded on the SafeMoonInvesting subreddit account and can be found at: [https://www.reddit.com/r/SafeMoonInvesting/comments/sxsggw/blockchain\\_innovation\\_company/](https://www.reddit.com/r/SafeMoonInvesting/comments/sxsggw/blockchain_innovation_company/).

<sup>194</sup> *Id.*

<sup>195</sup> @SafeMoon 2.0 , Twitter (Nov. 22, 2021), [https://twitter.com/safemoon/status/1461460219251380229?s=20&t=mwc81B1H\\_z3uloVjS68mcw:](https://twitter.com/safemoon/status/1461460219251380229?s=20&t=mwc81B1H_z3uloVjS68mcw:) “WAGMI.”

<sup>196</sup> Way (@souljaboy), Twitter (Nov. 22, 2021), <https://twitter.com/souljaboy/status/1462956016388083713?lang=en>.

<sup>197</sup> Jake Frankenfield, *Hard Fork (Blockchain)*, INVESTOPEDIA (June 24, 2021), <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hard-fork.asp#:~:text=What%20is%20a%20Hard%20Fork,version%20of%20the%20protocol%20software.>

1 blockchain will no longer proceed in one line, but rather it will have two branches:  
2 one that follows the previous protocol and one that follows the new version.  
3 “Generally, after a short time, those on the old chain will realize that their version  
4 of the blockchain is outdated or irrelevant and quickly upgrade to the latest  
5 version.”<sup>198</sup>

6 305. “The scammer only makes money with the hard fork scam if lots of  
7 people hear about it, so they trick people into spreading their scam by promising  
8 them additional free coins from the fork.”<sup>199</sup> Those behind the scam will also require  
9 people to join the project’s various social media accounts, “which makes it look like  
10 there is more active community behind the project than there really is.”<sup>200</sup> Those  
11 following these directives for the purpose of receiving additional tokens for “free”  
12 do not know the actual value of these coins until after launch.

13 306. While this first phase of a hard fork scam resembles a kind of pump and  
14 dump scheme wherein the scammer artificially inflates the price and volume in order  
15 to sell of their pre-sale holdings, the second phase is more akin to outright theft.  
16 Usually, the scammer will assure everyone that they can use their own wallets to be  
17 able to claim the hard fork, but they cannot hold the coins on an exchange. This is  
18 “setting up for a sleight of hand later which is designed to steal your secret keys” to  
19 open your wallets and steal the tokens within.<sup>201</sup>

20 307. As the name emphasizes, the private keys to an investor’s  
21 cryptocurrency wallet are meant to be kept “secret.” These keys are the final failsafe  
22 against theft of one’s cryptocurrency. “Most people are used to operating in the  
23 context where if a password is compromised, even for a bank account, usually the  
24

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25 <sup>198</sup> *Id.*

26 <sup>199</sup> StellarGuard, *Anatomy of a Stellar Scam: The Hard Fork*, MEDIUM (Dec. 8,  
27 2018), <https://medium.com/stellar-community/anatomy-of-a-stellar-scam-the-hard-fork-4ac89808fd38>.

28 <sup>200</sup> *Id.*

<sup>201</sup> *Id.*



1 damage is at least somewhat reversible. Crypto is different: if you share your private  
2 keys, you lose **everything**. There is no recourse for getting back your stolen bitcoin,  
3 ether, or other tokens.”<sup>202</sup> This is a foundational truism for investing in digital assets,  
4 and given its vital importance, many in the crypto community believe that the “first  
5 rule of crypto” is to “never, ever, EVER share your private key.”<sup>203</sup>

6 308. On December 12, 2021, Karony posted the following message on his  
7 personal Twitter account: “Shoutout to our brilliant community, the product team  
8 and all #SAFEMOON employees for all the hard work these past 9 months, looking  
9 forward to the next 9 of evolution. Always out front! #SAFEMOONV2 is the  
10 #Evolution.” Karony also posted some frequently asked questions about the V2  
11 Migration and provided answers on the Company’s behalf.<sup>204</sup>

12 309. That same day, a developer by the name of SafeMoon LLC (the same  
13 name as one of the SafeMoon entities that was quietly created by Karony) announced  
14 and facilitated a hard fork of the SafeMoon protocol, which was referred to as the  
15 “V2 Migration.”

16 310. The V2 Migration related to the Company’s efforts to transfer the value  
17 of the V1 SAFEMOON Token and its associated liquidity pool into the newly  
18 minted V2 SAFEMOON token and its associated liquidity pool(s). The V1  
19 SAFEMOON Token was a part of the liquidity pool that was used when the  
20 Company launched. V2 SAFEMOON Token was created on April 24, 2021.

21 311. Notably, the smart contract that applies the 5% liquidity tax on all  
22 SAFEMOON Token transactions – which Defendants stated would serve as  
23

24 <sup>202</sup> Dan Elitzer, *Opinion – Friends Don’t Let Friends Do Bad Crypto*, COINDESK  
25 (Nov. 17, 2017), <https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2017/11/17/friends-dont-let-friends-do-bad-crypto/>.

26 <sup>203</sup> *Id.*; William C., *NEVER Share Your Private Keys!*, MEDIUM (Aug. 3, 2018),  
27 <https://medium.com/@deathd0tcom/never-share-your-private-keys-d117471fda07>  
28 (“Remember, no one should ask you for your Private Keys and you should never share them with anyone!”).

<sup>204</sup> Karony (@CptHodl). Twitter (Dec. 12, 2021). [https://twitter.com/CptHodl/status/1470053508443475973?s=20&t=szGCNKn90fZ3Mf17c\\_ZQzw](https://twitter.com/CptHodl/status/1470053508443475973?s=20&t=szGCNKn90fZ3Mf17c_ZQzw).

1 automatically-generated liquidity for SAFEMOON Token transactions – also had a  
2 particular wallet address written into the code: the wallet address that supplied the  
3 V1 liquidity pool. This means that although swapping can (and does) occur on the  
4 V2 liquidity pool, the actual funding is still deposited into the V1 liquidity pool. If  
5 the V1 liquidity pool’s funds are not migrated to the V2 liquidity pool, then those  
6 funds become effectively useless for their intended purpose.

7 312. By designing the dueling liquidity pool structure like this, the Company  
8 nullified one of the key selling points within its whitepaper. Specifically, the  
9 Company’s change undercut its promised “solution” to the problem of liquidity  
10 provisioning as described in the Company’s whitepaper:

11 Historically, developers created incentives aimed at users to provide  
12 liquidity which can be outweighed by risk due to the subjectivity of  
13 impermanent loss. As a solution, we propose utilizing a smart contract  
14 function to automatically capture liquidity to be used on the  
15 decentralized exchanges and held in custody independent from user  
16 possession.

17 \* \* \*

18 Problems arise when the liquidity pool provider loses the incentive to  
19 add tokens into the pool, which occurs after the token pair is subjected  
20 to impermanent loss resulting from arbitrage.

21 As a solution, Liquidity can be taken as a function of the smart contract  
22 using market activity from all swaps and transfers. A portion of these  
23 swaps and transfers will be captured by the smart contract and utilized  
24 with the function: “\_swapAndLiquify.” For this to happen, the portion  
25 of the 5% fee from swap and transfers can be kept in a standalone pool  
26 within the contract itself and automatically converted to the liquidity  
27  
28

1 pool after the token count reaches a threshold, set at 500 billion  
2 tokens.<sup>205</sup>

3 313. The only transfer of value from the V1 liquidity pool to the V2 liquidity  
4 pool occurred on May 12, 2021 when the Company cashed in LP Tokens from the  
5 V1 liquidity pool and transferred that liquidity in the V2 liquidity pool.<sup>206</sup>  
6 Conversely, the SafeMoon LLC wallet address 0x79c4af has and continues to  
7 receive transfers of value from the V1 liquidity pool.<sup>207</sup> Those funds then remain in  
8 that wallet instead of being transferred and/or converted into the V2 liquidity pool.

9 314. The Company promoted the V2 Migration as an offer to investors  
10 holding the V1 SAFEMOON Tokens would be given a 1000:1 conversion rate of V2  
11 SAFEMOON Tokens. Defendants encouraged investors to download a new  
12 SafeMoon wallet (which finally debuted after long delays and technical difficulties)  
13 and then directly transfer their V1 holdings into the new wallet. After the  
14 SAFEMOON Tokens arrived in the new wallet safely, investors were directed by  
15 the Company to convert the V1 SAFEMOON Tokens into V2 SAFEMOON Tokens  
16 while inside the new wallet.

17 315. Unbeknownst to investors, when they complied with the Company's  
18 instructions, they were also charged an undisclosed 10% processing fee or "tax"  
19 when making these transactions.<sup>208</sup>

20 316. After receiving complaints from investors who were surprised by the  
21 tax, the Company reduced the fee amount from 10% to 2%. This, in turn, caused an  
22 arbitrage-like event wherein investors could purchase the V1 SAFEMOON Tokens

23  
24 <sup>205</sup> See fn.18, *supra*.

25 <sup>206</sup> <https://bscscan.com/tx/0xe8a786a9334553fc575bc0df8ddabdbd0e9296c23c07dac5be489dedd2bee912>; <https://bscscan.com/token/0xff3dd404afba451328de089424c74685bf0a43c9?a=0x79c4af7c43f500b9ccba9396d079cc03dfcafda1#tokenAnalytics> (last visited on June 27, 2022).

26 <sup>207</sup> <https://bscscan.com/address/0x79c4af7c43f500b9ccba9396d079cc03dfcafda1> (last visited on June 27, 2022).

27 <sup>208</sup> See @SafeMoon 2.0  Twitter (Dec. 18, 2021). [https://twitter.com/safemoon/status/1472174876429586432?s=20&t=szGCNK90fZ3Mf17c\\_ZQzw](https://twitter.com/safemoon/status/1472174876429586432?s=20&t=szGCNK90fZ3Mf17c_ZQzw).

1 at a lower price than V2 SAFEMOON Tokens and then convert those V1  
2 SAFEMOON Tokens into exponentially more V2 SAFEMOON Tokens due to the  
3 1000:1 conversion rate minus the minimal 2% fee. The Company then increased the  
4 fee amount back to 10%, but this did not remove the dangers the Company's  
5 previous attempt to encourage the migration from V1 to V2 tokens had created.

6 317. In the following days, the Company raised and lowered the fee  
7 percentages repeatedly.<sup>209</sup> But the first phase of the hard fork scam and related  
8 growth strategy that the Karony devised with the V2 Migration had opened  
9 pandora's box. Many investors had faithfully held on to their SAFEMOON Tokens  
10 despite the rug pull that Nagy, Smith, Haines, Wyatt, and the Promotor Defendants  
11 orchestrated in 2021 because of the Company's and Karony's repeated reassurances  
12 that the proverbial SafeMoon rocketship was still on course to the moon.

13 318. By the time the V2 Migration was under way, many of those faithful  
14 "hodlers" had suffered massive unrealized losses and the favorable conversion rate  
15 offered a way for investors to mitigate their losses by buying **more** V1 SAFEMOON  
16 Tokens in an effort to average down their respective dollar cost averages. The  
17 Company and Karony's greed could not let this stand.

18 319. In response, the Company and Karony engaged in a media campaign  
19 push to have the remaining V1 SAFEMOON Token holders transfer to V2 **and** to  
20 stop buying more V1 SAFEMOON Tokens. They offered investors a "migration"  
21 portal to achieve this. The major problem was that, in order to use the migration  
22 portal, the Company required SafeMoon investors to break the "first rule of crypto."  
23 V1 SAFEMOON Token holders were told to share their private keys to their existing  
24 wallets with SafeMoon's barely-field tested, proprietary software wallet (which has  
25  
26

27 <sup>209</sup> See @SafeMoon 2.0  Twitter (Dec. 21, 2021). [https://twitter.com/safemoon/status/1473406130965602311?s=20&t=szGCNKn90fZ3Mf17c\\_ZOzw:](https://twitter.com/safemoon/status/1473406130965602311?s=20&t=szGCNKn90fZ3Mf17c_ZOzw:)  
28 "The V1 contract tax rate will be changed to 20% (19% LP Generation, 1% Reflections)."

1 had publicized issues, from its launch), or linking their existing wallets with  
2 SafeMoon's website.

3 320. Approximately 3,000,000 wallet holders rejected the Company's offer  
4 to use the migration portal because it required those investors to either expose their  
5 private keys or link their unlocked wallets, which often contain other tokens and  
6 digital assets, to the questionable SafeMoon wallet. Again, this was a situation that  
7 Karony and the Company did not want.

8 321. In a desperate response to investors gaining back some of the unrealized  
9 losses that had suffered at the hands of Defendants, Karony and the Company gave  
10 a final kick to all of those SafeMoon investors.

11 322. On December 29, 2021, at approximately 4:00 p.m. EST, SafeMoon  
12 changed the code line running in the SafeMoon smart contract that governs the  
13 transaction fee rate (AKA Tax) to 100%. The Company concurrently announced  
14 this on its official Twitter account, adding that "Migration from V1 to V2 will remain  
15 open indefinitely so nobody is left behind."<sup>210</sup> Karony responded to the Company's  
16 tweet, saying that "the V1 tax will be changing to 100%. We are moving our full  
17 focus to V2 to evolve the #SAFEMOON ecosystem."<sup>211</sup> In other words, ***the***  
18 ***Company implemented a 100% tax on every sale, purchase, or general transfer of***  
19 ***V1 SAFEMOON Tokens from one wallet to another.*** In effect, the Company, at  
20 Karony's direction, seized every V1 SAFEMOON Token they could from  
21 unsuspecting investors.

22 323. The Company did not provide any, much less sufficient, notice to  
23 investors of the impending full taxation prior to its implementation on December 29.  
24 Indeed, the Company's website did not indicate any change had occurred until  
25 approximately ten hours later when a small, generalized banner was added, which  
26

27 <sup>210</sup> @SafeMoon 2.0  Twitter (Dec. 29, 2021). [https://twitter.com/safemoon/status/1476198900717342724?s=20&t=szGCNKn90fZ3Mf17c\\_ZQzw](https://twitter.com/safemoon/status/1476198900717342724?s=20&t=szGCNKn90fZ3Mf17c_ZQzw).

28 <sup>211</sup> Karony (@CptHodl). Twitter (Dec. 29, 2021). [https://twitter.com/CptHodl/status/1476206499898691589?s=20&t=szGCNKn90fZ3Mf17c\\_ZQzw](https://twitter.com/CptHodl/status/1476206499898691589?s=20&t=szGCNKn90fZ3Mf17c_ZQzw).

1 stated that V1 support had come to an end and directed investors to migrate to V2.  
2 On its face, this banner did not include any disclosure regarding the 100% taxation.  
3 Subsequently, sometime in January 2022, the banner was updated to include a sub  
4 icon “read more” which, when clicked on, led to a second banner than mentioned  
5 the taxation.

6 324. This hyper version of the hard fork scam took place over a 17-day  
7 period from December 12, 2021 to December 29, 2021, but investors unaware of  
8 Karony’s secret tax continued to suffer complete losses of their SAFEMOON  
9 Tokens afterwards. The Company’s change to the smart contract created a trading  
10 environment of uncertainties, which have been resulting in mounting losses, for  
11 existing tokens holders and those attempting to buy them.

12 325. SafeMoon did not take steps to ensure that investors who attempted to  
13 transact with V1 SAFEMOON Tokens would be protected against losing their full  
14 investment. It did not make a conversion of V1 to V2 tokens automatic. It did not  
15 post a warning within the SAFEMOON wallet interface. It did not implement a pop-  
16 up warning in the SAFEMOON wallet to alert investors who were attempting to  
17 transact in SAFEMOON V1 tokens that an such attempts were futile and would only  
18 result in confiscation of their tokens.

19 326. Many investors, of course, did not see SafeMoon’s random Twitter post  
20 or the subsequent discussion of it on social media in the short period between when  
21 the tax was announced and when it was implemented. Instead, those unsuspecting  
22 investors attempted to transact in V1 SAFEMOON Tokens, reasonably believing  
23 that they would be able to do so without issue.

24 327. Those investors who attempted to transact in SAFEMOON V1 tokens  
25 after imposition of the “100% tax” effectively had those tokens confiscated by the  
26 Company, losing their access, control, and ownership over their SAFEMOON V1  
27 tokens despite having a proprietary right to those tokens. Other investors faced the  
28 situation where, despite not even transferring their SAFEMOON V1 tokens and



1 being subjected to the 100% tax, their SAFEMOON V1 tokens were outright  
2 removed or deleted from their wallets (in part or in whole). The result was the same:  
3 investors lost most if not all of their investment in Safemoon.

4 328. SafeMoon, on the other hand, kept the funds that it seized from the  
5 original purchasers (and rightful owners) of those SAFEMOON V1 Tokens when it  
6 issued them. Upon information and belief, the wallets owned/controlled by Karony  
7 received some or all of those seized SAFEMOON V1 Tokens and cashed them out  
8 for his own personal use.

9 329. In January 2022, Safemoon investors who suffered a complete loss by  
10 the V1 to V2 migration tax filed the following petition<sup>212</sup> requesting that the  
11 Company reimburse or refund the tokens that were improperly confiscated from  
12 investors during the migration:

13 Dear Safemoon Developers and Core team,

14 Many of our Safemoon community members have lost their  
15 tokens due to the 100% tax that had been imposed on V1 by the devs  
16 just days ago. While instructions were given on social media channels,  
17 they were not clear enough and many users missed them if they weren't  
18 frequenting those channels. There was a lack of disclosure of the 100%  
19 tax across all apps, and the fees appeared normal to the user.  
20 SafeMoon's own app, which the development team has absolute control  
21 over, did not provide sufficient warning to prevent users making this  
22 simple mistake, nor did it bar users from making this transaction.

23 Imposing a 100% tax was an unprofessional and disappointing  
24 business decision which those affected in our community want  
25 rectified. In the traditional business world, a company would not be

26  
27 <sup>212</sup> [https://www.change.org/p/safemoon-development-and-core-team-reimburse-](https://www.change.org/p/safemoon-development-and-core-team-reimburse-safemoon-community-for-losses-due-to-100-tax-during-compulsory-migration?utm_content=cl_sharecopy_31903683_en-US%3A7&recruiter=1244229397&utm_source=share_petition&utm_medium=copylink&utm_campaign=share_petition)  
28 [safemoon-community-for-losses-due-to-100-tax-during-compulsory-](https://www.change.org/p/safemoon-development-and-core-team-reimburse-safemoon-community-for-losses-due-to-100-tax-during-compulsory-migration?utm_content=cl_sharecopy_31903683_en-US%3A7&recruiter=1244229397&utm_source=share_petition&utm_medium=copylink&utm_campaign=share_petition)  
[migration?utm\\_content=cl\\_sharecopy\\_31903683\\_en-US%3A7&recruiter=](https://www.change.org/p/safemoon-development-and-core-team-reimburse-safemoon-community-for-losses-due-to-100-tax-during-compulsory-migration?utm_content=cl_sharecopy_31903683_en-US%3A7&recruiter=1244229397&utm_source=share_petition&utm_medium=copylink&utm_campaign=share_petition)  
[1244229397&utm\\_source=share\\_petition&utm\\_medium=copylink&utm\\_campaign=](https://www.change.org/p/safemoon-development-and-core-team-reimburse-safemoon-community-for-losses-due-to-100-tax-during-compulsory-migration?utm_content=cl_sharecopy_31903683_en-US%3A7&recruiter=1244229397&utm_source=share_petition&utm_medium=copylink&utm_campaign=share_petition)  
[share\\_petition](https://www.change.org/p/safemoon-development-and-core-team-reimburse-safemoon-community-for-losses-due-to-100-tax-during-compulsory-migration?utm_content=cl_sharecopy_31903683_en-US%3A7&recruiter=1244229397&utm_source=share_petition&utm_medium=copylink&utm_campaign=share_petition) (last visited on June 27, 2022).

1 allowed to do this. If Safemoon is serious about wanting mainstream  
2 adoption, it needs to look after it's community and provide a fair  
3 platform, that is accessible to young and old, new and seasoned  
4 members of the cryptocurrency community. To be considered a  
5 valuable asset, it needs to embody the value it's name references – to  
6 be safe. Creating a poorly explained 100% tax consolidation  
7 environment, was anything but safe for it's users.

8 Some of the members out there who lost their tokens were  
9 dependant on them for their livelihoods. Maybe they were using those  
10 funds to survive the economic hardship of the pandemic, to feed their  
11 families or to pay off student loans. We ask that the Safemoon  
12 community and team show humility rather than greed or quick  
13 judgement, and weigh this issue seriously.

14 On behalf of those Safemoon users who were taxed at 100%, we  
15 ask for reimbursement of our funds.

16 Critical questions need to be raised and examined:

- 17 • Why was an automatic swap not done?
- 18 • Why was 100% tax imposed, instead of other more community  
19 friendly options?
- 20 • Why was the 100% tax not mentioned on the consolidation page  
21 in the Safemoon app?
- 22 • How much money of people's money was accrued in the 100%  
23 tax?
- 24 • What does Safemoon have to say about where all this 100% tax  
25 has gone?
- 26 • Is this ethical?
- 27 • How and when will our community members be reimbursed?
- 28

1 330. As of the filing of this amended complaint, 457 separate Safemoon  
2 investors have signed the petition.

3 **The Dump – SAFEMOON Token Price Plummets**

4 331. Following the SAFEMOON Token’s launch and Defendants’  
5 promotional activities beginning in March 2021, the trading volume and price of  
6 SafeMoon surged. By April 20, 2021, SAFEMOON Tokens already had a  
7 transaction volume of over \$144 million, up approximately 1,747% in just over a  
8 month. That same day, the SAFEMOON Token reached its maximum price of  
9 \$0.000011, *which represents a rise of approximately 2,749,900% more than its*  
10 *initial launch price* of \$0.0000000004.

11 332. However, this astronomical rise was short-lived. After the  
12 SAFEMOON Token price and trading volume spiked following the launch,  
13 Defendants began the “slow rug pull” on investors. This term refers to a situation in  
14 the cryptocurrency sector where the developers and insiders of a token deceive  
15 investors by encouraging them to purchase the token with promises of future  
16 success, while, at the same time, slowly selling off their own holdings as the trading  
17 volume from retail investors remains inflated.

18 333. On December 31, 2021, the price of the SAFEMOON Token hit a low  
19 of \$0.0000006521 per token, an over 80% drop from its height during the Class  
20 Period, which it has not been able to recover. As of the filing of this Complaint, the  
21 trading volume for the SAFEMOON Token has plummeted to around only  
22 \$60,000.<sup>213</sup>

23 334. The Promoter Defendants’ improper promotional activities generated  
24 the trading volume needed for all the Defendants to offload their SAFEMOON  
25 Tokens onto unsuspecting investors. While Plaintiff and Class members were  
26 buying the inappropriately promoted SAFEMOON Tokens, Defendants were able  
27

28 <sup>213</sup> See fn. 18, *supra*.

1 to, and did, sell their SAFEMOON Tokens during the Class Period for substantial  
2 profits.

3 335. On or about December 1, 2021, Smith participated in telephonic debate  
4 with Ginger regarding what had occurred with the Piggy and Nobility tokens.  
5 During that debate, Ginger read a sworn statement he had prepared on November  
6 29, 2021, which read in relevant part: “On the 21st of May, at roughly 1AM I was  
7 asked to join a call with Thomas Smith and Trevor Church. During the call with  
8 Thomas and Trevor, many statements were made by Thomas, including, but not  
9 limited to, “Piggy is the perfect contract. I took the SafeMoon contract and improved  
10 it. The best thing about Piggy is the fact that nobody owns it. It can’t be sued. . . .  
11 What made SafeMoon special was that it was made to be a rug-pull. Not that we  
12 intended to pull, but the very feature that makes it ruggable is the feature that makes  
13 it function so well. What the contract needed was a team that would never rug. . . .  
14 In the beginning of SafeMoon, Kyle asked me to come on board along with Trevor.  
15 John is my fault. I brought him on. I’m sorry for that.”<sup>214</sup>

16 336. In response, Smith did not directly deny any of Ginger’s allegations,  
17 but rather stated there were “some inaccuracies here.” Smith also hinted that he had  
18 a “secret” about whether the Executive Defendants “defrauded” investors. Smith  
19 then claimed everything was “fine” and that Karony had texted Smith on November  
20 4th that the “FBI stuff went really well the matter is now closed.” Smith later  
21 clarified that the FBI was interested in the findings of the “Doxxlocker” due  
22 diligence report. The Doxxlocker report questioned certain transactions that sent  
23 approximately \$68.4 million in SAFEMOON Tokens from the Protocol Deployer  
24 wallet to unrecognized wallets instead of returning those funds to the liquidity pool.

25 337. The SAFEMOON Token price still has not recovered and trading  
26 volume remains down, significantly.

27  
28 <sup>214</sup> Ginger (RBTC Public), *Ginger & Thomas Twitter Space Debate*, YouTube  
(Dec. 1, 2021), <https://youtu.be/abyQA4BOaXw>.

338. Meanwhile, Defendants have gone on to live the high life off of their ill-gotten gains. For example, Phillips, flush with millions in cash from the funds he extracted from Safemoon, jaunts around on private jets for dinner in neighboring countries and he purchased a “top of the fleet” Rolls Royce worth over \$400,000. But experiencing this wealth was not enough, Phillips needed to also flaunt it on social media.

339. In May 2021, at the same time Defendants were pumping and dumping the SAFEMOON Tokens for millions of dollars, Phillips attributed his success to his so-called “work ethic”:



340. A month later, Phillips bragged about how he “Jumped on the PJ with baby girl [aka Haines-Davies sister, @geehaines] to Scotland for a birthday bite!”:<sup>215</sup>

<sup>215</sup> <https://www.instagram.com/p/CQhJ2iqL8pM/?igshid=MDJmNzVkMjY=>. The same is true for Haine-Davies, who,





341. Phillips even began *eating steak wrapped in 24k gold*, and posting it on social media:




342. Upon information and belief, Phillips’ lavish trip to Scotland for a “bite” to celebrate his girlfriend’s birthday, his over-the-top Rolls Royce, and his golden steak dinners were all funded by his ill-gotten gains from Safemoon.



1     343.     Phillips was not alone in showing off the wealth that he and the  
2 Defendants extracted from SAFEMOON Token investors. The same is true for  
3 Haines-Davies, who took to social media to post pictures of himself riding on private  
4 jets while wearing designer clothes and a Rolex watch and attending black-tie events  
5 where he is teased on social media about the woes of having to “spend all that  
6 #safemoon money.” For example:






344. Smith also joined in the displays of Safemoon wealth acquired through misleading investors. In June 2021, when asked by an investor about an update on Safemoon, Smith responded by making a reference to a luxury sports car. Safemoon investors took this as a suggestion that the price of SAFEMOON Tokens would rise high enough for investors to purchase a McLaren.<sup>216</sup>

<sup>216</sup> This is apparently a play on an inside joke among crypto investors that they will one day buy a “lambo” with their crypto riches once their token of choice rises.

Colonel Safemoon V2  
@Kay9514

for #SAFEMOON no more Lambos its all about McLaren's now just the wizard @papacthulu said himself. #SAFEMOONARMY #SAFEMOONWALLET #SafeMoonCommunity



10:31 AM · Jun 18, 2021 · Twitter Web App

345. Much to investors' disappointment, the SAFEMOON Token's price plummeted, leaving them with significant losses which were much less than enough gains to spend on luxury items. Smith, however, made good on his promise to one person: himself. After asking "wen mclaren," Smith posted a picture of himself with his newly-purchased, million-dollar McLaren, which he has subsequently suggested was owed to him because of his upbringing and work on Safemoon:



346. In addition to promoting and soliciting sales of SAFEMOON Tokens, the Company itself has continuously sold SAFEMOON Tokens throughout the Class

1 Period. The Company was the original seller of every single SAFEMOON Token  
2 ever in circulation.

3 347. In early March 2021 alone, the Company created one quadrillion  
4 SAFEMOON Tokens out of thin air. Since launch, moreover, SafeMoon has sold  
5 SAFEMOON Tokens to raise funds for its business. For example, in a March 2021  
6 ask-me-anything session, the Company explained that they sold tokens because they  
7 “needed USDT to pay for business expenses” to “help develop the project and help  
8 the community.”<sup>217</sup> As noted above, Karony has likewise admitted that SafeMoon  
9 reserves the right to withdraw SAFEMOON Tokens from liquidity pools created by  
10 SafeMoon, and sell those tokens, in order to pay for “development costs of future  
11 SafeMoon innovations.”

12 348. Further, each time that there is a transaction with SAFEMOON Tokens,  
13 the Company **necessarily** sells a portion of those tokens (to the extent that it does  
14 not siphon those Tokens). This is because, as explained above, as part of the protocol  
15 underlying SAFEMOON Tokens, 10% of each transaction is taxed and, purportedly,  
16 half of the amount taxed – *i.e.*, 5% – is allocated to liquidity pools. Specifically, the  
17 Company swaps half of that 5% of SAFEMOON Tokens earmarked for liquidity  
18 pools for BNB, meaning that SafeMoon **sells** half of that 5% (*i.e.*, 2.5%) on the  
19 market. The Company then stakes the BNB that it obtains on the market, plus the  
20 remaining 2.5% of SAFEMOON Tokens earmarked for liquidity pools, into the  
21 liquidity pools. For example, if someone sells 1,000 SAFEMOON Tokens, 100 of  
22 those Tokens will be taxed. Of those 100 Tokens, 50 will be allocated to the liquidity  
23 pools: 25 will be sold by SafeMoon on the open market for BNB, which will then  
24 be staked in the liquidity pools along with another 25 SAFEMOON Tokens. Since  
25 SAFEMOON Tokens were first released in early March 2021, the volume of trading  
26 in SAFEMOON Tokens has exceeded \$7.5 billion. SafeMoon has thus sold (if its  
27

28 <sup>217</sup> [https://www.reddit.com/r/SafeMoon/comments/m87k9l/notes\\_from\\_tonights\\_live\\_ama/](https://www.reddit.com/r/SafeMoon/comments/m87k9l/notes_from_tonights_live_ama/). (last visited Jun 28, 2022).

1 protocol works the way that SafeMoon has represented it works) at least  
2 \$189 million in SAFEMOON tokens for BNB, and staked another \$189 million  
3 worth of SAFEMOON tokens in liquidity pools.

4 **The SAFEMOON Token Is a Security that the Company and Executive**  
5 **Defendants Failed to Register Before Selling**

6 **A. SAFEMOON Tokens Are Securities**

7 349. Under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”),  
8 a “security” is defined to include an “investment contract.” 15 U.S.C. §77b(a)(1).  
9 An investment contract is “an investment of money in a common enterprise with  
10 profits to come solely from the efforts of others.” *S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co.*, 328 U.S.  
11 293, 301 (1946). Specifically, a transaction qualifies as an investment contract and,  
12 thus, a security if it is: (1) an investment; (2) in a common enterprise; (3) with a  
13 reasonable expectation of profits; and (4) to be derived from the entrepreneurial or  
14 managerial efforts of others. *See United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman*, 421  
15 U.S. 837, 852-53 (1975). This definition embodies a “flexible rather than a static  
16 principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes  
17 devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits,”  
18 and thereby “permits the fulfillment of the statutory purpose of compelling full and  
19 fair disclosure relative to the issuance of ‘the many types of instruments that in our  
20 commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security.’” *W.J. Howey*, 328  
21 U.S. at 299. Accordingly, in analyzing whether something is a security, “form should  
22 be disregarded for substance,” and the emphasis should be “on economic realities  
23 underlying a transaction, and not on the name appended thereto.” *Forman*, 421 U.S.  
24 at 849.

25 350. Investors who bought SAFEMOON Tokens invested money or other  
26 valuable consideration, in a common enterprise: namely SafeMoon. Investors had a  
27 reasonable expectation of profit based upon the efforts of the Defendants, including,  
28



1 among other things, Defendant obtaining favorable listings of their SAFEMOON  
2 Tokens on cryptocurrency exchanges such as Pancakeswap.

3 **1. SAFEMOON Token Investors Invested Money**

4 351. Plaintiff and the Class invested fiat, including U.S. dollars, and digital  
5 currencies, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, to purchase SAFEMOON Tokens.

6 352. The SAFEMOON Tokens were listed on cryptocurrency exchanges  
7 like Pancakeswap, which allowed retail investors to purchase SAFEMOON Tokens  
8 with traditional and other digital currencies.

9 353. Defendants sold SAFEMOON Tokens to the general public through  
10 global, online cryptocurrency exchanges during its so-called launch.

11 354. Every purchase of SAFEMOON Tokens by a member of the public is  
12 an investment contract.

13 **2. SAFEMOON Token Investors Were Intertwined in a**  
14 **Common Enterprise with Defendants**

15 355. Additionally, investors were passive participants in the SAFEMOON  
16 Tokens' launch and the profits of each Plaintiff and the Class were intertwined with  
17 those of Defendants and of other investors. SafeMoon concedes that it uses the  
18 funds from the SAFEMOON liquidity pool to also fund its operations and  
19 promote projects on the SAFEMOON blockchain.

20 356. Defendants also were responsible for supporting the SAFEMOON  
21 Tokens, pooled investors' assets, and controlled those assets.

22 357. Further, Defendants held and/or hold a significant stake in the  
23 SAFEMOON Tokens, and thus shared in the profits and risk of the project.

24 **3. Investors Purchased the SAFEMOON Tokens with a**  
25 **Reasonable Expectation of Profit from Owning Them**

26 358. Investors in the SAFEMOON Tokens, including Plaintiff and the Class,  
27 made their investment with a reasonable expectation of profits. The SAFEMOON  
28 Tokens were sold to investors prior to a network or "ecosystem" being fully



1 developed on which they could be used. For pre-functional tokens, such as the  
2 SAFEMOON Tokens, the primary purpose for purchasing SAFEMOON Tokens  
3 was to make a profit or accumulate additional “reflections” (i.e., additional tokens  
4 of value), rather than to utilize the SAFEMOON Tokens themselves for a task.

5 **4. Investors Expected Profits from the SAFEMOON Tokens to**  
6 **Be Derived from the Managerial Efforts of the Executive**  
7 **Defendants**

8 359. Investors’ profits in the SAFEMOON Tokens were to be derived from  
9 the managerial efforts of others – specifically the Company and the Executive  
10 Defendant. SAFEMOON Token investors relied on the managerial and  
11 entrepreneurial efforts of the Executive Defendants to manage, oversee, and/or  
12 develop the projects funded by sale of the SAFEMOON Tokens.

13 360. Purchasers of pre-functional tokens necessarily rely on the managerial  
14 efforts of others to realize value from their investments. The success of these  
15 managerial efforts in developing the networks on which these tokens will operate is  
16 the primary factor in their price, that is, until such tokens transition into being  
17 functional utility tokens.

18 361. Each of the SAFEMOON Tokens was a security at issuance because  
19 profit from the SAFEMOON Tokens would be derived primarily from the  
20 managerial efforts of SafeMoon’s teams developing the associated networks on  
21 which the SAFEMOON Tokens would function, rather than having their profit  
22 derived from market forces of supply and demand, such as might affect the price of  
23 a commodity such as gold (or Bitcoin).

24 362. Investors in SAFEMOON Tokens relied on the managerial and  
25 entrepreneurial efforts of SafeMoon and the Executive Defendants to manage,  
26 market, and develop the so-called SafeMoon ecosystem.

27 363. The Executive Defendants typically held themselves out to investors as  
28 experts in the blockchain and crypto field. Investors in the SAFEMOON Tokens

1 reasonably expected the SafeMoon development teams to provide significant  
2 managerial efforts after the SAFEMOON Tokens' launch.

3 364. Investors in SAFEMOON Tokens thus reasonably expected the  
4 Company and Executive Defendants to provide significant managerial efforts  
5 after the token launch.

6 365. This dependency, however, on the managerial efforts of the Company  
7 and Executive Defendants was not apparent at issuance to a reasonable investor.  
8 Considering the limited available information about how these SAFEMOON Tokens  
9 were designed and intended to operate, if such an investor were even able to interpret  
10 the relevant law at the time, a reasonable investor lacked sufficient bases to conclude  
11 whether the SAFEMOON Tokens were securities until the platform at issue, and its  
12 relevant "ecosystem," had been given time to develop. In the interim, the investor  
13 lacked the facts necessary to conclude – let alone formally allege in court – that the  
14 tokens she had acquired were securities. It was only after certain revelations that  
15 provided more information about Defendant's intent, SafeMoon's token economics,  
16 and how the Executive Defendants operated to hide their ownership in both the  
17 Company and the SAFEMOON Token, that an investor could reasonably determine  
18 that a token that was advertised as something other than a security was a security all  
19 along.

20 **B. Investors Would Not Reasonably Have Understood that**  
21 **SAFEMOON Tokens Were Securities**

22 366. In connection with the SAFEMOON Token launch, the Company and  
23 Executive Defendants made statements that reasonably led Plaintiff and Class  
24 members to conclude that the SAFEMOON Tokens were not securities.

25 367. As a threshold matter, the Company refused to register SAFEMOON  
26 Tokens with the SEC, which indicated to investors that these were not securities.  
27 No such valid exemption from registration requirements exists for SAFEMOON  
28 Tokens.

1 368. Additionally, SafeMoon’s whitepaper refers to “new use cases” for the  
2 SAFEMOON Tokens,<sup>218</sup> suggesting to investors that SAFEMOON Tokens were  
3 “utility tokens,” rather than “security tokens” (which would be securities that would  
4 have to be registered with the SEC).

5 369. At the time of the SAFEMOON Token launch, Defendants took  
6 advantage of the market’s lack of understanding and awareness concerning how  
7 cryptocurrency projects – particularly decentralized finance projects – work.  
8 Considering the new technology at issue and the Company’s other statements, many  
9 investors were understandably unaware that SAFEMOON Tokens had  
10 fundamentally different features than other cryptocurrencies, which the SEC has  
11 determined are not securities.

12 370. Karony himself stated on September 25, 2021, that “SafeMoon is NOT  
13 a token project. We are a tech company, that uses SafeMoon as the connecting agent  
14 in our ecosystem.” Karony echoed this sentiment in an article on December 21,  
15 2021, being quoted as saying: “SafeMoon is actually a tech company, it’s a  
16 blockchain innovation company.”<sup>219</sup>

17 371. Moreover, the SafeMoon project was advertised as developing  
18 revolutionary and cutting edge blockchain technology that was safer than existing  
19 products. Unbeknownst to investors, most of the products ultimately produced by  
20 the SafeMoon developers like Smith were simply knockoffs of other existing  
21 products.

22 372. In addition to claiming SafeMoon’s technical superiority over other  
23 cryptocurrencies, the Company also indicated that it would benefit financially and  
24 use the funds raised through SAFEMOON Token launch to continue to enhance the  
25

26  
27 <sup>218</sup> See fn.18, *supra*.

28 <sup>219</sup> Vanessa Armstrong, *SafeMoon’s emphatic fanbase won’t let it fail*, UTAH  
BUSINESS (Dec. 21, 2021), <https://www.utahbusiness.com/the-safemoon-fanbase-wont-let-this-utah-based-crypto-fail/>.

1 SafeMoon-related products (*e.g.*, wallet and exchange) and support the growth of  
2 the project.

3 373. At the time of the SAFEMOON Token launch, Defendants took  
4 advantage of the market's lack of understanding and awareness concerning how this  
5 investment contract worked. With promises that SAFEMOON Tokens would be  
6 better than other cryptocurrencies, many individuals were unaware that  
7 SAFEMOON Tokens had fundamentally different features than other  
8 cryptocurrencies, including being more centralized than Bitcoin or Ethereum. One  
9 of these primary differences is that all SAFEMOON Tokens were issued by Nagy  
10 and the Company at creation at very little economic cost – and enormous potential  
11 upside – to them.

12 374. The creation of SAFEMOON Tokens by Nagy and Smith occurred  
13 through a centralized process, in contrast to Bitcoin and Ethereum. This would not  
14 have been apparent at issuance, however, to a reasonable investor. Rather, it was  
15 only after the passage of time and disclosure of additional information about the  
16 issuer's intent and process of management to arise that a reasonable purchaser could  
17 know that he or she had acquired a security. Purchasers were thereby misled into  
18 believing that the SAFEMOON Token was something other than a security, when it  
19 was a security.

20 375. Accordingly, it was not apparent to a reasonable investor, at issuance,  
21 that the SAFEMOON Tokens were securities under the law, and a reasonable  
22 investor would not have believed they were securities.

### 23 **C. Guidance from the SEC**

#### 24 **1. The SEC's 2019 Framework**

25 376. On April 3, 2019, the SEC published its "Framework for 'Investment  
26 Contract' Analysis of Digital Assets" (the "Framework") in which it "provided a  
27 framework for analyzing whether a digital asset is an investment contract and  
28 whether offers and sales of a digital asset are securities transactions."

1 377. The Framework described how to analyze the various facts surrounding  
2 an ICO in making the determination of whether a given digital asset is a security.

3 378. In particular, the Framework provides that the “inquiry into whether a  
4 purchaser is relying on the efforts of others focuses on two key issues: Does the  
5 purchaser reasonably expect to rely on the efforts of an [Active Participant or “AP”]?  
6 Are those efforts ‘the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts  
7 which affect the failure or success of the enterprise,’ as opposed to efforts that are  
8 more ministerial in nature?”

9 379. The Framework further notes that the “stronger the[ ] presence” of the  
10 following factors, “the more likely it is that a purchaser of a digital asset is relying  
11 on the ‘efforts of others.’”

12 380. The first factor the SEC looked at was whether an AP is responsible  
13 for the development, improvement (or enhancement), operation, or promotion of the  
14 network, particularly if purchasers of the digital asset expect an AP to be performing  
15 or overseeing tasks that are necessary for the network or digital asset to achieve or  
16 retain its intended purpose or functionality.

17 381. At the time of the SAFEMOON Token launch, Defendants actively  
18 marketed the token launch and the SafeMoon project, thereby necessitating the  
19 continued managerial efforts of the Company and Executive Defendants. Where  
20 the network or the digital asset is still in development and the network or digital asset  
21 is not fully functional at the time of the offer or sale, purchasers would reasonably  
22 expect an AP to further develop the functionality of the network or digital asset  
23 (directly or indirectly).

24 382. Another factor the Framework considers is whether the AP creates  
25 or supports a market for, or the price of, the digital asset. This includes, *inter alia*,  
26 whether the AP “(1) controls the creation and issuance of the digital asset; or  
27 (2) takes other actions to support a market price of the digital asset, such as by  
28

1 limiting supply or ensuring scarcity through, for example, buybacks, “burning,” or  
2 other activities.”

3 383. As noted above (*see supra*, ¶252), all of the SAFEMOON tokens in  
4 circulation were created at the direction of Nagy and Smith. Additionally, Nagy and  
5 Smith also created the protocols by which the SAFEMOON Tokens are burned.

6 384. The framework further states that “An AP has a continuing  
7 managerial role in making decisions about or exercising judgment concerning the  
8 network or the characteristics or rights the digital asset represents[.]”

9 385. Here, the Company and Executive Defendants have discussed the long-  
10 term prospects on years-long time frames, continually noting how the SafeMoon  
11 ecosystem will “evolve” in the future.

12 386. The ability to determine whether and where the digital asset will trade  
13 is another factor discussed in the Framework. For example, “purchasers may  
14 reasonably rely on an AP for liquidity, such as where the AP has arranged, or  
15 promised to arrange for, the trading of the digital asset on a secondary market or  
16 platform.”

17 387. Here, SafeMoon’s whitepaper focuses extensively on the ability of the  
18 SAFEMOON Token smart contract to “automatically capture liquidity” and enable  
19 trading of the SAFEMOON Token.<sup>220</sup>

20 388. Another factor the Framework notes is whether the AP has the ability  
21 to determine who will receive additional digital assets and under what conditions.  
22 This could be, for example, “[m]aking or contributing to managerial level business  
23 decisions, such as how to deploy funds raised from sales of the digital asset.”

24 389. Here, the Company, along with the Controlling Defendants, are the  
25 arbiters of funding for SafeMoon project.

26  
27  
28 <sup>220</sup> See fn.18, *supra*.



1 390. The Company’s Twitter account also announced that Karony himself  
2 had locked up “\$250 MILLION+ DOLLARS WORTH OF LP.” in the liquidity pool  
3 to fund future project and marketing campaigns.<sup>221</sup>

4 391. Making other managerial judgements or decisions that will directly or  
5 indirectly impact the success of the network or the value of the digital asset  
6 generally.

7 392. The Framework also remarks that purchasers would reasonably  
8 expect the AP to undertake efforts to promote its own interests and enhance the value  
9 of the network or digital asset, including, but not limited to, the instances where the  
10 AP “has the ability to realize capital appreciation from the value of the digital asset.  
11 This can be demonstrated, for example, if the AP retains a stake or interest in the  
12 digital asset.” According to the SEC, in these instances, “purchasers would  
13 reasonably expect the AP to undertake efforts to promote its own interests and  
14 enhance the value of the network or digital asset.”

15 393. Here, several Defendants – including but not limited to Karony and  
16 Arriaga – retain a significant interest in the SafeMoon project even after selling off  
17 many SAFEMOON Tokens at the height of the token launch (*see supra*).

## 18 2. SEC’s Previous Statements and Findings

19 394. On May 7, 2021, on CNBC’s “Squawk Box” television program,  
20 chairman of the SEC Gary Gensler stated that “a lot of crypto tokens – I won’t call  
21 them cryptocurrencies for this moment – ***are indeed securities***[.]”<sup>222</sup> In addition  
22 to being the Chairman of the SEC, Mr. Gensler is also a world renowned expert on  
23 cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology, having taught the “Blockchain and  
24

25  
26 <sup>221</sup> @SafeMoon 2.0  Twitter (Apr. 21, 2021), <https://twitter.com/safemoon/status/1384869489376907265?s=20&t=SNlPI ut6sbeeQ6RbNX8iw>.

27 <sup>222</sup> Jesse Point, *SEC Chairman Gary Gensler says more investor protections are*  
28 *needed for bitcoin and crypto markets*, CNBC (May 7, 2021), <https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/07/sec-chairman-gary-gensler-says-more-investor-protections-are-needed-for-bitcoin-and-crypto-markets.html>.

1 Money” course at the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of  
2 Technology (“MIT”).<sup>223</sup> [Emphasis added.]

3 395. In a June 14, 2018 speech entitled “Digital Asset Transactions: When  
4 Howey Met Gary (Plastic)” that is available on the SEC’s website,<sup>224</sup> the following  
5 observations were made on “when a digital transaction may no longer represent a  
6 security offering”:

7 If the network on which the token or coin is to function is sufficiently  
8 decentralized – where purchasers would no longer reasonably expect a  
9 person or group to carry out essential managerial or entrepreneurial  
10 efforts – the assets may not represent an investment contract.  
11 Moreover, when the efforts of the third party are no longer a key factor  
12 for determining the enterprise’s success, material information  
13 asymmetries recede. As a network becomes truly decentralized, the  
14 ability to identify an issuer or promoter to make the requisite  
15 disclosures becomes difficult, and less meaningful.

16 And so, when I look at Bitcoin today, I do not see a central third party  
17 whose efforts are a key determining factor in the enterprise. The  
18 network on which Bitcoin functions is operational and appears to have  
19 been decentralized for some time, perhaps from inception.

20 396. A key factor in determining whether a digital asset is a security or not  
21 is whether there is a centralized entity behind the digital asset.<sup>225</sup>

22  
23  
24 <sup>223</sup> Lectures and Materials from Chairman Gensler’s MIT course are available to  
25 the public for free at: <https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/sloan-school-of-management/15-s12-blockchain-and-money-fall-2018/video-lectures/session-1-introduction/>.

26 <sup>224</sup> William Hinman, *Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary*  
27 *(Plastic)*, Remarks at the Yahoo Finance All Markets Summit: Crypto, SEC (Speech)  
(June 14, 2018), <https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman-061418>.

28 <sup>225</sup> *Id.* (noting that the “decentralized structure” of Bitcoin and Ethereum placed  
these digital assets outside the “disclosure regime of the federal securities laws”).

397. As discussed above, the circumstances surrounding the creation of the SAFEMOON Token demonstrate that an exceedingly small number of centralized insiders maintained exclusive control over the SafeMoon project.

398. Finally, the SEC also already concluded that another virtual currency (*i.e.*, DAO tokens) that substantially similar to SAFEMOON Tokens are “securities and therefore subject to the federal securities laws.” As stated by the SEC, “issuers of distributed ledger or blockchain technology-based securities must register offers and sales of such securities unless a valid exemption applies.”<sup>226</sup>

### **CLASS ALLEGATIONS**

399. Plaintiff brings this action, individually, and on behalf of a nationwide class, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), 23(b)(2), and/or 23(b)(3), defined as follows:

All persons who, during the Class Period, purchased SafeMoon’s SAFEMOON Tokens and were subsequently damaged thereby.

400. The Class Period is defined as the period between March 8, 2021 and the date of this filing.<sup>227</sup>

401. Excluded from the Class are: (a) Defendants; (b) Defendants’ affiliates, agents, employees, officers, and directors; (c) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendants’ counsel; and (d) the judge assigned to this matter, the judge’s staff, and any member of the judge’s immediate family. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify, change, or expand the various class definitions set forth above, based on discovery and further investigation.

402. **Numerosity**: Upon information and belief, the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. While the exact number and identity

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<sup>226</sup> Press Release, *SEC Issues Investigative Report Concluding DAO Tokens, a Digital Asset, Were Securities*, SEC (July 25, 2017), <https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-131>.

<sup>227</sup> Plaintiff reserves the right to expand or amend the Class Period based on discovery produced in this matter.

1 of individual members of the Class is currently unknown, such information being in  
2 the sole possession of SafeMoon and/or third parties and obtainable by Plaintiff only  
3 through the discovery process, Plaintiff believes, and on that basis alleges, that the  
4 Class consists of at least hundreds of people. The number of Class members can be  
5 determined based on SafeMoon's and other third party's records.

6 403. **Commonality**: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all  
7 members of the Class. These questions predominate over questions affecting  
8 individual Class members. These common legal and factual questions include, but  
9 are not limited to:

- 10 a. whether the SAFEMOON Tokens are securities under the Securities  
11 Act;
- 12 b. whether the sale of SAFEMOON Tokens violates the registration of the  
13 Securities Act;
- 14 c. whether Defendants improperly and misleadingly marketed  
15 SAFEMOON Tokens;
- 16 d. whether Defendants' conduct violates the state consumer protection  
17 statutes asserted herein;
- 18 e. whether Promoter Defendants aided and abetted violations of the state  
19 consumer protection statutes asserted herein;
- 20 f. whether Executive Defendants conspired to artificially inflate the price  
21 of the SAFEMOON Tokens and then sell their SAFEMOON Tokens to  
22 unsuspecting investors;
- 23 g. whether Defendants have been unjustly and wrongfully enriched as a  
24 result of their conduct;
- 25 h. whether the proceeds that Defendants obtained as a result of the sale of  
26 SAFEMOON Tokens, rightfully belongs to Plaintiff and Class  
27 members;
- 28

- 1 i. whether Defendants should be required to return money they received
- 2 as a result of the sale of SAFEMOON Tokens to Plaintiff and Class
- 3 members;
- 4 j. whether Executive Defendants breached the implied covenant of good
- 5 faith and fair dealing; and
- 6 k. whether Plaintiff and Class members have suffered damages, and, if so,
- 7 the nature and extent of those damages.

8 404. **Typicality**: Plaintiff has the same interest in this matter as all Class  
9 members, and Plaintiff's claims arise out of the same set of facts and conduct as the  
10 claims of all Class members. Plaintiff's and Class members' claims all arise out of  
11 SafeMoon's uniform misrepresentations, omissions, and unlawful, unfair, and  
12 deceptive acts and practices related to the sale of SAFEMOON Tokens.

13 405. **Adequacy**: Plaintiff has no interest that conflicts with the interests of  
14 the Class and are committed to pursuing this action vigorously. Plaintiff has retained  
15 counsel competent and experienced in complex consumer class action litigation.  
16 Accordingly, Plaintiff and Lead Counsel will fairly and adequately protect the  
17 interests of the Class.

18 406. **Superiority**: A class action is superior to all other available means of  
19 fair and efficient adjudication of the claims of Plaintiff and members of the Class.  
20 The injury suffered by each individual Class member is relatively small compared  
21 to the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex and extensive  
22 litigation necessitated by the Company's conduct. It would be virtually impossible  
23 for individual Class members to effectively redress the wrongs done to them. Even  
24 if Class members could afford individualized litigation, the court system could not.  
25 Individualized litigation would increase delay and expense to all parties, and to the  
26 court system, because of the complex legal and factual issues of this case.  
27 Individualized rulings and judgments could result in inconsistent relief for similarly  
28 situated individuals. By contrast, the class action device presents far fewer

1 management difficulties, and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy  
2 of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court.

3 407. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable  
4 to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding  
5 declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole.

6 **FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION**

7 **Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5**  
8 **False and Misleading Statements**  
9 **(Against the Company and Executive Defendants)**

10 408. Plaintiff restates and realleges all preceding allegations above as if fully  
11 set forth herein.

12 409. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations above.

13 410. Plaintiff brings this claim for violations of Section 10(b) of the  
14 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. §78j(b), and Rule  
15 10b-5(b) promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5(b).

16 411. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of all Class members who  
17 purchased SAFEMOON Tokens from March 8, 2021 to the time of this filing.

18 412. The SAFEMOON Tokens are securities within the meaning of Section  
19 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §77b(a)(1). Moreover, the Company’s CEO,  
20 Karony, has admitted that SafeMoon is not a token project. Instead, as a self-  
21 described “tech company,” Defendants sold these securities to Plaintiff and the other  
22 Class members during and after the March 2021 launch.

23 413. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b) make it illegal, in connection with the  
24 purchase or sale of any security, “for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of  
25 any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any  
26 facility of any national securities exchange . . . to make any untrue statement of a  
27 material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the  
28



1 statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not  
2 misleading.”

3 414. Defendants carried out a plan, scheme, and course of conduct that  
4 SafeMoon intended to and did deceive the retail investors – Plaintiff and the other  
5 Class members – who acquired SAFEMOON Tokens pursuant to the March 2021  
6 launch offering and thereby caused them to purchase SAFEMOON Tokens at  
7 artificially inflated prices.

8 415. In connection with the March 2021 launch of SAFEMOON Tokens,  
9 Defendants disseminated, approved, and/or endorsed the false statements described  
10 herein, which these Defendants knew or recklessly should have known were  
11 materially misleading in that they contained material misrepresentations and failed  
12 to disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of  
13 the circumstances under which they were made, not materially misleading.

14 416. Defendants employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud; made  
15 untrue statements of material fact and omitted to state material facts necessary to  
16 make the statements made not misleading; and engaged in acts, practices, and a  
17 course of business that operated as a fraud and deceit upon the Class members that  
18 resulted in artificially high market prices for SAFEMOON Tokens in connection  
19 with the March 2021 launch, in violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and  
20 Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

21 **Misrepresentations and Omissions**

22 417. Defendants’ untrue statements and omissions of material facts in  
23 connection with the sale of SAFEMOON Tokens include at least the following:

24 a) In the Long Whitepaper (published prior to the launch of  
25 SAFEMOON Tokens in March 2021), the Company represented that it had devised  
26 a “Step-by-Step Plan to Ensure 100% Safety,” and that, as step 3 of that plan, “LP  
27 Locked on DxLocker for 4 years.” In order to make this statement not misleading,  
28 the Company was required to, but did not, disclose that it was not using a mechanism

1 to lock funds in the liquidity pools such that those funds could not be accessed by  
2 the Company or the Executive Defendants.

3           b) On March 19, 2021, the Company stated: “The moon just became  
4 even more #SAFU. Now completed is the 4 year lock on the second LP. We now  
5 have 2 locked LP expiring on May 1, 2025.” In order to make this statement not  
6 misleading, the Company was required to, but did not, disclose that it was not using  
7 a mechanism to lock funds in the liquidity pools such that those funds could not be  
8 accessed by the Company or the Executive Defendants.

9           c) On March 19, 2021, in a now-deleted post on his official Twitter  
10 account, Phillips publicly stated: “I keep seeing #SafeMoon everywhere anyone  
11 know about it? Is it gonna pop? Or . . . has it got Big #Doge energy.”<sup>228</sup> In order  
12 to make this statement not misleading Phillips was required to, but did not, disclose  
13 his connection to the Company and that the “buzz” about SafeMoon manufactured  
14 by Defendants themselves instead of being naturally created by investor interest.

15           d) On March 21, 2021, the Company released a statement via its  
16 official Twitter account, stating that 841,685,253,836 SAFEMOON Tokens “have  
17 been burnt in the last 24 hours alone. That’s over 800 billion tokens permanently  
18 removed from the circulating supply!” By stressing the “burn” of the SAFEMOON  
19 Token supply in a short period of time, the Company purposefully suggested to  
20 investors that the value of SAFEMOON Token would increase as more  
21 SAFEMOON Tokens are burned. In this statement and thereafter, however,  
22 SafeMoon has never disclosed the details of the Company’s token burning protocols,  
23 which was material information. In order to make this statement not misleading,  
24 Defendants were obligated to (but did not) disclose that the Company could change  
25 the burn rate at will, thus there was no guarantee to investors that the supply of  
26 SAFEMOON Tokens would continue to depreciate from tokens being burned.

27  
28 <sup>228</sup> See [https://www.reddit.com/r/SafeMoon/comments/m8mjpk/safemoontweet\\_by\\_ben\\_phillips\\_benphillipsuk/](https://www.reddit.com/r/SafeMoon/comments/m8mjpk/safemoontweet_by_ben_phillips_benphillipsuk/) (last visited Feb. 16, 2022).

1 e) On March 22, 2021, the Company announced that “over 1.1  
2 trillion tokens [were] permanently removed from the circulating supply” and that  
3 this amount of tokens were “burnt in the last 24 hours alone. By stressing the “burn”  
4 of the SAFEMOON Token supply in a short period of time, the Company  
5 purposefully suggested to investors that the value of SAFEMOON Token would  
6 increase as more SAFEMOON Tokens are burned. In this statement and thereafter,  
7 however, SafeMoon has never disclosed the details of the Company’s token burning  
8 protocols, which was material information. In order to make this statement not  
9 misleading, Defendants were obligated to (but did not) disclose that the Company  
10 could change the burn rate at will, thus there was no guarantee to investors that the  
11 supply of SAFEMOON Tokens would continue to depreciate from tokens being  
12 burned.

13 f) On March 27, 2021, Paul, speaking on behalf of the Company,  
14 promoted SAFEMOON in a tweet stoking investors’ fear of missing out on the next  
15 big thing (*i.e.*, SAFEMOON Tokens). In order to make this statement not  
16 misleading, Defendants were obligated to disclose that (1) Paul was a paid promotor  
17 working for the Company and (2) Paul was paid in SAFEMOON Tokens and could  
18 (and did) sell those tokens immediately with no restrictions.

19 g) On March 29, 2021, McCollum, speaking on behalf of the  
20 Company, promoted SAFEMOON in a tweet that suggested that the SAFEMOON  
21 Token would be just as profitable for investors as another more-popular token: Doge  
22 coin. In order to make this statement not misleading, Defendants were obligated to  
23 disclose that (1) McCollum was a paid promotor working for the Company and  
24 (2) McCollum was paid in SAFEMOON Tokens and could (and did) sell those  
25 tokens immediately with no restrictions.

26 h) On March 31, 2021, McCollum, speaking on behalf of the  
27 Company, promoted SAFEMOON in a tweet repeating “SAFEMOON” over and  
28 over again in an attempt to generate sales of the SAFEMOON Tokens. In order to

1 make this statement not misleading, Defendants were obligated to disclose that  
2 (1) McCollum was a paid promotor working for the Company and (2) McCollum  
3 was paid in SAFEMOON Tokens and could (and did) sell those tokens immediately  
4 with no restrictions.

5 i) On April 3, 2021, the Company announced that 396 trillion  
6 SAFEMOON Tokens were “burnt” and “gone.” That same day, Karony, speaking  
7 as the Company’s CEO, reposted the token announcement on his personal Twitter  
8 account and noted in the caption that the supply of SAFEMOON Tokens would  
9 receive “continual burns” and that the price of the SAFEMOON Tokens was at an  
10 all-time high (“ATH”) and would be going to the “moon” imminently. By stressing  
11 the “burn” of the SAFEMOON Token supply in a short period of time, the Company  
12 and Karony purposefully suggested to investors that the value of SAFEMOON  
13 Token would increase as more SAFEMOON Tokens are burned. In this statement  
14 and thereafter, however, SafeMoon has never disclosed the details of the Company’s  
15 token burning protocols, which was material information. In order to make this  
16 statement not misleading, Defendants were obligated to (but did not) disclose that  
17 the Company could change the burn rate at will, thus there was no guarantee to  
18 investors that the supply of SAFEMOON Tokens would continue to depreciate (and,  
19 in turn, increase the scarcity and value of the SAFEMOON Tokens) from “continual  
20 burns.”

21 j) On April 6, 2021, Keem, speaking on behalf of the Company,  
22 advised investors to “HODL da #SAFEMOON” because “12 months from now  
23 looks good.” In order to make this statement not misleading, Defendants were  
24 obligated to (but did not) disclose that (1) Keem was a paid promotor working for  
25 (not with) the Company, (2) Keem was paid in SAFEMOON Tokens and could (and  
26 did) sell those tokens immediately with no restrictions, and (3) Keem was not look  
27 “12 months from now” at the long-term growth prospects for Safemoon but rather  
28 was planning on selling (and did) at the first opportunity.

1 k) On April 7, 2021, the Company's official Twitter account posted  
2 a video update from Karony, wherein he stated, among other things, that the  
3 Company's developers were using the "most innovative" features for the exchange.  
4 In order to make this statement not misleading, Defendants were obligated to (but  
5 did not) disclose that the Company had no intention of creating innovations for the  
6 SafeMoon exchange or wallet but rather planned on (and did) using a copied version  
7 of existing smart contracts and cryptocurrency coding.

8 l) On April 8, 2021, the Company, and Karony speaking on the  
9 Company's behalf, stated: "400 TRILLION TOKENS BURNT GONE! NEVER  
10 COMING BACK." By stressing the "burn" of the SAFEMOON Token supply in a  
11 short period of time, the Company purposefully suggested to investors that the value  
12 of SAFEMOON Token would increase as more SAFEMOON Tokens are burned.  
13 In this statement and thereafter, however, SafeMoon has never disclosed the details  
14 of the Company's token burning protocols, which was material information. In order  
15 to make this statement not misleading, Defendants were obligated to (but did not)  
16 disclose that the Company could change the burn rate at will, thus there was no  
17 guarantee to investors that the supply of SAFEMOON Tokens would continue to  
18 depreciate from tokens being burned.

19 m) On April 17, 2021, Way, speaking on behalf of the Company,  
20 stated on his personal Twitter account that he had a public wallet address for  
21 SAFEMOON Tokens, signaling to investors that Way was investing his own money  
22 into SAFEMOON Tokens. In order to make this statement not misleading,  
23 Defendants were obligated to disclose that (1) Way was a paid promotor working  
24 for the Company and (2) Way was paid in SAFEMOON Tokens and could (and did)  
25 sell those tokens immediately with no restrictions.

26 n) On April 18, 2021, Keem, speaking on behalf of the Company,  
27 urged investors to "CHECK YOUR #SAFEMOON RIGHT NOW!" because the  
28

1 “price is going through the damn roof!”, cheering them on “bro we’re rich!”<sup>229</sup>  
2 Keem went on to state: “Truly believe in #SAFEMOON & not for this quick   
3 boom. I’m long. People at @safemoon are doing some much good stuff. Love the  
4 roadmap. Huge community already. Feels like the start of something huge. In a  
5 world of 100,000 new crypto coins. This one sticks out!” In order to make these  
6 statements not misleading, Defendants were obligated to disclose that (1) Keem was  
7 a paid promotor working for the Company and (2) Keem was paid in SAFEMOON  
8 Tokens and could (and did) sell those tokens immediately with no restrictions.

9 o) On April 18, 2021, Witriol, speaking on behalf of the Company,  
10 posted a screenshot that showed the hashtag “#SAFEMOON” was trending in  
11 California and stated in the caption to that post: “This is only in California” and  
12 “#safemoonisthenewdoge coin.” In order to make these statements not misleading,  
13 Defendants were obligated to disclose that: (1) SafeMoon’s popularity specifically  
14 in California was not organically created (as suggested by Witriol) but rather  
15 artificially manufactured by Witriol himself and the other Defendants; and (2) the  
16 comparison to the heavily-traded Dogecoin was not based on any measurable  
17 similarities but rather it was simply meant to have investors believe that the  
18 SAFEMOON Token would be just as profitable for investors as Dogecoin.

19 p) On April 21, 2021, the Company and Haines-Davies stated in  
20 response to a drop in the price of the SAFEMOON Tokens: “That wasn’t a dip today  
21 . . . we went back to earth for a bigger rocket and more passengers.” In order to  
22 make these statements not misleading, Defendants were obligated to disclose that  
23 they were responsible for the downward selling pressure on the SAFEMOON  
24 Tokens and, as a result, that investors would be unable to receive any return on  
25 investment.

26 q) On April 21, 2021, Karony stated in a series of all-caps tweets:  
27 “THE LP LOCK IS NOT AUTOMATIC BUT AUTOMATED. AUTOMATED  
28

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<sup>229</sup> <https://twitter.com/KEEMSTAR/status/1383976698098507785>.



1 AND AUTOMATIC ARE NOT THE SAME THING. THIS IS ONE FOR BOTH  
2 SECURITY AND LONGEVITY OF #SAFEMOON. WE ARE FOCUSED ON  
3 THE FUTURE, AND UNDERSTAND THAT SITUATIONS ARISE WHICH  
4 MAY REQUIRE THE USE OF THE LP. USES INCLUDE: SEEDING OTHER  
5 EXCHANGES AND DEX'S, DEVELOPMENT COSTS OF FUTURE  
6 SAFEMOON INNOVATIONS.” In order to make this statement not misleading,  
7 Karony was obligated to disclose that the liquidity pools were not locked in an  
8 automatic fashion **because** the Company and the Executive Defendants wanted to,  
9 and did in fact, siphon funds from those pools (not because they wanted to reserve  
10 their right to use such funds to invest in “future Safemoon innovations”). He was  
11 likewise obligated to disclose that the funds were not “locked” in any meaningful  
12 way because they could be accessed by the Company and the Executive Defendants.

13 r) On April 21, 2021, the Company stated on its official Twitter  
14 account that SafeMoon was going to lock up \$250 million of the SafeMoon liquidity  
15 pool. That same day, Karony stated: “We are locking away the current LP, which  
16 is a quarter of a billion+ dollars worth of tokens.” In order to make that statement  
17 not misleading at the time, Defendants were obligated to disclose that Karony and  
18 the Executive Defendants had not, in truth, locked the liquidity pool but were instead  
19 using the funds in the liquidity pool for non-business/personal purchases and  
20 expenses. Months later, on June 2, 2021, Arriaga admitted that the liquidity pool  
21 was not locked (in an automatic fashion or otherwise). Karony was likewise  
22 obligated to disclose that the funds were not “locked” in any meaningful way  
23 because they could be accessed by the Company and the Executive Defendants.

24 s) On May 3, 2021, the Company stated:

25 In regards to owner control, we are a fair launch governed by a central  
26 board which is subject to governmental regulations and law. We are a  
27 legally registered entity in accordance to the law and jurisdiction in  
28 which we operate. SafeMoon is very different from other projects, and

1 our differences provide more security for the community vs.  
2 anonymous teams and projects. Risks in regard to “rug pulls” or  
3 anything else is mitigated due to the fact that every member of  
4 SafeMoon would be subject to litigation and likely a swift prison  
5 sentence. Additionally, outside of the law, our social lives would be in  
6 ruin, and we would not be able to show our faces in public again, let  
7 alone get another job. This should be taken into account when looking  
8 at the SafeMoon project as a whole.

9 This statement thus suggested that the Company and the Executive Defendants  
10 would not siphon funds from the liquidity pools. In order to make this statement not  
11 misleading, the Company was obligated to disclose that it and the Executive  
12 Defendant had, and were in fact, siphoning funds from the liquidity pools.

13 t) On May 16, 2021, Karony, speaking on behalf of the Company,  
14 stated that SafeMoon was in “ongoing conversations about SafeMoon” with  
15 Gambia’s “Ambassador at-Large, Sankung Jawara, who has done the initial vetting  
16 of Safemoon.” Karony further stated that SafeMoon would be used as “another tool  
17 in [Gambia’s] forward-leaning, innovative efforts.” In order to make these  
18 statements not misleading, Defendants were obligated to disclose that the Company  
19 was not in any meaningful discussions with the Gambian government about  
20 implementing SafeMoon into the country’s financial system but instead that the  
21 meeting with Gambia’s “Ambassador at-Large” was just a meet and greet that was  
22 arranged by Karony’s parents in order to give the appearance of authenticity to  
23 investors.

24 u) On May 18, 2021, Portnoy, acting as a representative of the  
25 Company, recommended to his followers: “If it is a Ponzi, get in on the ground floor.  
26 To the Moon, safely we go.” He further discloses that he had purchased \$40,000 in  
27 SAFEMOON Tokens and that “he will not sell in the near future.” Within an hour  
28 of Portnoy’s post, the price of SAFEMOON Tokens rose about 18%. Portnoy

1 tweeted later that day: “Ps - #safemoon is up 25% since I adopted it” and “Rules of  
2 #SAFEMOON”: “Always tell people you bought it,” “Never sell it,” “Get pucks in  
3 deep,” and “Make memes.” In order to make these statements not misleading, the  
4 Company was obligated to disclose that: (1) many of the Executive Defendants,  
5 including, but not limited to Nagy, Smith, Haines-Davies, and Wyatt, as well as the  
6 Promotor Defendants had already sold off some or all of their SAFEMOON Token  
7 holdings when the trading volume was artificially inflated between March 2021 and  
8 May 2021; and (2) without continued artificial pumping of the volume, the  
9 SAFEMOON Tokens price would never recover, leaving investors stuck holding  
10 worthless tokens that no one wants to buy.

11 v) On May 24, 2021, Arriaga, operating on behalf of the Company,  
12 created the “FUD Hound” account on YouTube and published videos “debunking”  
13 and “exposing” critics of SAFEMOON. In particular, Arriaga posted six videos to  
14 the FUD Hound channel on the following dates: (1) May 24, 2021; (2) May 28,  
15 2021; (3) June 2, 2021; (4) June 7, 2021; (5) June 13, 2021; and (6) June 21, 2021.  
16 Each one of these videos contains misleading statements about SafeMoon’s growth  
17 prospects, the safety and functionality of SafeMoon’s technology, the Hashex audit’s  
18 findings, and the timing of milestones for the Company, etc. In order to make these  
19 videos as a whole, and the statements made therein, not misleading, the Company  
20 was obligated to disclose that Arriaga was working on behalf of the Company at the  
21 time these videos were made and released.

22 w) On June 1, 2021, the Company published a photo of puppies with  
23 SafeMoon badges photoshopped on, with accompanying text that read: “No rug pulls  
24 here.” In order to make this post not misleading, the Company was obligated to  
25 disclose that: (1) many of the Executive Defendants, including, but not limited to  
26 Nagy, Smith, Haines-Davies, and Wyatt, as well as the Promotor Defendants had  
27 already sold off some or all of their SAFEMOON Token holdings when the trading  
28 volume was artificially inflated between March 2021 and May 2021; and (2) without

1 continued artificially pumping of the volume, the SAFEMOON Tokens price would  
2 never recover, leaving investors stuck holding worthless tokens that no one wants to  
3 buy. This post was further misleading because the Company and the Executive  
4 Defendants had **already** engaged in a rug pull, by siphoning funds from the liquidity  
5 pools.

6 x) On June 5, 2021, Witriol, speaking on behalf of the Company,  
7 stated that there was a “low chance of a rug pull” of the SAFEMOON Tokens  
8 because Karony would “lose his credentials” with the U.S. Department of Defense.  
9 In order to make this post not misleading, the Company was obligated to disclose  
10 that: (1) many of the Executive Defendants, including, but not limited to Nagy,  
11 Smith, Haines-Davies, and Wyatt, as well as the Promotor Defendants had already  
12 sold off some or all of their SAFEMOON Token holdings when the trading volume  
13 was artificially inflated between March 2021 and May 2021; and (2) without  
14 continued artificially pumping of the volume, the SAFEMOON Tokens price would  
15 never recover, leaving investors stuck holding worthless tokens that no one wants to  
16 buy. This post was further misleading because the Company and the Executive  
17 Defendants had **already** engaged in a rug pull, by siphoning funds from the liquidity  
18 pools.

19 y) On June 7, 2021, Karony, speaking on behalf of the Company,  
20 stated that the Company had “identified glaring security gaps with a lot of wallet  
21 providers” and was in the process of “integrating game changing encryption into the  
22 wallet.” Karony further stated that, “The SafeMoon wallet will be one of / if not the  
23 strongest wallets on the market. #SAFEMOON is the #Evolution! In order to make  
24 these statements not misleading, Defendants were obligated to (but did not) disclose  
25 that: (1) the Company had no intention of creating innovations for the SafeMoon  
26 wallet that would make it safer or have better encryption than other pre-existing  
27 wallets; (2) the Company intended to (and did) use a copied version of existing  
28 wallets with no additional security features; and (3) that the Company used the

1 SafeMoon wallet to collect investors' personal data without first obtaining informed  
2 consent.<sup>230</sup>

3           z) On June 11, 2021, Karony, speaking on behalf of the Company,  
4 stated that the Company was "smashing out our internal deadlines." Karony also  
5 hinted at imminent release dates for promised features for "the Wallet, exchange and  
6 more importantly Operation Pheonix." In order to make these statements not  
7 misleading, Defendants were obligated to (but did not) disclose that: (1) the  
8 Company, up to that point, had made little (if any) progress with developing the  
9 SafeMoon wallet (much less the innovative, military-grade encrypted wallet that  
10 Karony promised) or exchange; and (2) that this lack of progress would delay to  
11 promised launch date for the wallet and exchange.

12           aa) On June 13, 2021, Karony, speaking on behalf of the Company,  
13 stated that Smith was "involved with the Doge Coin x SpaceX partnership." In order  
14 to make these statements not misleading, Defendants were obligated to (but did not)  
15 disclose that: (1) the Smith's so-called involvement was merely serving as the  
16 moderator for the Doge coin Facebook account Company, and not in any leadership  
17 or developer roles; and (2) Smith had no direct contact or relationship with Elon  
18 Musk or Space X.

19           bb) On August 14, 2021, the Company stated that the "Full Launch"  
20 of the SafeMoon Wallet would occur on August 28, 2021 and that the wallet would  
21 be "available on Android and iOS." In order to make these statements not  
22 misleading, Defendants were obligated to (but did not) disclose that: (1) the lack of  
23 progress with the development of the SafeMoon wallet would likely (and did) delay  
24 its "full launch" beyond August 28, 2021; and (2) the SafeMoon wallet would not  
25 be available on both Android and iOS at the time of launch.

26  
27  
28 <sup>230</sup> Upon information and belief, the Company is, without consent, using this  
information to identify investors for targeted marketing for SafeMoon's financial  
products and/or selling their investors' personal data to third-party purchasers.

1 cc) On August 19, 2021 and August 24, 2021, Karony, speaking on  
2 behalf of the Company, stated: “Looking forward to #SAFEMOONWALLET  
3 launch on August 28th!” In order to make these statements not misleading,  
4 Defendants were obligated to (but did not) disclose that the lack of progress with the  
5 development of the SafeMoon wallet would likely (and did) delay its “full launch”  
6 beyond August 28, 2021.

7 dd) On November 22, 2021, Way, speaking on behalf of the  
8 Company, stated: “Safemoon just tweeted about WAGMI. Don’t miss the rocket.”  
9 In order to make this statement not misleading, Defendants were obligated to  
10 disclose that: (1) Way was a paid promotor working for the Company; and (2) Way  
11 was paid in SAFEMOON Tokens and could (and did) sell those tokens immediately  
12 with no restrictions.

13 ee) On December 12, 2021, Karony, speaking on behalf of the  
14 Company, stated: “Shoutout to our brilliant community, the product team and all  
15 #SAFEMOON employees for all the hard work these past 9 months, looking forward  
16 to the next 9 of evolution. Always out front! #SAFEMOONV2 is the #Evolution.”  
17 Karony also posted some frequently asked questions about the V2 Migration and  
18 provided answers on the Company’s behalf. In order to make these statements not  
19 misleading, Defendants were obligated to disclose that the primary purpose of the  
20 V2 migration was not due to purported technological innovations by the Company’s  
21 “team” but rather it was purposefully designed as a vehicle to extract value from  
22 investors and transfer that to the Company and Karony.

23 **Materiality**

24 418. The forgoing misrepresentations and omissions were each material.  
25 These representations related to critical issues concerning the security of  
26 SAFEMOON tokenholders’ investments. Indeed, if the foregoing representations  
27 were true (and the Company had in fact locked SAFEMOON Tokens in liquidity  
28



1 pools), then the Company and the Executive Defendants would not have been able  
2 to access or withdraw those tokens.

3 419. These misrepresentations and omissions related to, among other things:  
4 (i) the extent to which the Defendants and other insiders were restricted from selling  
5 substantial amounts of SAFEMOON Tokens on crypto-asset exchanges in the weeks  
6 immediately following the March 2021 launch; (ii) the extent to which Defendants  
7 and its insiders intended to sell their SAFEMOON Token holdings over that same  
8 period; and (iii) the extent to which Defendants and its insiders did in fact sell  
9 substantial amounts of their SAFEMOON Tokens crypto-asset exchanges over that  
10 same period. If a reasonable investor knew that the Company and the Executive  
11 Defendants could in fact abscond with those tokens (or did in fact abscond with those  
12 tokens), then that investor would reasonably expect the price of SAFEMOON  
13 Tokens to be substantially lower, given that the investment would be much riskier.

14 420. Accordingly, there is a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the  
15 omitted facts would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having  
16 significantly altered the “total mix” of information made available.

17 **Scienter**

18 421. The Company and Executive Defendants acted with scienter in  
19 engaging in the forgoing misconduct, in that they either had actual knowledge of the  
20 misrepresentations and omissions of material facts set forth herein, or acted with  
21 reckless disregard for the truth in that they failed to ascertain and to disclose such  
22 facts, even though such facts were available to them.

23 422. Indeed, the Company and the Executive Defendants created and  
24 controlled the software that determined whether they would have the ability to retain  
25 control over funds staked in liquidity pools and whether they could draw on those  
26 funds. They have likewise admitted that they intentionally decided to retain control  
27 over funds supposedly “locked” in liquidity pools because they wanted to provide  
28 themselves with flexibility to pay for expenses that could arise in the future.

1 423. Defendants knew before the March 2021 launch that any applicable  
2 vesting periods would not preclude the Executive Defendants or their friends and  
3 family dumping massive quantities of SAFEMOON Tokens on the market and  
4 SafeMoon intended to transfer billions of the newly issued SAFEMOON Tokens to  
5 project insiders, and that it, along with those insiders, intended to dump tens of  
6 millions of these tokens on crypto-asset exchanges, such that SafeMoon and its  
7 insiders intended to profit massively from the offering, while outside investors  
8 would be precluded from doing so.

9 424. Indeed, Defendants necessarily knew what restrictions were imposed  
10 on their own tokens, as well as the tokens that they issued and allocated to current  
11 and former team members, and to outside investors. These Defendants likewise  
12 knew that they, along with current and former team members, held a significant  
13 amount of the total SAFEMOON Token supply in circulation, and that if that portion  
14 of the Float were sold, the price of SAFEMOON Tokens would likely collapse. It  
15 was thus highly unreasonable for Defendants to conceal information relating to  
16 selling restrictions imposed on their and their insiders' tokens.

17 425. In addition, starting on March 5, 2021, Executive Defendants siphoned  
18 funds from the liquidity pools. Smith even admitted in an April 21, 2022 interview  
19 that "when the organization started, [Karony] leveraged to have [the liquidity pools]  
20 unlocked." The Executive Defendants thus knew that funds from the liquidity pools  
21 were being siphoned from the outset.

22 426. Defendants' failure to disclose such information, coupled with their  
23 imposition of various taxes on transactions on outside investors but not on  
24 themselves as well as undisclosed use of the Promotor Defendants to marketing  
25 SAFEMOON Tokens to unsuspecting investors, demonstrates that these Defendants  
26 intended that they and their insiders would sell substantial amounts of SAFEMOON  
27 Tokens at significant profits high the price was artificially inflated on and during the  
28 weeks and months that followed the March 2021 launch.

1 427. The Company and the Executive Defendants had the motive not to  
2 disclose these facts because such disclosure would have been self-defeating. They  
3 controlled a significant proportion of SAFEMOON Tokens, and such a disclosure  
4 would decrease the value of those assets. In other words, they had an incentive to  
5 ensure that the price of SAFEMOON Tokens remained inflated.

6 428. These Defendants executed on that plan, too, by (along with current and  
7 former team members) selling trillions of SAFEMOON Tokens on the market during  
8 that period.

9 429. Defendants knew that they had sold SAFEMOON Tokens on the  
10 market on and in the months that followed March 8, 2021. They likewise know that  
11 their current and former team members sold SAFEMOON Tokens: in addition to  
12 stating that such individuals had sold, these Defendants know which SAFEMOON  
13 TOKENS they allocated to team members and can therefore track the transaction  
14 history of that SAFEMOON TOKENS on the blockchain.

15 **Reliance, Economic Loss, and Loss Causation**

16 430. As a result of the publication and dissemination of the materially false  
17 and misleading information and failure to disclose material facts, as set forth above,  
18 the price of the SAFEMOON Tokens upon issuance on March 8, 2021, and for a  
19 period of time, thereafter, was artificially inflated.

20 431. In ignorance of the fact that the price of SAFEMOON Tokens was  
21 artificially inflated, and relying directly or indirectly on the false, misleading, and  
22 materially incomplete statements that Defendants made and approved, or upon the  
23 integrity of the market in which the SAFEMOON Tokens were sold, or on the  
24 absence of material adverse information that these Defendants knew or recklessly  
25 should have known of but failed to disclose in public statement, Plaintiff and the  
26 other Class members acquired SAFEMOON Tokens at artificially high prices and  
27 were damaged thereby.

28

1 432. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' wrongful conduct,  
2 Plaintiff and the other Class members suffered damages in connection with the  
3 respective purchases of SAFEMOON Tokens and are entitled to an award  
4 compensating them for such damages.

5 433. Indeed, the price of SAFEMOON TOKENS dropped significantly as  
6 Defendants disclosed, and the market discovered, the truth concerning the  
7 SAFEMOON project and its prospects. For example, following the release of the  
8 HashEX report on May 22, 2021, the price of SafeMoon tokens dropped  
9 approximately 30% from an opening of \$0.00000568 on May 22, 2021 to a close of  
10 \$0.00000396 on May 23, 2021. Furthermore, the price of SAFEMOON TOKENS  
11 went from a high of \$0.00000355 on August 28, 2021 in advance of the Wallet  
12 Release to a low of \$0.00000119 on September 10, 2021 in the wake of the failed  
13 wallet launch and executive departures.

14 434. On December 31, 2021, the price of the SAFEMOON Token hit a low  
15 of \$0.0000006521 per token, an over 80% drop from its height during the Class  
16 Period, which it has not been able to recover.

17 435. Worse still, after briefly recovering some of these losses, the price fell  
18 again to fall in 2022.

19 436. For example, on the news that the Company and the Executive Team  
20 **did in fact** draw on the liquidity pools (on April 18, 2022, April 21, 2022, and April  
21 28, 2022), the price of SAFEMOON Tokens (V2) further plummeted. Specifically,  
22 the price of such Tokens fell from \$0.0008177 on April 17, 2022, to \$0.0006161 on  
23 April 18, 2022, and to \$0.0004777 by the end of April 2022.

24 437. In addition, as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' wrongful  
25 conduct, SafeMoon has generated and retained ill-gotten in connection with the  
26 March 2021 launch of SAFEMOON Tokens, such that Plaintiff and the other Class  
27 members are entitled to the disgorgement of SafeMoon's ill-gotten gain from such  
28 misconduct.

**SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION**

**Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5  
Scheme Liability  
(Against the Company, the Executive Defendants,  
and the Promoter Defendants)**

438. Plaintiff restates and realleges all preceding allegations above as if fully set forth herein.

439. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations above.

440. Plaintiff brings this claim for violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. §78j(b), and Rule 10b-5(b) promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5(b).

441. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of all Class members who purchased SAFEMOON Tokens from March 8, 2021 to the time of this filing.

442. The SAFEMOON Tokens are securities within the meaning of Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §77b(a)(1). Moreover, the Company’s CEO, Karony, has admitted that SafeMoon is not a token project. Instead, as a self-described “tech company,” Defendants sold these securities to Plaintiff and the other Class members during and after the March 2021 launch.

443. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b) make it illegal, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, “for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange: (a) [t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; (b) [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or (c) [t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.” (*Id.*)

444. Defendants carried out a plan, scheme, and course of conduct that SafeMoon intended to and did deceive the retail investors – Plaintiff and the other

1 Class members – who acquired SAFEMOON Tokens pursuant to the March 2021  
2 launch offering thereafter, and thereby caused them to purchase SAFEMOON  
3 Tokens at artificially inflated prices.

4 445. In connection with the March 2021 launch of SAFEMOON Tokens,  
5 Defendants disseminated, approved, and/or endorsed the false statements described  
6 herein, which these Defendants knew or recklessly should have known were  
7 materially misleading in that they contained material misrepresentations and failed  
8 to disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of  
9 the circumstances under which they were made, not materially misleading.

10 446. Defendants employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud; made  
11 untrue statements of material fact and omitted to state material facts necessary to  
12 make the statements made not misleading; and engaged in acts, practices, and a  
13 course of business that operated as a fraud and deceit upon the Class members that  
14 resulted in artificially high market prices for SAFEMOON Tokens in connection  
15 with the March 2021 launch and thereafter, in violation of Section 10(b) of the  
16 Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

17 447. Specifically, the Company, the Executive Defendants, and the  
18 Promoter Defendants engaged in a pump-and-dump scheme, whereby: (i) the  
19 Company provided consideration to the Promoter Defendants in exchange for their  
20 promotion of SAFEMOON Tokens; (ii) the Promoter Defendants promoted  
21 SAFEMOON Tokens on their social media platforms without disclosing that they  
22 had been given consideration to post such promotions; (iii) the Company and the  
23 Executive Defendants “re-tweeted” or otherwise broadcasted the Promoter  
24 Defendants’ promotions of SAFEMOON Tokens without disclosing that the  
25 Promoter Defendants had received consideration from the Company to post such  
26 promotions; (iv) such promotions (both when posted by the Promoter Defendants  
27 and when re-posted by the Company and the Executive Defendants) artificially  
28 inflated the demand for, and thus the price of, SAFEMOON Tokens; (v) the



Executive Defendants and Promoter Defendants sold their SAFEMOON Tokens at those inflated prices; and (vi) such sales caused the price of SAFEMOON Tokens to decrease over time.

448. Examples of the Promoter Defendants misleading promotions include the following statements:

a. On March 19, 2021, in a now-deleted post on his official Twitter account, Phillips publicly stated: “I keep seeing #SafeMoon everywhere anyone know about it? Is it gonna pop? Or . . . has it got Big #Doge energy.”<sup>231</sup> In order to make this statement not misleading Phillips was required to, but did not, disclose his connection to the Company and that the “buzz” about SafeMoon manufactured by Defendants themselves instead of being naturally created by investor interest.

b. On March 27, 2021, Paul, speaking on behalf of the Company, promoted SAFEMOON in a tweet stoking investors’ fear of missing out on the next big thing (*i.e.*, SAFEMOON Tokens). In order to make this statement not misleading, Defendants were obligated to disclose that (1) Paul was a paid promotor working for the Company and (2) Paul was paid in SAFEMOON Tokens and could (and did) sell those tokens immediately with no restrictions.

c. On March 29, 2021, McCollum, speaking on behalf of the Company, promoted SAFEMOON in a tweet that suggested that the SAFEMOON Token would be just as profitable for investors as another more-popular token: Doge coin. In order to make this statement not misleading, Defendants were obligated to disclose that (1) McCollum was a paid promotor working for the Company and (2) McCollum was paid in SAFEMOON Tokens and could (and did) sell those tokens immediately with no restrictions.

d. On March 31, 2021, McCollum, speaking on behalf of the Company, promoted SAFEMOON in a tweet repeateding “SAFEMOON” over and

<sup>231</sup> See [https://www.reddit.com/r/SafeMoon/comments/m8mjpk/safemoon\\_tweet\\_by\\_ben\\_phillips\\_benphillipsuk/](https://www.reddit.com/r/SafeMoon/comments/m8mjpk/safemoon_tweet_by_ben_phillips_benphillipsuk/) (last visited Feb. 16, 2022).

1 over again in an attempt to generate sales of the SAFEMOON Tokens. In order to  
2 make this statement not misleading, Defendants were obligated to disclose that:  
3 (1) McCollum was a paid promotor working for the Company; and (2) McCollum  
4 was paid in SAFEMOON Tokens and could (and did) sell those tokens immediately  
5 with no restrictions.

6 e. On April 6, 2021, Keem, speaking on behalf of the Company,  
7 advised investors to “HODL da #SAFEMOON” because “12 months from now  
8 looks good.” In order to make this statement not misleading, Defendants were  
9 obligated to (but did not) disclose that: (1) Keem was a paid promoter working for  
10 (not with) the Company; (2) Keem was paid in SAFEMOON Tokens and could (and  
11 did) sell those tokens immediately with no restrictions; and (3) Keem was not  
12 looking “12 months from now” at the long-term growth prospects for Safemoon but  
13 rather was planning on selling (and did) at the first opportunity.

14 f. On April 17, 2021, Way, speaking on behalf of the Company,  
15 stated on his personal Twitter account that he had a public wallet address for  
16 SAFEMOON Tokens, signaling to investors that Way was investing his own money  
17 into SAFEMOON Tokens. In order to make this statement not misleading,  
18 Defendants were obligated to disclose that: (1) Way was a paid promotor working  
19 for the Company; and (2) Way was paid in SAFEMOON Tokens and could (and  
20 did) sell those tokens immediately with no restrictions.

21 g. On April 18, 2021, Keem, speaking on behalf of the Company,  
22 urged investors to “CHECK YOUR #SAFEMOON RIGHT NOW!” because the  
23 “price is going through the damn roof!,” cheering them on “bro we’re rich!”<sup>232</sup>  
24 Keem went on to state: “Truly believe in #SAFEMOON & not for this quick   
25 boom. I’m long. People at @safemoon are doing some much good stuff. Love the  
26 roadmap. Huge community already. Feels like the start of something huge. In a  
27 world of 100,000 new crypto coins. This one sticks out!” In order to make these

28 <sup>232</sup> <https://twitter.com/KEEMSTAR/status/1383976698098507785>.

1 statements not misleading, Defendants were obligated to disclose that: (1) Keem  
2 was a paid promotor working for the Company; and (2) Keem was paid in  
3 SAFEMOON Tokens and could (and did) sell those tokens immediately with no  
4 restrictions.

5 449. Indeed, far from reflecting sincere endorsements regarding the  
6 prospects of the Company or SAFEMOON Tokens, the foregoing statements  
7 reflected paid celebrity endorsements.

8 450. As explained above, such endorsements – many of which were re-  
9 tweeted by the Company and the Executive Defendants – caused the price and  
10 trading volume of SAFEMOON Tokens to increase substantially throughout March  
11 2021, April 2021, and May 2021.

12 451. The price of SAFEMOON Tokens, as explained above, likewise  
13 decreased as the Executive Defendants and Promoter Defendants offloaded their  
14 SAFEMOON Tokens to retail investors.

15 452. The Company, the Executive Defendants, and the Promoter Defendants  
16 acted with scienter in connection with the foregoing scheme. Indeed, they  
17 necessarily knew that: (i) the Promoter Defendants received consideration for their  
18 social-media promotions of the Company and SAFEMOON Tokens; (ii) such  
19 promotions did not reflect the sincere beliefs of the Promoter Defendants; and  
20 (iii) they sold SAFEMOON Tokens in the period of and immediately following such  
21 promotions.

22 453. Plaintiff and the Class relied on such promotions in deciding whether  
23 to purchase SAFEMOON Tokens (including because the price of SAFEMOON  
24 Tokens incorporated such promotions), and further relied on the reasonable  
25 assumption that they were trading in an efficient market free of manipulation.

26 454. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff and  
27 the Class have suffered damages in connection with their purchases of SAFEMOON  
28 Tokens.

**THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION**

**Unregistered Offering and Sale of Securities in  
Violation of Sections 5 and 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act  
(Against All Defendants)**

455. Plaintiff restates and realleges all preceding allegations above as if fully set forth herein.

456. Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, realleges and incorporates herein by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs of this complaint, and further alleges as follows:

457. Defendants, and each of them, by engaging in the conduct described above, directly or indirectly, made use of means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, to offer to sell or to sell securities, or to carry or cause such securities to be carried through the mails or in interest commerce for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale.

458. SAFEMOON Tokens are securities within the meaning of Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §77b(a)(1).

459. Plaintiff and members of the Class purchased SAFEMOON Token securities.

460. No registration statements have been filed with the SEC or have been in effect with respect to any of the offerings alleged herein. No exemption to the registration requirement applies.

461. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that statutory sellers under §12(a)(1) also include “the buyer’s immediate seller” and any person who actively solicited the sale of the securities to plaintiff and did so for financial gain. *See Pinter v. Dahl*, 486 U.S. 622, 644 n.21 & 647 (1988); *accord, e.g., Steed Finance LDC v. Nomura Sec. Int’l, Inc.*, No. 00 Civ. 8058, 2001 WL 1111508, at \*7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001). That is, §12(a)(1) liability extends to sellers who actively solicit the sale of securities with a motivation to serve their own financial interest or those of the

1 securities owner. *Pinter*, 486 U.S. at 647; *Capri v. Murphy*, 856 F.2d 473, 478 (2d  
2 Cir. 1988). Defendants are all statutory sellers.

3 462. By reason of the foregoing, each of the Defendants have violated  
4 Sections 5(a), 5(c), and 12(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§77e(a), 77e(c), and  
5 771(a).

6 463. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' unregistered sale of  
7 securities, Plaintiff and the Class have suffered damages in connection with their  
8 SAFEMOON Token purchases.

9 **FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

10 **Violation of Sections 15 of the Securities Act**  
11 **(Against the Executive Defendants)**

12 464. Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, realleges  
13 and incorporates herein by reference, each and every allegation contained in the  
14 preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, and further alleges as follows:

15 465. This Count is asserted against the Executive Defendants (collectively,  
16 the "Control Person Defendants") under Section 15 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.  
17 §77o.

18 466. The Control Person Defendants, by virtue of their offices, ownership,  
19 agency, agreements or understandings, and specific acts were, at the time of the  
20 wrongs alleged herein, and as set forth herein, controlling persons within the  
21 meaning of Section 15 of the Securities Act. The Control Person Defendants, and  
22 each of them, had the power and influence and exercised the same to cause the  
23 unlawful offer and sale of SAFEMOON Tokens securities as described herein.

24 467. The Control Person Defendants, separately or together, possess,  
25 directly or indirectly, the power to direct or cause the direction of the management  
26 and policies of SafeMoon, through ownership of voting securities, by contract,  
27 subscription agreement, or otherwise.  
28

1 468. The Control Person Defendants also have the power to direct or cause  
2 the direction of the management and policies of SafeMoon.

3 469. The Control Person Defendants, separately or together, have sufficient  
4 influence to have caused SAFEMOON Tokens and/or the Company to submit a  
5 registration statement.

6 470. The Control Person Defendants, separately or together, jointly  
7 participated in SafeMoon's failure to register SAFEMOON Tokens.

8 471. By virtue of the conduct alleged herein, the Control Person Defendants  
9 are liable for the wrongful conduct complained of herein and are liable to Plaintiff  
10 and the Class for rescission and/or damages suffered.

11 **FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

12 **Violation of Sections 20(a) of the Exchange Act**  
13 **(Against the Executive Defendants)**

14 472. Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, realleges  
15 and incorporates herein by reference, each and every allegation contained in the  
16 preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, and further alleges as follows:

17 473. This Count is asserted against the Executive Defendants (collectively,  
18 the "Control Person Defendants") under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, 15  
19 U.S.C. §78t(a).

20 474. The Control Person Defendants, by virtue of their offices, ownership,  
21 agency, agreements or understandings, and specific acts were, at the time of the  
22 wrongs alleged herein, and as set forth herein, controlling persons within the  
23 meaning of Section 15 of the Securities Act. The Control Person Defendants, and  
24 each of them, had the power and influence and exercised the same to cause the  
25 unlawful scheme to artificially increase the price of SAFEMOON Tokens described  
26 above.

27 475. The Control Person Defendants, separately or together, possess,  
28 directly or indirectly, the power to direct or cause the direction of the management



1 and policies of SafeMoon, through ownership of voting securities, by contract,  
2 subscription agreement, or otherwise.

3 476. The Control Person Defendants also have the power to direct or cause  
4 the direction of the management and policies of SafeMoon.

5 477. The Control Person Defendants, separately or together, have sufficient  
6 influence to have caused SAFEMOON Tokens and/or the Company to engage in the  
7 fraudulent conduct described above.

8 478. The Control Person Defendants, separately or together, jointly  
9 participated in the Company's fraudulent conduct described above.

10 479. By virtue of the conduct alleged herein, the Control Person Defendants  
11 are liable for the wrongful conduct complained of herein and are liable to Plaintiff  
12 and the Class for rescission and/or damages suffered.

13 **SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

14 **Aiding and Abetting**  
15 **California Common Law**  
**(Against Promoter Defendants)**

16 480. Plaintiff restates and realleges all preceding allegations above as if fully  
17 set forth herein.

18 481. Plaintiff Vlad Iacob is a resident and citizen of the State of California.

19 482. Under California law, aiding and abetting requires not agreement, but  
20 simply assistance. The elements of aiding and abetting liability have cited the  
21 elements of the tort, as they are set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS  
22 §876, and have omitted any reference to an independent duty on the part of the aider  
23 and abettor.

24 483. Under California law, "[l]iability may . . . be imposed on one who aids  
25 and abets the commission of an intentional tort if the person: (a) knows the other's  
26 conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or  
27 encouragement to the other to so act; or (b) gives substantial assistance to the other  
28 in accomplishing a tortious result and the person's own conduct, separately

1 considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.” *Neilson v. Union Bank*  
2 *of Cal., N.A.*, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1118 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (citations omitted).

3 484. “Unlike a conspirator, an aider and abettor does not ‘adopt as his or her  
4 own’ the tort of the primary violator. Rather, the act of aiding and abetting is distinct  
5 from the primary violation; liability attaches because the aider and abettor behaves  
6 in a manner that enables the primary violator to commit the underlying tort.” *Id.*

7 485. The Promoter Defendants have previous knowledge and experience  
8 with making misleading promotional statements (with Defendant Mayweather  
9 having nearly an identical experience with a previous fraudulent cryptocurrency  
10 promotion), and, as such, knew or should have known that the marketing strategy  
11 employed by the Executive Defendants for the SAFEMOON Tokens was unlawful,  
12 deceitful, fraudulent, and/or violated the terms of the California, Florida, and New  
13 York state statutes described in this Complaint.

14 486. By promoting the SAFEMOON Tokens on their social media platforms  
15 and through their reported conduct, the Promoter Defendants provided assistance  
16 that was a substantial factor causing the SAFEMOON Token price to both surge and  
17 do so long enough to allow all Defendants to sell their SAFEMOON Tokens for  
18 huge profits at the expense of their followers and investors. Without the help of the  
19 Promoter Defendants’ activities, the Executive Defendants would have been unable  
20 to use the misleading marketing strategy devised by Haines-Davies, Arriaga, and  
21 Witriol, and Defendants would not have been able to commit the violations of  
22 California state consumer protection statutes alleged herein.

23 487. As a direct and proximate result of Promoter Defendants’ unlawful,  
24 unfair, and deceptive practices, Plaintiff and Class members suffered damages. The  
25 Executive Defendants’ activities with the Promoter Defendants caused Plaintiff and  
26 the Class members to purchase and/or hold the SAFEMOON Tokens when they  
27 otherwise would not have done so.

28

1 488. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin further unlawful, unfair, and/or fraudulent acts  
2 or practices by SafeMoon, to obtain monetary damages, restitution and disgorgement  
3 of all monies generated as a result of such practices, and for all other relief allowed  
4 under California law.

5 **SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

6 **Conversion**  
7 **(California Common Law)**  
8 **(Against the Company and Individual Defendant Karony)**

8 489. Plaintiff restates and realleges all preceding allegations above as if fully  
9 set forth herein.

10 490. Plaintiff Vlad Iacob is a resident and citizen of the State of California.

11 491. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the class maintained a possessory  
12 interest in the V1 SAFEMOON Tokens in their respective wallets at the time of the  
13 V1 to V2 migration in December 2021.

14 492. Through creating and implementing the 100% tax on V1 SAFEMOON  
15 Tokens being migrated to V2 SAFEMOON Tokens, the Company, under Karony's  
16 leadership, targeted and restricted Plaintiff and the class from accessing all the  
17 SAFE/MOON Tokens in their respective personal wallets. In doing so, the Company  
18 and Karony assumed control over Plaintiff's property, without authorization.

19 493. Plaintiff asked the Company to return and/or reimburse the V1  
20 Safemoon Tokens that were improperly seized as a part of the compulsory migration  
21 from V1 to V2.

22 494. To date, neither the Company nor Individual Defendant Karony has  
23 returned the confiscated V1 SAFEMOON Tokens (or the equivalent value in V2  
24 SAFEMOON Tokens or other currencies) to Plaintiff or the class.

25 495. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and punitive  
26 damages.

**EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

**Violation of the Racketeer Influenced  
and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”)  
18 U.S.C. §1961, *et seq.*  
(Against Executive Defendants and Promoter Defendants  
Paul, Phillips, and Keem)**

496. Plaintiff restates and reallege all preceding allegations above as if fully set forth herein.

497. This claim is brought on behalf of the class against Defendants for actual damages, treble damages, and equitable relief under 18 U.S.C. §1964 for violations of 18 U.S.C. §1962, *et seq.* Defendants are “person[s]” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §1961(3) who conducted the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1962(c).

498. Plaintiff and the members of the class are each “persons,” as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. §1961(3) who were injured in their business or property as a result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct.

**The SAFEMOON Token Enterprise**

499. Under 18 U.S.C. §1961(4), a RICO “enterprise” may be an association-in-fact that, although it has no formal legal structure, has: (i) a common purpose; (ii) relationships among those associated with the enterprise; and (iii) longevity sufficient to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.

500. Defendants formed such an association-in-fact enterprise, namely, the SAFEMOON Token Enterprise that included the Executive Defendants, along with Promoter Defendants Paul, Phillips, and Keem. For the purpose of this claim, these Defendants are collectively referred to as the “RICO Defendants.”

501. The SAFEMOON Token Enterprise are ongoing and continuing business organizations consisting of “persons” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §1961(3) that created and maintained systematic links for a common purpose: to ensure that the RICO Defendants could sell off their SAFEMOON Token holdings to retail investors at artificially inflated prices without their fraud being detected.

1 502. To accomplish this purpose, the SAFEMOON Token Enterprise  
2 periodically and systematically promoted the SAFEMOON Tokens – either  
3 affirmatively or through half-truths and omissions – to retail investors, including  
4 Plaintiff and the class, that the SAFEMOON Tokens had real utility (as opposed to  
5 pure speculation). The SAFEMOON Token Enterprise concealed from investors,  
6 like Plaintiff and the Class members, that the SAFEMOON Tokens were not the  
7 sound investment that the RICO Defendants claimed. This scheme of the  
8 SAFEMOON Token Enterprise translated into increased volume and more  
9 SAFEMOON Token investors buying at artificially inflated prices (and therefore,  
10 more profits) for the RICO Defendants.

11 503. The persons engaged in the SAFEMOON Token Enterprise are  
12 systematically linked through contractual relationships, financial ties, and  
13 continuing coordination of activities, as spearheaded by the Executive Defendants  
14 and Promoter Defendant Phillips. There is regular communication between the  
15 RICO Defendants, in which information is shared. Typically, this communication  
16 occurred, and continues to occur, through the use of the wires and the mail in which  
17 RICO Defendants share information regarding various timing and content of  
18 promotional activities for the SAFEMOON Tokens. The RICO Defendants through  
19 their administration, funding, and execution of the scheme to misleadingly market  
20 the SAFEMOON Tokens each functioned as a continuing unit for the purposes of  
21 implementing, respectively, the SAFEMOON Token pump and dump scheme and,  
22 as set forth above, when issues arise during the scheme, the scheme’s participants  
23 agreed to take actions to hide the scheme and continue its existence.

24 504. At all relevant times, Executive Defendants were aware of the Promoter  
25 Defendants’ conduct, were knowing and willing participants in that conduct, and  
26 reaped profits from that conduct. Executive Defendants concealed the members of  
27 the Safemoon leadership and founding team, which allowed the unidentified co-  
28 conspirators to sell their portion of the Float without any scrutiny or complaint.

Executive Defendants represented to investors that Safemoon had staying power, long-term value, and tremendous growth potential. But they knew that the conduct of the Promotor Defendants was artificially inflating the price of the SAFEMOON Tokens. Executive Defendants also knew, but did not disclose, that both the trading volume and price action for the SAFEMOON Tokens would plummet if the promotional activities ceased. Promotor Defendants Phillips, Paul, and Keem also knew that their promotional activities artificially caused spikes in the SAFEMOON Token price and trading volume, but likewise would not disclose the fraud. By failing to disclose this information, the RICO Defendants perpetuated the SAFEMOON Token Enterprise's scheme, and reaped substantial profits.

505. During the time that the SAFEMOON Tokens were being launched and were first publicly marketed to retail investors, the Executive Defendants were aware of the promotional activities of Phillips, Paul, and Keem, were knowing and willing participants in that conduct, and reaped profits from that conduct. The Executive Defendants knew that using misleading marketing would result in lawsuits and even criminal charges. Accordingly, the Executive Defendants concealed the identities of the Safemoon founders and insiders in order to escape detection and punishment for their participation in the SAFEMOON Token Enterprise. The RICO Defendants knew, but did not disclose, that they were promoting the SAFEMOON Tokens, then turning around and selling off their holdings as retail investors, like Plaintiff and the Class members, were buying in. The Executive Defendants knew, but did not disclose, that they were allowing the Promoter Defendants to engage in this fraud to the detriment of retail investors.

506. The RICO Defendants participated in the conduct of the SAFEMOON Token Enterprise, sharing the common purpose of inflating the price and trading volume of SAFEMOON Tokens in order to sell their respective portion of the Float for substantial profit, through a pattern of racketeering activity within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§1961(1) and (5), which includes multiple instances of mail fraud in



1 violation of 18 U.S.C. §1341, and multiple instances of wire fraud in violation of 18  
2 U.S.C. §1343. In the SAFEMOON Token Enterprise, the RICO Defendants  
3 knowingly made material misstatements to retail investors in furtherance of the  
4 fraudulent scheme regarding:

- 5 a. the ownership interests and identities of the Safemoon founders;
- 6 b. the timing and amount of SAFEMOON Token sales made by the  
7 RICO Defendants; and
- 8 c. the RICO Defendants' intent to sell their SAFEMOON Tokens  
9 after artificially inflating the price.

10 507. The Executive Defendants alone could not have accomplished the  
11 purpose of the SAFEMOON Token Enterprise without the assistance of the  
12 Promoter Defendants. For the Executive Defendants to profit from the scheme, the  
13 Promoter Defendants needed to use their influence to mislead investors into buying  
14 the SAFEMOON Tokens. And the Promoter Defendants did so. They then, through  
15 misrepresentations and failures to disclose material information, failed to disclose to  
16 investors that the Promoter Defendants were simultaneously selling their  
17 SAFEMOON Tokens at inflated prices. Without these misrepresentations, the  
18 SAFEMOON Token Enterprise could not have achieved its common purpose.

19 508. The SAFEMOON Token Enterprise engaged in and affected interstate  
20 commerce because, *inter alia*, it created the SAFEMOON Tokens that were paid for  
21 by thousands of Class members throughout the United States.

22 509. The foregoing evidence that the RICO Defendants were each willing  
23 participants in the SAFEMOON Token Enterprise, that the SAFEMOON Token  
24 Enterprise had a common purpose and interest in the objective of the scheme, and  
25 functioned within a structure designed to effectuate the Enterprise's purpose, *i.e.*,  
26 through the Executives' creation of the SAFEMOON Tokens, coupled with the  
27 Promoter Defendants' misleading promotion of the SAFEMOON Tokens.  
28

1 510. During the Relevant Period, the RICO Defendants exerted control over  
2 the SAFEMOON Token Enterprise and participated in the operation or management  
3 of the affairs of the SAFEMOON Token Enterprise, directly or indirectly, in the  
4 following ways:

5 a. The RICO Defendants concealed the identities of the leadership  
6 team behind Safemoon and the individuals that own/controlled key SAFEMOON  
7 Token wallet addresses in order to get away with improperly promoting the  
8 SAFEMOON Tokens to investors;

9 b. The RICO Defendants concealed that they were causing the  
10 SAFEMOON Token price to artificially inflate in order to allow themselves to sell  
11 off their respective SAFEMOON Token holdings at that inflated price; and

12 c. The Executive Defendants expected and intended that the  
13 Promoter Defendants Paul, Phillips, and Keem would (and did) distribute through  
14 the U.S. Mail and interstate wire facilities, communications that failed to disclose  
15 that the RICO Defendants were pumping up price and trading volume of  
16 SAFEMOON Tokens artificially.

17 511. The scheme had a hierarchical decision-making structure that was  
18 headed by the Executive Defendants. They controlled the minting of the  
19 SAFEMOON Tokens and directed Promotor Defendants Paul, Phillips, and Keem  
20 to misleadingly promote the SAFEMOON Tokens to their social media audiences.

21 512. The scheme devised and implemented by the RICO Defendants, as well  
22 as other members of the SAFEMOON Token Enterprise, amounted to a common  
23 course of conduct intended to (a) allow the RICO Defendants to artificially inflate  
24 the price of and trading volume for the SAFEMOON Tokens; and (b) sell their  
25 respective portion of the Float for a profit at the expense of Plaintiff and the Class  
26 members.

**RICO Defendants' Pattern of Racketeering Activity**

513. The RICO Defendants conducted and participated in the conduct of the affairs of the SAFEMOON Token Enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, including acts that are indictable under 18 U.S.C. §1341, relating to mail fraud, and 18 U.S.C. §1343, relating to wire fraud. The pattern of racketeering activity by the SAFEMOON Token Enterprise likely involved thousands of separate instances of use of the U.S. Mail or interstate wire facilities in furtherance of the unlawful HSP pricing scheme. Each of these fraudulent mailings and interstate wire transmissions constitutes “racketeering activity” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §1961(1)(B). Collectively, these violations constitute a “pattern of racketeering activity,” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §1961(5), through which the RICO Defendants intended to defraud Plaintiff, members of the class, and other intended victims.

514. Each instance of racketeering activity alleged herein was related, had similar purposes, involved the same or similar participants and methods of commission, and had similar results affecting similar victims, including Plaintiff and members of the class. The RICO Defendants calculated and intentionally crafted the SAFEMOON Token Enterprise to ensure their own profits remained high, without regard to the effect such behavior had on Plaintiff and members of the class who would be buying the SAFEMOON Tokens at artificially inflated prices.

515. By intentionally and artificially inflating the SAFEMOON Token prices, and then subsequently failing to disclose such practices to the investors, the RICO Defendants engaged in a fraudulent and unlawful course of conduct constituting a pattern of racketeering activity.

516. The pattern of racketeering activity alleged herein was continuing until June 27, 2021.

**The RICO Defendants' Use of the U.S. Mail and Interstate Wire Facilities**

517. The SAFEMOON Token Enterprise engaged in and affected interstate commerce because it transmitted and published false and misleading information concerning the growth potential for Safemoon across state lines.

518. During the Class Period, the SAFEMOON Token Enterprise's unlawful conduct and wrongful practices were carried out by an array of employees, working across state boundaries, who necessarily relied upon frequent transfers of documents, communications, information, products, and funds by the U.S. Mail and interstate wire facilities.

519. The nature and pervasiveness of the fraudulent token promotion scheme, which was orchestrated by Executive Defendants, necessarily required those headquarters to communicate directly and frequently by U.S. Mail and interstate wire facilities.

520. Many of the precise dates of the SAFEMOON Token Enterprise's uses of the U.S. Mail and interstate wire facilities (and corresponding RICO predicate acts of mail and wire fraud) have been hidden and cannot be alleged without access to the Executive Defendants' or Promoter Defendants Paul, Phillips, and Keem. Indeed, an essential part of the successful operation of the Enterprise alleged herein depended upon secrecy. However, Plaintiff can generally describe the occasions on which the RICO predicate acts of mail fraud and wire fraud occurred, and how those acts were in furtherance of the scheme; Plaintiff describes this below.

521. The RICO Defendants' use of the U.S. Mail and interstate wire facilities to perpetrate the fraudulent promotion scheme involved thousands of communications throughout the class period including, *inter alia*:

a. Communications on official Safemoon accounts on various social media platforms, including, but not limited to: Twitter, Reddit, Telegram, and

Discord to investors, which occurred on a regular basis as investors like Plaintiff and Class members purchased SAFEMOON Tokens;

b. Written representations and telephone calls between the Executive Defendants and Promotor Defendants Paul, Phillips, and Keem regarding the promotion of SAFEMOON Tokens and the financial benefits to the RICO Defendants for doing so;

c. Written representations and telephone calls between any of the RICO Defendants and Promoter Defendants Portnoy, Way, and McCollum regarding the promotion of SAFEMOON Tokens and the financial benefits to the RICO Defendants for doing so;

d. Written representations and telephone calls between the RICO Defendants and the moderators of the Safemoon social media accounts regarding the promotion of SAFEMOON Tokens and the financial benefits to the RICO Defendants for doing so;

e. Emails between the Executive Defendants and Promotor Defendants Paul, Phillips, and Keem agreeing to or effectuating the implementation of the SAFEMOON Token fraud scheme;

f. Written and oral communications directed to retail investors that fraudulently misrepresented the growth potential for the SAFEMOON Tokens that were designed to conceal the scheme and deter investigations into the SAFEMOON Token Enterprise; and

g. Receipts of increased profits sent through the U.S. Mail and interstate wire facilities – the wrongful proceeds of the scheme.

522. In addition to the above-referenced RICO predicate acts, it was foreseeable to the Executive Defendants that Promoter Defendants Paul, Phillips, and Keem would distribute publications through the U.S. Mail and by interstate wire facilities, and in those publications, conceal that the SAFEMOON Token price was fraudulently inflated.

**Motive and Common Purpose**

523. The RICO Defendants' motive and purpose in creating and conducting the scheme and the Enterprise(s) was to increase the price and trading volume for the SAFEMOON Tokens so that they could sell off their portion of the Float for grossly inflated prices. Each person joined in that common purpose because each person made more money the higher the SAFEMOON Token price rose and, as trading volume increased, the RICO Defendants would be able to sell off in the increased liquidity.

**Damages Caused by the RICO Defendants Marketing Fraud**

524. The RICO Defendants violations of federal law and its pattern of racketeering activity have directly and proximately caused Plaintiff and Class members to be financially injured as a result of purchasing the SAFEMOON Tokens.

525. As described above, when the RICO Defendants executed the SAFEMOON Token promotional scheme, the result was an artificial increase in both price and trading volume. When the SAFEMOON Token price and trading volume is artificially inflated, investors like Plaintiff and the class overpay due to a fraudulent price.

526. Plaintiff's injuries, and those of the Class members, were proximately caused by the RICO Defendants' racketeering activity. But for the misleading statements and omissions made by the RICO Defendants, Plaintiff and others similarly situated would have paid less for the SAFEMOON Tokens.

527. Plaintiff's injuries were directly caused by the RICO Defendants' racketeering activity. The RICO Defendants' racketeering activity inflated the SAFEMOON Token price, which was ultimately paid for by Plaintiff and the other class members.

528. Plaintiff and those similarly situated were most directly harmed by the fraud, and there is no other Plaintiff or class of plaintiffs better situated to seek a



1 remedy for the economic harms to consumers from the RICO Defendants' fraudulent  
2 scheme.

3 529. By virtue of these violations of 18 U.S.C. §1962(c), the RICO  
4 Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for three times the damages they have sustained,  
5 plus the cost of this suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees.

6 **NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

7 **Common Law Conspiracy**  
8 **(Against All Defendants)**

9 530. Plaintiff restates and realleges all preceding allegations above as if fully  
10 set forth herein.

11 531. Beginning in March 2021, and continuously thereafter up to and  
12 including the date of the filing of the Complaint, the Executive Defendants did  
13 engage in the formation and operation of a conspiracy with the Promotor Defendants  
14 to misleadingly promote the SAFEMOON Tokens to retail investors in order to  
15 artificially inflate the price and trading volume so that Defendants could sell their  
16 respective SAFEMOON Tokens for substantial profits.

17 532. As alleged above, each Defendant acted in furtherance of the  
18 conspiracy by, among other things, concealing the identity and ownership interests  
19 of, and association with, the Safemoon leadership team; falsely promoting the  
20 SAFEMOON Tokens as sound investments with significant growth potential; and  
21 making misleading statements about the Defendants holding their SAFEMOON  
22 Tokens along with the retail investors who bought, while, in truth, the Defendants  
23 were selling their SAFEMOON Tokens for substantial profits.

24 533. As a proximate result of said conspiracy, as described in the foregoing  
25 paragraphs, Plaintiff suffered, continues to suffer, and will suffer in the future, the  
26 damages alleged herein.

27 534. For Defendants' conduct in the alleged conspiracy, Plaintiff seeks  
28 compensatory damages against all Defendants, and each of them, jointly and

1 severely, in an as-yet undetermined amount; punitive damages, injunctive relief  
2 enjoining Defendants from continuing to falsely and misleadingly promote the  
3 SAFEMOON Tokens; and divestiture of all money wrongfully obtained, whether  
4 directly or indirectly, as part of the alleged conspiracy

5 **TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

6 **Violation of Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA")**  
7 **Ch. 501, §211(1), Fla. Stat. Ann.**  
8 **(Against All Defendants)**

9 535. Plaintiff restates and realleges all preceding allegations above as if fully  
10 set forth herein.

11 536. Plaintiff Combs is a resident of the State of Florida.

12 537. Chapter 501, Fla. Stat., FDUTPA is to be liberally construed to protect  
13 the consuming public, such as Plaintiff in this case, from those who engage in unfair  
14 methods of competition, or unconscionable, deceptive, or unfair acts or practices in  
15 the conduct of any trade or commerce.

16 538. Plaintiff is a "consumer" within the meaning of Fla. Stat. §501.203(7).

17 539. By soliciting investor funds in the manner in which they did,  
18 Defendants engaged in "trade and commerce" within the meaning of Fla. Stat.  
19 §501.203(8).

20 540. While FDUTPA does not define "deceptive" and "unfair," it  
21 incorporates by reference the Federal Trade Commission's interpretations of these  
22 terms. The FTC has found that a "deceptive act or practice" encompasses "a  
23 representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting  
24 reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer's detriment."

25 541. The federal courts have defined a "deceptive trade practice" as any act  
26 or practice that has the tendency or capacity to deceive consumers and have defined  
27 an "unfair trade practice" as any act or practice that offends public policy and is  
28 immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to  
consumers.

1 542. Defendants engaged in business acts and practices deemed “deceptive”  
2 because of the conduct, statements, and omissions described above, including, but  
3 not limited to, the following:

4 (a) knowingly and intentionally concealing the Executive  
5 Defendants’ specific roles and ownership interests in Safemoon; and

6 (b) knowingly and intentionally using and/or failing to disclose the  
7 use of the Promotor Defendants to “instill trust” in uninformed investors to promote  
8 the financial benefits of a highly speculative and risky investment in SAFEMOON  
9 Tokens, in an effort to manipulate and artificially inflate the price and trading  
10 volume of the SAFEMOON Tokens and allow Defendants to sell their SAFEMOON  
11 Tokens at those inflated prices.

12 (c) knowingly and intentionally using and/or failing to disclose that  
13 the V1 to V2 Migration would likely result in the total loss of the investors’  
14 SAFEMOON Tokens via the V1 to V2 migration scheme.

15 (d) knowingly and intentionally using and/or failing to disclose that  
16 the Company was not using a mechanism to lock funds in the liquidity pools as  
17 promised but instead created a backdoor by which the Company or the Executive  
18 Defendants could access those funds.

19 543. These acts and omissions constitute both deceptive and unfair trade  
20 practices because the false representations and omissions made by Defendants have  
21 a tendency or capacity to deceive consumers, such as Plaintiff, into investing in the  
22 SAFEMOON Tokens to their collective financial detriment. Such conduct is  
23 immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to  
24 consumers.

25 544. As a result of Defendants’ deceptive trade practices, Plaintiff was  
26 deceived into retaining functionally worthless cryptocurrencies and/or investing  
27 their cryptocurrency and/or fiat currency with a company that functioned solely as  
28 an engine of fraud – thus causing significant economic damage to Plaintiff.

1 545. The materially false statements and omissions as described above, and  
2 the fact that this was a misleading investment, were unfair, unconscionable, and  
3 deceptive practices perpetrated on Plaintiff which would have likely deceived a  
4 reasonable person under the circumstances.

5 546. Defendants were on notice at all relevant times that the false  
6 representations of material facts described above were being communicated to  
7 prospective investors (such as Plaintiff) by their authorized agents.

8 547. As a result of the false representations and violations of the laws  
9 described above, Plaintiff has been damaged by, among other things losing the true  
10 value of their invested cryptocurrency.

11 548. Plaintiff has also been damaged in other and further ways subject to  
12 proof at trial.

13 549. Therefore, Defendants engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices  
14 in violation of Florida Statute Section 501.201, *et seq.*

15 550. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin further unlawful, unfair, and/or fraudulent acts  
16 or practices by Defendants, to obtain restitution and disgorgement of all monies  
17 generated as a result of such practices, and for all other relief allowed under Florida  
18 law.

19 551. Pursuant to Florida Statute Sections 501.211(1) and 501.2105, Plaintiff  
20 is entitled to recover from Defendants the reasonable amount of attorneys' fees  
21 Plaintiff has had to incur in representing their interests in this matter.

22  
23 **ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

24 **Unjust Enrichment/Restitution**  
25 **(California Common Law, in the Alternative)**  
26 **(Against All Defendants)**

27 552. Plaintiff restates and realleges all preceding allegations above as if fully  
28 set forth herein.

553. Plaintiff Vlad Iacob is a resident and citizen of the State of California.

1 554. Plaintiff and members of the Class conferred a monetary benefit on  
2 Defendants by raising the price and trading volume of the SAFEMOON Tokens,  
3 which allowed Defendants to sell their SAFEMOON Tokens to Plaintiff and Class  
4 members at inappropriately and artificially inflated prices.

5 555. Defendants received a financial benefit from the sale of their  
6 SAFEMOON Tokens at inflated prices and are in possession of this monetary value  
7 that was intended to be used for the benefit of, and rightfully belongs to, Plaintiff  
8 and members of the Class.

9 556. Plaintiff seeks restitution in the form of the monetary value of the  
10 difference between the purchase price of the SAFEMOON Tokens and the price  
11 those SAFEMOON Tokens sold for.

12 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

13 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly  
14 situated, respectfully requests that this Court:

15 A. Determine that the claims alleged herein may be maintained as a class  
16 action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and issue an order  
17 certifying one or more of the Classes defined above;

18 B. Appoint Plaintiff as a representative of the Class and Lead Counsel as  
19 Class counsel;

20 C. Declare that the Company and Executive Defendants offered and sold  
21 unregistered securities in violation of Sections 5(a), 12(a), and 15 of the Securities  
22 Act;

23 D. Declare that Defendants made fraudulent misstatements and omission  
24 with scienter in violation of Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act;

25 E. Award all actual, general, special, incidental, statutory, rescission,  
26 punitive, and consequential damages and restitution to which Plaintiff and the Class  
27 members are entitled;

28 F. Award post-judgment interest on such monetary relief;

- 1 G. Grant appropriate injunctive and/or declaratory relief;  
2 H. Award reasonable attorneys' fees and costs; and  
3 I. Grant such further relief that this Court deems appropriate.

4 **JURY DEMAND**

5 Plaintiff, individually, and on behalf of the putative Class, demands a trial by  
6 jury on all issues so triable.

7 DATED: June 28, 2022

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28 *Additional Counsel for Plaintiffs*



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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on June 28, 2022, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk using CM / ECF, which will send notification via electronic means to all counsel of record.

DATED: June 28, 2022

**SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT  
LAW LLP**

s/ John T. Jasnoch  
John T. Jasnoch